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arXiv:1311.5253 · American Journal of Physics

An introduction to QBism with an application to the locality of quantum mechanics

Christopher A. Fuchs, N. David Mermin, Rüdiger Schack

Published Jul 23, 2014• 634 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We give an introduction to the QBist interpretation of quantum mechanics, which removes the paradoxes, conundra, and pseudo-problems that have plagued quantum foundations for the past nine decades. As an example, we show in detail how this interpretation eliminates “quantum nonlocality.”
DOI
10.1119/1.4874855

Related papers

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Recently Pienaar (2026), building on work of Cavalcanti (2021), has shown that QBism cannot always assume distinct observers' quantum-measurement outcomes---say, of Wigner and his friend---are embedded in a single spacetime. This follows from QBism's rejection of the `Absoluteness of Observed Events' assumption in the Bong et al. no-go theorem. Thus, QBism has no choice but to treat the notion of spacetime every bit as personalistic as it treats quantum states and quantum measurement outcomes. In a way, this is not a surprise to QBists, as they have taken the notion of `personalist spacetimes' to be the ansatz most compatible with their other views since at least 2009. But it does enjoin us to finally make crystal clear the sense in which QBism is a purely local interpretation of quantum mechanics despite this new theorem and despite quantum theory's age-old violation of Bell's inequalities. With the extra clarity we also hope to poise QBism for a distinctly new way to approach issues at the interface of quantum theory and gravity.

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A critique to the article by C.A. Fuchs, N.D. Mermin, and R.Schack, "An introduction to QBism with and application to the locality of quantum mechanics" that appeared in Am. J. Phys. 82 (8), 749-754 (2014)

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Comment on "An Introduction to Qbism with an Application to the Locality of Quantum Mechanics" Arxiv: 1311.5253v1

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This is a reply to Michael Nauenberg's arXiv:1502.00123, to be published in the American Journal of Physics, in which he comments critically on our paper "An introduction to QBism with an application to the locality of quantum mechanics", Am. J. Phys. 82, 749--754 (2014) and arXiv:1311.5253.

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Introduction

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In this monograph I present the basic structure of an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Chapter 1 outlines the central ideas behind the interpretation and illustrates them by means of examples: Subsequent chapters fill in the details of the interpretation. But it is important to begin by explaining what I take an interpretation of quantum mechanics to be, and why any further interpretation needs to be offered. After all, quantum mechanics (in some form) is by now both a foundation for much of contemporary physics and a veteran of more than sixty years of intermittent but sometimes intense reflection on its content and meaning. What more can be, or should be, said about the interpretation of this theory? Many physicists believe that no more needs to be said: that there is basically only one way of understanding quantum mechanics, due to Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others, and that the only remaining interpretative task is that of the physics teacher, who seeks to perfect ways of conveying this understanding to new generations of students. Sir Rudolf Peierls, one of the more lucid and distinguished of these physicists, even objects to the use of the familiar term ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ to refer to the way of understanding quantum mechanics due to Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others. Because this sounds as if there were several interpretations of quantum mechanics. There is only one. There is only one way in which you can understand quantum mechanics.[…]

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Soltau, Andrew

QBism explicitly takes the subjective view: probabilities of events are defined solely by past experiences, i.e. the record of observations. As shown by the authors (Fuchs et al, 2013), this: “... removes the paradoxes, conundra, and pseudo-problems that have plagued quantum foundations for the past nine decades”. It is criticised for its lack of ontology and anthropocentric nature. However, if Everett's (1957) formulation is taken at face value, exactly the features of QBism are the result, and the ontology is inherent. The anthropocentric nature of the solution is simply an indication that the quantum state is relative, as is central to Everett. Problems of measurement and locality do not arise. As described by Tegmark (1997), Everett defines the relationship between two fundamentally different views of the world, different types of frame of reference. The outside view is defined by the unitary wave function, the inside view by the record of observations. As Lockwood (1989) states, the preferred basis problem is fully resolved if the latter is taken as the basis. Taken literally, only that defined by the record of observations is determinate in the physical world of this inside view. The reality of QBism is the result. The same can be derived from first principles in the no-collapse universe. Taking the outside view to define all possible decoherent quasi-classical worlds, the physical world of the inside view is the superposition of all such worlds in which it is instantiated. In this quantum mechanical frame of reference only that observed is determinate. The quantum state as ontology is questioned because it defines only the linear dynamics and cannot account for collapse. No deeper reality is required, however: the inside view, and the collapse dynamics that operates in this type of frame of reference, are emergent properties of the system, and operate at a different level of logical type. The world operates as described by QBism, but is nonetheless defined by the quantum state.

