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Physical Review A

Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with source-intensity errors

Pu Wang, Xuyang Wang, Yongmin Li

Published Aug 10, 2020• 11 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-QKD) is immune to all detector side channel attacks, however its security requires trusted sources. We investigate the effects of source intensity errors, the most crucial source error, on the security of CV-MDI-QKD protocol with Gaussian-modulated coherent states. We establish a general source intensity errors model and derive the secret key rate based on different assumptions on the abilities of legal parties Alice and Bob. To avoid the adverse effects of the sources' intensity errors on CV-MDI-QKD, we present different data-processing schemes. We also assess the security of the protocol against collective Gaussian attacks in the finite-size scenario with composable security. Taking source intensity errors into consideration, we achieve improved security compared to previous demonstrations. Our results will provide a useful reference for practical implementations of CV-MDI-QKD.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.102.022609

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Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-QKD) is immune to all detector side channel attacks, however its security requires trusted sources. We investigate the effects of source intensity errors, the most crucial source error, on the security of CV-MDI-QKD protocol with Gaussian-modulated coherent states. We establish a general source intensity errors model and derive the secret key rate based on different assumptions on the abilities of legal parties Alice and Bob. To avoid the adverse effects of the sources' intensity errors on CV-MDI-QKD, we present different data-processing schemes. We also assess the security of the protocol against collective Gaussian attacks in the finite-size scenario with composable security. Taking source intensity errors into consideration, we achieve improved security compared to previous demonstrations. Our results will provide a useful reference for practical implementations of CV-MDI-QKD.
We present a rigorous security analysis of continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV MDI QKD) in a finite-size scenario. The security proof is obtained in two steps: by first assessing the security against collective Gaussian attacks, and then extending to the most general class of coherent attacks via the Gaussian de Finetti reduction. Our result combines recent state-of-the-art security proofs for CV QKD with findings about min-entropy calculus and parameter estimation. In doing so, we improve the finite-size estimate of the secret key rate. Our conclusions confirm that CV MDI protocols allow for high rates on the metropolitan scale, and may achieve a nonzero secret key rate against the most general class of coherent attacks after 107{10}^{7}107--109{10}^{9}109 quantum signal transmissions, depending on loss and noise, and on the required level of security.
The measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol is immune to imperfect measurement devices. However, its practicality and performance when implemented in continuous-variable (CV) mode are still not satisfactory. We propose a CV-MDI-QKD protocol based on modulated squeezed states, and analyze its security against two-mode Gaussian attack. The results show that the protocol can achieve a higher secret key rate and transmission distance than previous coherent-state and squeezed-state protocols. A method to compensate the imperfection of a practical homodyne detector using phase-sensitive optical amplifiers is also presented. By setting an appropriate optical amplification gain, realistic detectors with ordinary quantum efficiency can be employed. In addition, we discuss the impact of finite-size effects on the secret key rate of the protocol. The methods presented may aid in the practical application of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), leaving the detection procedure to the third partner and thus being immune to all detector side-channel attacks, is very promising for the construction of high-security quantum information networks. We propose a scheme to implement MDI-QKD, but with continuous variables instead of discrete ones, i.e., with the source of Gaussian-modulated coherent states, based on the principle of continuous-variable entanglement swapping. This protocol not only can be implemented with current telecom components but also has high key rates compared to its discrete counterpart; thus it will be highly compatible with quantum networks.
Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI QKD) can fundamentally defend all attacks on the measurement devices. Consequently, higher requirements are put forward for the source of a CV-MDI QKD system. However, the imperfections of the actual source brings practical security risks to the CV-MDI QKD system. Therefore, the characteristics of the realistic source must be controlled in real time to guarantee the practical security of the CV-MDI QKD system. Here we propose a countermeasure for negative impact introduced by the actual source in the CV-MDI QKD system based on the one-time-calibration method, not only eliminating the loophole induced from the relative intensity noise (RIN), which is part of the source noise, but also modeling the source noise thus improves the performance. In particular, three cases in terms of whether the preparation noise of the practical sources are defined or not, where only one of the users or both of the two users operate monitoring on their respective source outputs, are investigated. The simulation results show that the estimated secret key rate without our proposed scheme is about 10.7 times higher than the realistic rate at 18 km transmission distance when the variance of RIN is only 0.4. What is worse, the difference becomes greater and greater with the increase of the variance of RIN. Thus, our proposed scheme makes sense in further completing the practical security of the CV-MDI QKD system. In other words, our work enables the CV-MDI QKD system not only to resist all attacks against detectors, but also to close the vulnerability caused by the actual source, thus making the scheme closer to practical security.
Continuous variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-QKD) removes all known or unknown side-channel attacks on detectors. However, it is difficult to fully implement assumptions in the security demonstration model, which leads to potential security vulnerabilities inevitably existing in the practical system. In this paper, we explore the impact of imbalanced modulation at transmitters on the security of the CV-MDI-QKD system mainly using a coherent state and squeezed state under symmetric and asymmetric distances. Assuming two different modulation topologies of senders, we propose a generalized theoretical scheme and evaluate the key parameter achievable of the protocol with the mechanism of imbalanced modulation. The presented results show that imbalanced modulation can achieve a relatively nonlinearly higher secret key rate and transmission distances than the previous protocol which is the balanced modulation variance used by transmitters. The advantage of imbalanced modulation is demonstrated for the system key parameter estimation using numerical simulation under different situations. In addition, the consequences indicate the importance of imbalanced modulation on the performance of CV-MDI-QKD protocol and provide a theoretical framework for experimental implementation as well as the optimal modulated mode.
A continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI QKD) protocol using squeezed states is proposed where the two legitimate partners send Gaussian-modulated squeezed states to an untrusted third party to realize the measurement. Security analysis shows that the protocol can not only defend all detector side channels, but also attain higher secret key rates than the coherent-state-based protocol. We also present a method to improve the squeezed-state CV-MDI QKD protocol by adding proper Gaussian noise to the reconciliation side. It is found that there is an optimal added noise to optimize the performance of the protocol in terms of both key rates and maximal transmission distances. The resulting protocol shows the potential of long-distance secure communication using the CV-MDI QKD protocol.