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arXiv:1406.3013

Secure positioning and non-local correlations

Nadeem, Muhammad

Published Jun 11, 2014• 7 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Recently, the problem of secure position-verification has been extensively analyzed in a formal notion where distant verifiers send encrypted challenge along with the decryption information to the prover. However, currently it is known that all the existing position-verification scheme are insecure and secure positioning is impossible. We propose here a different notion for position-verification where distant verifiers determine the actions of the prover through non-local correlations generated by local measurements at the provers site. The proposed scheme guarantees secure positioning even if the verifiers do not have any pre-shared data with the prover, position is the only credential of the prover. Our proposed scheme is secure in general and evades known quantum attacks based on instantaneous non-local computations in particular. The scheme enables verifiers to identify dishonest provers with very high probability , where n is the number of entangled pairs used.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1406.3013

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Recently, the problem of secure position-verification has been extensively analyzed in a formal notion where distant verifiers send encrypted challenge along with the decryption information to the prover. However, currently it is known that all the existing position-verification scheme are insecure and secure positioning is impossible. We propose here a different notion for position-verification where distant verifiers determine the actions of the prover through non-local correlations generated by local measurements at the provers site. The proposed scheme guarantees secure positioning even if the verifiers do not have any pre-shared data with the prover, position is the only credential of the prover. Our proposed scheme is secure in general and evades known quantum attacks based on instantaneous non-local computations in particular. The scheme enables verifiers to identify dishonest provers with very high probability , where n is the number of entangled pairs used.
A new commitment scheme based on position-verification and non-local quantum correlations is presented here for the first time in literature. The only credential for unconditional security is the position of committer and non-local correlations generated; neither receiver has any pre-shared data with the committer nor does receiver require trusted and authenticated quantum/classical channels between him and the committer. In the proposed scheme, receiver trusts the commitment only if the scheme itself verifies position of the committer and validates her commitment through non-local quantum correlations in a single round. The position-based commitment scheme bounds committer to reveal valid commitment within allocated time and guarantees that the receiver will not be able to get information about commitment unless committer reveals. The scheme works for the commitment of both bits and qubits and is equally secure against committer/receiver as well as against any third party who may have interests in destroying the commitment. Our proposed scheme is unconditionally secure in general and evades Mayers and Lo-Chau attacks in particular.
Secure position verification certifies that a remote prover occupies a claimed location, a task that is provably impossible with classical resources alone against colluding adversaries. Most existing quantum position verification schemes require transmitting quantum states between verifiers and provers, and the resulting photon loss makes long-distance verification impractical. Classical verifier position verification (CVPV) schemes with classical verifier-prover communication exist, but rely on complex quantum processes that generate certifiable randomness, placing them outside the reach of near-term hardware. Here we introduce a general compiler that maps any complete-support non-local game with the required quantum advantage into a multi-prover CVPV protocol. This addresses both limitations, with entirely classical verifier-prover communication and all quantum resources confined to shared entanglement and local measurements on the prover devices. Instantiating with the CHSH game enables near-term implementation on existing experimental platforms. We prove finite-size security in the quantum random oracle model for both simultaneous verification of multiple provers and verification of a single prover with multiple prover devices. Notably, security in the multi-prover setting is governed not by the certified randomness of the joint provers' outputs, but by certified blind local randomness that depends critically on the spatial arrangement of provers and verifiers.
Secure positioning, a prover located at a specified position convinces a set of verifiers at distant reference stations that he/she is indeed at the specific position, is considered to be impossible if the prover and verifiers have no pre-shared data while dishonest provers have an arbitrary amount of pre-shared entanglement [Nature 479, 307-308 (2011)]. We argue here that current impossibility results for secure positioning are the upshot of not utilizing full powers of relativistic quantum information theory and show that secure positioning and hence position-based quantum cryptography is possible if causal structure of Minkowski space time and quantum non-locality is used properly.
In this article, we propose quantum position verification (QPV) schemes where all the channels are untrusted except the position of the prover and distant reference stations of verifiers. We review and analyze the existing QPV schemes containing some pre-shared data between the prover and verifiers. Most of these schemes are based on non-cryptographic assumptions, i.e. quantum/classical channels between the verifiers are secure. It seems impractical in an environment fully controlled by adversaries and would lead to security compromise in practical implementations. However, our proposed formula for QPV is more robust, secure and according to the standard assumptions of cryptography. Furthermore, once the position of the prover is verified, our schemes establish secret keys in parallel and can be used for authentication and secret communication between the prover and verifiers.
In this work, we study position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. The aim is to use the geographical position of a party as its only credential. On the negative side, we show that if adversaries are allowed to share an arbitrarily large entangled quantum state, the task of secure position-verification is impossible. To this end, we prove the following very general result. Assume that Alice and Bob hold respectively subsystems AAA and BBB of a (possibly) unknown quantum state ∣ψ⟩∈HA⊗HB|\psi\rangle \in {\cal H}_A \otimes {\cal H}_B∣ψ⟩∈HA​⊗HB​. Their goal is to calculate and share a new state ∣φ⟩=U∣ψ⟩|\varphi\rangle = U|\psi\rangle∣φ⟩=U∣ψ⟩, where UUU is a fixed unitary operation. The question that we ask is how many rounds of mutual communication are needed. It is easy to achieve such a task using two rounds of classical communication, whereas, in general, it is impossible with no communication at all. Surprisingly, in case Alice and Bob share enough entanglement to start with and we allow an arbitrarily small failure probability, we show that the same task can be done using a single round of classical communication in which Alice and Bob exchange two classical messages. Actually, we prove that a relaxed version of the task can be done with no communication at all, where the task is to compute instead a state ∣φ′⟩|\varphi'\rangle∣φ′⟩ that coincides with ∣φ⟩=U∣ψ⟩|\varphi\rangle = U|\psi\rangle∣φ⟩=U∣ψ⟩ up to local operations on AAA and on BBB, which are determined by classical information held by Alice and Bob. The one-round scheme for the original task then follows as a simple corollary. We also show that these results generalize to more players. As a consequence, we show a generic attack that breaks any position-verification scheme. On the positive side, we show that if adversaries do not share any entangled quantum state but can compute arbitrary quantum operations, secure position-verification is achievable. Jointly, these results suggest the interesting question whether secure position-verification is possible in case of a bounded amount of entanglement. Our positive result can be interpreted as resolving this question in the simplest case, where the bound is set to zero. In models where secure position-verification is achievable, it has a number of interesting applications. For example, it enables secure communication over an insecure channel without having any preshared key, with the guarantee that only a party at a specific location can learn the content of the conversation. More generally, we show that in settings where secure position-verification is achievable, other position-based cryptographic schemes are possible as well, such as secure position-based authentication and position-based key agreement.
Abstract We discuss quantum position verification (QPV) protocols in which the verifiers create and send single-qubit states to the prover. QPV protocols using single-qubit states are known to be insecure against adversaries that share a small number of entangled qubits. We introduce QPV protocols that are practically secure: they only require single-qubit states from each of the verifiers, yet their security is broken if the adversaries sharing an impractically large number of entangled qubits employ teleportation-based attacks. These protocols are a modification of known QPV protocols in which we include a classical random oracle without altering the amount of quantum resources needed by the verifiers. We present a cheating strategy that requires a number of entangled qubits shared among the adversaries that grows exponentially with the size of the classical input of the random oracle.