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arXiv:1509.04144 · IOP SciNotes

CV-MDI-QKD with coherent state: beyond one-mode Gaussian attacks

Carlo Ottaviani, Gaetana Spedalieri, Samuel L. Braunstein, Stefano Pirandola

Published Jul 21, 2020• 3 citations
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Abstract

Abstract A general security proof of continuous variable (CV) measurement device independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD) should not be automatically reduced to the analysis of one-mode Gaussian attacks (in particular, independent entangling-cloner attacks). To stress this point, the present work provides a very simple (almost trivial) argument, showing that there are an infinite number of two-mode Gaussian attacks that cannot be reduced to or simulated by one-mode Gaussian attacks. This result further confirms that the security analysis of CV-MDI-QKD must generally involve a careful minimization over two-mode attacks as originally performed in (Pirandola et al, 2015 Nature Photon. 9, 397–402; arXiv: 1312.4104 (2013)).

DOI
10.1088/2633-1357/ab92f6

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Abstract A general security proof of continuous variable (CV) measurement device independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD) should not be automatically reduced to the analysis of one-mode Gaussian attacks (in particular, independent entangling-cloner attacks). To stress this point, the present work provides a very simple (almost trivial) argument, showing that there are an infinite number of two-mode Gaussian attacks that cannot be reduced to or simulated by one-mode Gaussian attacks. This result further confirms that the security analysis of CV-MDI-QKD must generally involve a careful minimization over two-mode attacks as originally performed in (Pirandola et al, 2015 Nature Photon. 9, 397–402; arXiv: 1312.4104 (2013)).
We present a rigorous security analysis of continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV MDI QKD) in a finite-size scenario. The security proof is obtained in two steps: by first assessing the security against collective Gaussian attacks, and then extending to the most general class of coherent attacks via the Gaussian de Finetti reduction. Our result combines recent state-of-the-art security proofs for CV QKD with findings about min-entropy calculus and parameter estimation. In doing so, we improve the finite-size estimate of the secret key rate. Our conclusions confirm that CV MDI protocols allow for high rates on the metropolitan scale, and may achieve a nonzero secret key rate against the most general class of coherent attacks after 107{10}^{7}107--109{10}^{9}109 quantum signal transmissions, depending on loss and noise, and on the required level of security.
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We study the impact of finite-size effects on the key rate of continuous-variable (CV) measurement-device-independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD), considering two-mode Gaussian attacks. Inspired by the parameter estimation technique developed in by Ruppert et al. [Phys. Rev. A 90, 062310 (2014)], we adapt it to study CV-MDI-QKD and, assuming realistic experimental conditions, we analyze the impact of finite-size effects on the key rate. We find that the performance of the protocol approaches the ideal one, increasing the block size, and, most importantly, that blocks between 106{10}^{6}106 and 109{10}^{9}109 data points may provide key rates $\ensuremath{\sim}{10}^{\ensuremath{-}2}$ bit/use over metropolitan distances.
Non-Gaussian operations in continuous variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD) have been limited to photon subtraction on squeezed vacuum states only. This is mainly due to the ease of calculating the covariance matrix representation of such states. In this paper we study the effects of general non-Gaussian operations corresponding to photon addition, catalysis, and subtraction on squeezed coherent states on CV measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD. We find that non-Gaussianity coupled with coherence can yield significantly longer transmission distances than without. Particularly we observe that zero photon catalysis on the two-mode squeezed coherent state (TMSC) is an optimal choice for CV MDI QKD, while single photon subtraction is also a good candidate; both of them offer nearly 70 km of transmission distances. We also derive a single generalized covariance matrix for the aforementioned states which will be useful in several other aspects of CV quantum information processing.
We propose a continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI QKD) protocol, in which detection is conducted by an untrusted third party. Our protocol can defend all detector side channels, which seriously threaten the security of a practical CV QKD system. Its security analysis against arbitrary collective attacks is derived based on the fact that the entanglement-based scheme of CV-MDI QKD is equivalent to the conventional CV QKD with coherent states and heterodyne detection. We find that the maximal total transmission distance is achieved by setting the untrusted third party close to one of the legitimate users. Furthermore, an alternate detection scheme, a special application of CV-MDI QKD, is proposed to enhance the security of the standard CV QKD system.
Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-QKD) allows remote parties to share information-theoretical secure keys while defending all the side-channel attacks on measurement devices. However, the secure transmission distance and the secret key rate are quite limited due to the high untrusted equivalent excess noise in the Gaussian modulation. More particularly, extremely high-efficiency homodyne detections are required for even non-zero secure transmission distances, which directly restrict its practical realization. Here, we propose a CV-MDI-QKD protocol by encoding the key information into matched discrete phases of two groups of coherent states, which decreases the required detection efficiency for ideally asymmetric cases, and makes it possible to practically achieve secure key distribution with current low-efficiency homodyne detections. Besides, a proof-of-principle experiment with a locally generated oscillator is implemented, which, for the first time, demonstrates the realizability of CV-MDI-QKD using all fiber-based devices. The discrete-modulated phase-matching method provides an alternative direction of an applicable quantum key distribution with practical security.