The interpretative principle proposed by Bub in 1211.3062v1 [quant-ph] is justified only for all practical purposes (Bell's "FAPP trap"). An alternative interpretative principle is proposed. It brings to light those features of the quantum world because of which the fundamental theoretical framework of physics is a "mere" probability calculus, and it amply justifies Bohr's insistence that quantum-mechanical observables cannot be defined without reference to the experimental conditions in which they are measured. It implies that the spatial distinctions we make cannot be intrinsic to space, that regions "of space" must be realized by macroscopic objects, that the spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete, that the positions of macroscopic objects (suitably defined) are definite in a nonclassical sense, and that unconditional factuality can be consistently attributed to them.
The interpretative principle proposed by Bub in 1211.3062v1 [quant-ph] is justified only for all practical purposes (Bell's "FAPP trap"). An alternative interpretative principle is proposed. It brings to light those features of the quantum world because of which the fundamental theoretical framework of physics is a "mere" probability calculus, and it amply justifies Bohr's insistence that quantum-mechanical observables cannot be defined without reference to the experimental conditions in which they are measured. It implies that the spatial distinctions we make cannot be intrinsic to space, that regions "of space" must be realized by macroscopic objects, that the spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete, that the positions of macroscopic objects (suitably defined) are definite in a nonclassical sense, and that unconditional factuality can be consistently attributed to them.
This is intended to be a serious paper, in spite of the title. The idea is that quantum mechanics is about probabilistic correlations, i.e., about the structure of information, since a theory of information is essentially a theory of probabilistic correlations. To make this clear, it suffices to consider measurements of two binary-valued observables, x with outcomes a = 0 or 1, performed by Alice in a region A, and y with outcomes b = 0 or 1 performed by Bob in a separated region B --or, to emphasize the banality of the phenomena, two ways of peeling a banana, resulting in one of two tastes. The imagined bananas of Bananaworld are non-standard, with operational or phenomenal probabilistic correlations for peelings and tastes that lie outside the polytope of local correlations. The 'no go' theorems tell us that we can't shoe-horn these correlations into a classical correlation polytope, which has the structure of a simplex, by supposing that something has been left out of the story, without giving up fundamental principles that define what we mean by a physical system. The nonclassical features of quantum mechanics, including the irreducible information loss on measurement, are shown to be generic features of correlations that lie outside the local correlation polytope. As far as the conceptual problems are concerned, we might as well talk about bananas.
In a recent preprint [1] Jeffrey Bub presents a discussion of neo-Bohrian interpretations of quantum mechanics, and also of von Neumann's work on infinite tensor products [2]. He rightfully writes that this work provides a theoretical framework that deflates the measurement problem and justifies Bohr's insistence on the primacy of classical concepts. But then he rejects these ideas, on the basis that the infinity limit is "never reached for any real system composed of a finite number of elementary systems". In this note we present opposite views on two major points: first, admitting mathematical infinities in a physical theory is not a problem, if properly done; second, the critics of [3,4,5] comes with a major misunderstanding of these papers: they don't ask about "the significance of the transition from classical to quantum mechanics", but they start from a physical ontology where classical and quantum physics need each other from the beginning. This is because they postulate that a microscopic physical object (or degree of freedom) always appears as a quantum system, within a classical context. Here we argue why this (neo-Bohrian) position makes sense.
In his recent book Bananaworld. Quantum mechanics for primates, Jeff Bub revives and provides a mature version of his influential information theoretic interpretation of Quantum Theory (QT). In this paper, I test Bub s conjecture that QT should be interpreted as a theory about information, by examining whether his information theoretic interpretation has the resources to explain (or explain away) quantum conundrums. The discussion of Bub s theses will also serve to investigate, more in general, whether other approaches succeed in defending the claim that QT is about quantum information. First of all, I argue that Bub s interpretation of QT as a principle theory fails to fully explain quantum nonlocality. Secondly, I argue that a constructive interpretation, where the quantum state is interpreted ontically as information, also fails at providing a full explanation of quantum correlations. Finally, while epistemic interpretations might succeed in this respect, I argue that such a success comes at the price of rejecting some in between the most basic scientific standards of physical theories.
How can quantum mechanics be (i) the fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary physics and (ii) a probability calculus that presupposes the events to which, and on the basis of which, it assigns probabilities? The question is answered without invoking knowledge or observers, by interpreting the necessary distinction between two kinds of physical quantities - unconditionally definite quantities and quantities that have values only if they are measured - as a distinction between the manifested world and its manifestation.
Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. These compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications — the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world — which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified objective existence. Contrary to a widespread misconception, viewing the quantum formalism as being fundamentally a probability algorithm does not imply that quantum mechanics is concerned with states of knowledge rather than states of Nature. On the contrary, it makes possible a complete and strongly objective description of the physical world that requires no reference to observers. What objectively exists, in a sense that requires no qualification, is (i) the trajectories of macroscopic objects, whose fuzziness is empirically irrelevant, (ii) the properties and values of whose possession these trajectories provide indelible records, and (iii) the fuzzy and temporally undifferentiated states of affairs that obtain between measurements and are described by counterfactual probability assignments.
This note presents a concise and non-polemical comparison of several major interpretations of quantum mechanics, with a particular emphasis on the distinction between FAPP-solutions ("For All Practical Purposes'') versus ontological solutions to the measurement problem. Building on this distinction, we argue that the Contexts-Systems-Modalities (CSM) framework, supplemented by the operator-algebraic description of macroscopic contexts, provides a conceptually complete, non-FAPP ontology that naturally incorporates irreversibility and the physical structure of measurement devices. This approach differs significantly from other ontological interpretations such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse, or many-worlds, and highlights the major role of contextual quantization in shaping quantum theory.