•Dec 31, 2015•0 citations
Recently Pienaar (2026), building on work of Cavalcanti (2021), has shown that QBism cannot always assume distinct observers' quantum-measurement outcomes---say, of Wigner and his friend---are embedded in a single spacetime. This follows from QBism's rejection of the `Absoluteness of Observed Events' assumption in the Bong et al. no-go theorem. Thus, QBism has no choice but to treat the notion of spacetime every bit as personalistic as it treats quantum states and quantum measurement outcomes. In a way, this is not a surprise to QBists, as they have taken the notion of `personalist spacetimes' to be the ansatz most compatible with their other views since at least 2009. But it does enjoin us to finally make crystal clear the sense in which QBism is a purely local interpretation of quantum mechanics despite this new theorem and despite quantum theory's age-old violation of Bell's inequalities. With the extra clarity we also hope to poise QBism for a distinctly new way to approach issues at the interface of quantum theory and gravity.
In this monograph I present the basic structure of an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Chapter 1 outlines the central ideas behind the interpretation and illustrates them by means of examples: Subsequent chapters fill in the details of the interpretation. But it is important to begin by explaining what I take an interpretation of quantum mechanics to be, and why any further interpretation needs to be offered. After all, quantum mechanics (in some form) is by now both a foundation for much of contemporary physics and a veteran of more than sixty years of intermittent but sometimes intense reflection on its content and meaning. What more can be, or should be, said about the interpretation of this theory? Many physicists believe that no more needs to be said: that there is basically only one way of understanding quantum mechanics, due to Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others, and that the only remaining interpretative task is that of the physics teacher, who seeks to perfect ways of conveying this understanding to new generations of students. Sir Rudolf Peierls, one of the more lucid and distinguished of these physicists, even objects to the use of the familiar term ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ to refer to the way of understanding quantum mechanics due to Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and others. Because this sounds as if there were several interpretations of quantum mechanics. There is only one. There is only one way in which you can understand quantum mechanics.[…]
QBism explicitly takes the subjective view: probabilities of events are defined solely by past experiences, i.e. the record of observations. As shown by the authors (Fuchs et al, 2013), this: “... removes the paradoxes, conundra, and pseudo-problems that have plagued quantum foundations for the past nine decades”. It is criticised for its lack of ontology and anthropocentric nature. However, if Everett's (1957) formulation is taken at face value, exactly the features of QBism are the result, and the ontology is inherent. The anthropocentric nature of the solution is simply an indication that the quantum state is relative, as is central to Everett. Problems of measurement and locality do not arise. As described by Tegmark (1997), Everett defines the relationship between two fundamentally different views of the world, different types of frame of reference. The outside view is defined by the unitary wave function, the inside view by the record of observations. As Lockwood (1989) states, the preferred basis problem is fully resolved if the latter is taken as the basis. Taken literally, only that defined by the record of observations is determinate in the physical world of this inside view. The reality of QBism is the result. The same can be derived from first principles in the no-collapse universe. Taking the outside view to define all possible decoherent quasi-classical worlds, the physical world of the inside view is the superposition of all such worlds in which it is instantiated. In this quantum mechanical frame of reference only that observed is determinate. The quantum state as ontology is questioned because it defines only the linear dynamics and cannot account for collapse. No deeper reality is required, however: the inside view, and the collapse dynamics that operates in this type of frame of reference, are emergent properties of the system, and operate at a different level of logical type. The world operates as described by QBism, but is nonetheless defined by the quantum state.