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arXiv:1412.2409 · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences

Von Neumann was not a Quantum Bayesian

Blake C. Stacey

Published Apr 19, 2016• 35 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Wikipedia has claimed for over 3 years now that John von Neumann was the 'first quantum Bayesian'. In context, this reads as stating that von Neumann inaugurated QBism, the approach to quantum theory promoted by Fuchs, Mermin and Schack. This essay explores how such a claim is, historically speaking, unsupported.
DOI
10.1098/rsta.2015.0235

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Fast forward to the beginning of the current century, when a new version of the quantum-states-are-states-of-knowledge interpretation was launched by Carlton Caves, Chris Fuchs, and Ruediger Schack (2002). At first it was called Quantum Bayesianism, having been conceived as an extension of a personalist Bayesian theory of probability, but since then it has re-branded itself as QBism, the term preferred by Mermin (2017) because “QBism is as big a break with 20th century ways of thinking about science as Cubism was with 19th century ways of thinking about art.”
In this short essay we reject the interpretation of quantum theory called quantum Bayesianism (Qbism) which has been promoted recently by David Mermin in his essay published in Nature. According to Qbism quantum states are personal judgements of human agents. Physicists are not verifying their personal beliefs about their observations but search for the mathematical abstract description allowing to explain and to predict in a quantitative way the regularities observed (and those to be discovered) in physical phenomena which exist independently of the presence of any agent. We reject also the claim that Qbism explains properly the quantum nonlocality. The distant long range correlations can be correctly explained using a contextual statistical interpretation of quantum theory. We conclude that the Greeks were right to remove a perceiving subject out of Science.
Fuchs and Peres (2000) claimed that standard Quantum Mechanics needs no interpretation. In this essay, I show the flaws of the arguments presented in support to this thesis. Specifically, it will be claimed that the authors conflate QM with Quantum Bayesianism (QBism) - the most prominent subjective formulation of quantum theory; thus, they endorse a specific interpretation of the quantum formalism. Secondly, I will explain the main reasons for which QBism should not be considered a physical theory, being it concerned exclusively with agents' beliefs and silent about the physics of the quantum regime. Consequently, the solutions to the quantum puzzles provided by this approach cannot be satisfactory from a physical perspective. In the third place, I evaluate Fuchs and Peres arguments contra the non-standard interpretations of QM, showing again the fragility of their claims. Finally, it will be stressed the importance of the interpretational work in the context of quantum theory.
The purpose of this book is to explain Quantum Bayesianism ('QBism') to "people without easy access to mathematical formulas and equations" (4-5). Qbism is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that "doesn't meddle with the technical aspects of the theory [but instead] reinterprets the fundamental terms of the theory and gives them new meaning" (3). The most important motivation for QBism, enthusiastically stated on the book's cover, is that QBism provides "a way past quantum theory's paradoxes and puzzles" such that much of the weirdness associated with quantum theory "dissolves under the lens of QBism". Could a non-technical book that almost fits in your pocket really succeed in resolving the notorious paradoxes of quantum theory? I believe the answer is: not in this case. There are three primary reasons. Firstly, the argument that QBism solves quantum paradoxes is not convincing. Secondly, it proves difficult to pin down exactly what QBism says. Thirdly, as a scientific theory QBism seems explanatorily inert, which is maybe why the topic of scientific explanation is not broached. Sections 2-4 below discuss each of these problems in turn. However, there is still a wealth of insights that make this book a worthwhile read, and I shall begin with those.
Abstract The idea that the quantum probabilities are best construed as the personal/subjective degrees of belief of Bayesian agents is an old one. In recent years the idea has been vigorously pursued by a group of physicists who fly the banner of quantum Bayesianism (QBism). The present paper aims to identify the prospects and problems of implementing QBism, and it critically assesses the claim that QBism provides a resolution (or dissolution) of some of the long-standing foundations issues in quantum mechanics, including the measurement problem and puzzles of nonlocality.