Local randomization is a preprocessing procedure in which one of the legitimate parties of a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme adds noise to their version of the key and was found by Kraus et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 080501 (2005)] to improve the security of certain QKD protocols. In this article, the improvement yielded by local randomization is derived for an imperfect implementation of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD protocol, in which the source emits four given but arbitrary pure states and the detector performs arbitrarily aligned measurements. Specifically, this is achieved by modifying an approach to analyzing the security of imperfect variants of the BB84 protocol against collective attacks, introduced in [Phys. Rev. A 88, 012331 (2013)], to include the additional preprocessing step. The previously known improvement to the threshold channel noise, from 11% to 12.41%, is recovered in the special case of an ideal BB84 implementation and becomes more pronounced in the case of a nonideal source. Finally, the bound derived for the asymptotic key rate, both with and without local randomization, is shown to be tight with the particular source characterization used. This is demonstrated by the explicit construction of a family of source states and optimal attacks for which the key-rate bound is attained with equality.
Local randomization is a preprocessing procedure in which one of the legitimate parties of a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme adds noise to their version of the key and was found by Kraus et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 080501 (2005)] to improve the security of certain QKD protocols. In this article, the improvement yielded by local randomization is derived for an imperfect implementation of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD protocol, in which the source emits four given but arbitrary pure states and the detector performs arbitrarily aligned measurements. Specifically, this is achieved by modifying an approach to analyzing the security of imperfect variants of the BB84 protocol against collective attacks, introduced in [Phys. Rev. A 88, 012331 (2013)], to include the additional preprocessing step. The previously known improvement to the threshold channel noise, from 11% to 12.41%, is recovered in the special case of an ideal BB84 implementation and becomes more pronounced in the case of a nonideal source. Finally, the bound derived for the asymptotic key rate, both with and without local randomization, is shown to be tight with the particular source characterization used. This is demonstrated by the explicit construction of a family of source states and optimal attacks for which the key-rate bound is attained with equality.
The Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol is the most widely implemented quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme. However, despite enormous theoretical and experimental efforts in the past decades, the security of this protocol with imperfect sources has not yet been rigorously established. In this paper, we address this shortcoming and prove the security of the BB84 protocol in the presence of multiple source imperfections, including state preparation flaws and side channels, such as Trojan-horse attacks, mode dependencies and classical correlations between the emitted pulses. To do so, we consider a modified BB84 protocol that exploits the basis mismatched events, which are often discarded in standard security analyses of this scheme; and employ the reference technique, a powerful mathematical tool to accommodate source imperfections in the security analysis of QKD. Moreover, we compare the achievable secret-key rate of the modified BB84 protocol with that of the three-state loss-tolerant protocol, and show that the addition of a fourth state, while redundant in ideal conditions, significantly improves the estimation of the leaked information in the presence of source imperfections, resulting in a better performance. This paper demonstrates the relevance of the BB84 protocol in guaranteeing implementation security, taking us a step further towards closing the existing gap between theory and practice of QKD.
We introduce a quantum cloning bound which we apply to a straightforward and relatively direct security proof of the prepare-and-measure Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol against collective attacks. The approach we propose is able to handle the practical problem of source and detector alignment imprecisions in a simple way. Specifically, we derive a key-rate bound for a BB84 implementation in which Alice's source emits four given but arbitrary pure states, where the usual equivalence between prepare-and-measure and entanglement-based QKD no longer applies. Our result is similar to a key rate derived by Mar\o{}y et al. [Phys. Rev. A 82, 032337 (2010)] and generally an improvement over the key rate derivable from the entropic uncertainty relation in situations where it applies. We also provide a stronger result for a source emitting arbitrary qubit states, and a further improved result if the detector is additionally assumed two dimensional.
The security analysis of the Ekert 1991 (E91), Bennett 1992 (B92), six-state protocol, Scarani–Acín–Ribordy–Gisin 2004 (SARG04) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, and their variants have been studied in the presence of collective-rotation noise channels. However, besides the Bennett–Brassard 1984 (BB84) being the first proposed, extensively studied, and essential protocol, its security proof under collective-rotation noise is still missing. Thus, we aim to close this gap in the literature. Consequently, we investigate how collective-rotation noise channels affect the security of the BB84 protocol. Mainly, we study scenarios where the eavesdropper, Eve, conducts an intercept-resend attack on the transmitted photons sent via a quantum communication channel shared by Alice and Bob. Notably, we distinguish the impact of collective-rotation noise and that of the eavesdropper. To achieve this, we provide rigorous, yet straightforward numerical calculations. First, we derive a model for the collective-rotation noise for the BB84 protocol and parametrize the mutual information shared between Alice and Eve. This is followed by deriving the quantum bit error rate (QBER) for two intercept-resend attack scenarios. In particular, we demonstrate that, for small rotation angles, one can extract a secure secret key under a collective-rotation noise channel when there is no eavesdropping. We observe that noise induced by rotation of 0.35 radians of the prepared quantum state results in a QBER of 11%, which corresponds to the lower bound on the tolerable error rate for the BB84 QKD protocol against general attacks. Moreover, a rotational angle of 0.53 radians yields a 25% QBER, which corresponds to the error rate bound due to the intercept-resend attack. Finally, we conclude that the BB84 protocol is robust against intercept-resend attacks on collective-rotation noise channels when the rotation angle is varied arbitrarily within particular bounds.
We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. Our proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. We derive a general lower bound on the asymptotic key generation rate for weakly basis-dependent eavesdropping attacks, and also estimate the rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states with random phases, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.
This paper prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. This proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. The estimation of the key generation rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.
Standard security proofs of quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols often rely on symmetry arguments. In this paper, we prove the security of a three-state protocol that does not possess rotational symmetry. The three-state QKD protocol we consider involves three qubit states, where the first two states $\ensuremath{\mid}{0}_{z}⟩$ and $\ensuremath{\mid}{1}_{z}⟩$ can contribute to key generation, and the third state $\ensuremath{\mid}+⟩=(\ensuremath{\mid}{0}_{z}⟩+\ensuremath{\mid}{1}_{z}⟩)∕\sqrt{2}$ is for channel estimation. This protocol has been proposed and implemented experimentally in some frequency-based QKD systems where the three states can be prepared easily. Thus, by founding on the security of this three-state protocol, we prove that these QKD schemes are, in fact, unconditionally secure against any attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. The main task in our proof is to upper bound the phase error rate of the qubits given the bit error rates observed. Unconditional security can then be proved not only for the ideal case of a single-photon source and perfect detectors, but also for the realistic case of a phase-randomized weak coherent light source and imperfect threshold detectors. Our result in the phase error rate upper bound is independent of the loss in the channel. Also, we compare the three-state protocol with the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol. For the single-photon source case, our result proves that the BB84 protocol strictly tolerates a higher quantum bit error rate than the three-state protocol, while for the coherent-source case, the BB84 protocol achieves a higher key generation rate and secure distance than the three-state protocol when a decoy-state method is used.