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arXiv:2210.11754 · Physical Review Research

Modified BB84 quantum key distribution protocol robust to source imperfections

Margarida Pereira, Guillermo Currás-Lorenzo, Álvaro Navarrete, Akihiro Mizutani, Go Kato, Marcos Curty, Kiyoshi Tamaki

Published Apr 27, 2023• 59 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol is the most widely implemented quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme. However, despite enormous theoretical and experimental efforts in the past decades, the security of this protocol with imperfect sources has not yet been rigorously established. In this paper, we address this shortcoming and prove the security of the BB84 protocol in the presence of multiple source imperfections, including state preparation flaws and side channels, such as Trojan-horse attacks, mode dependencies and classical correlations between the emitted pulses. To do so, we consider a modified BB84 protocol that exploits the basis mismatched events, which are often discarded in standard security analyses of this scheme; and employ the reference technique, a powerful mathematical tool to accommodate source imperfections in the security analysis of QKD. Moreover, we compare the achievable secret-key rate of the modified BB84 protocol with that of the three-state loss-tolerant protocol, and show that the addition of a fourth state, while redundant in ideal conditions, significantly improves the estimation of the leaked information in the presence of source imperfections, resulting in a better performance. This paper demonstrates the relevance of the BB84 protocol in guaranteeing implementation security, taking us a step further towards closing the existing gap between theory and practice of QKD.

DOI
10.1103/physrevresearch.5.023065

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The Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol is the most widely implemented quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme. However, despite enormous theoretical and experimental efforts in the past decades, the security of this protocol with imperfect sources has not yet been rigorously established. In this paper, we address this shortcoming and prove the security of the BB84 protocol in the presence of multiple source imperfections, including state preparation flaws and side channels, such as Trojan-horse attacks, mode dependencies and classical correlations between the emitted pulses. To do so, we consider a modified BB84 protocol that exploits the basis mismatched events, which are often discarded in standard security analyses of this scheme; and employ the reference technique, a powerful mathematical tool to accommodate source imperfections in the security analysis of QKD. Moreover, we compare the achievable secret-key rate of the modified BB84 protocol with that of the three-state loss-tolerant protocol, and show that the addition of a fourth state, while redundant in ideal conditions, significantly improves the estimation of the leaked information in the presence of source imperfections, resulting in a better performance. This paper demonstrates the relevance of the BB84 protocol in guaranteeing implementation security, taking us a step further towards closing the existing gap between theory and practice of QKD.
Abstract In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) allows secure communications between two parties based on physical laws. However, most of the security proofs of QKD today make unrealistic assumptions and neglect many relevant device imperfections. As a result, they cannot guarantee the security of the practical implementations. Recently, the loss-tolerant protocol (K. Tamaki et al., Phys. Rev. A, 90, 052314, 2014) was proposed to make QKD robust against state preparation flaws. This protocol relies on the emission of qubit systems, which, unfortunately, is difficult to achieve in practice. In this work, we remove such qubit assumption and generalise the loss-tolerant protocol to accommodate multiple optical modes in the emitted signals. These multiple optical modes could arise, e.g., from Trojan horse attacks and/or device imperfections. Our security proof determines some dominant device parameter regimes needed for achieving secure communication and, therefore, it can serve as a guideline to characterise QKD transmitters. Furthermore, we compare our approach with that of H.-K. Lo et al. (Quantum Inf. Comput., 7, 431–458, 2007) and identify which method provides the highest secret key generation rate as a function of the device imperfections. Our work constitutes an important step towards the best practical and secure implementation for QKD.
Quantum cryptography, or, more precisely, quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to expand a previously shared secret key by sending quantum states through a quantum channel. The goal here is for Alice and Bob to communicate securely in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. The most well-known QKD protocol is the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol, which has been proved unconditionally secure against any attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. The main advantage of QKD over conventional cryptography is its absolute security. Thus, it is imperative to evaluate the security and performance of QKD protocols and realistic QKD systems. In this thesis, we study the security and performance aspects of QKD in four parts. In the first part, we study the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol. This protocol differs from the BB84 protocol only in the classical post-processing step and uses the same four quantum states as the BB84 protocol. We compared these two protocols and showed that in typical situations, the classical post-processing software for BB84 should be used in order to have a higher performance. In the second part, we prove the security of a three-state protocol. This protocol is similar to the BB84 protocol in that they share the same three qubit states. In the third part, we consider a practical Trojan horse attack on practical QKD systems implementing the BB84 protocol. The attack works by taking advantage of the finite response time of practical phase modulators to remap the states sent out by the legitimate user, Alice. We showed that if Alice and Bob are unaware of our attack, the final key shared between them can be compromised in some situations. In the fourth part, we consider another type of Trojan horse attack, which is based on mismatch between detection efficiencies of detectors. Practical detectors in QKD systems usually do not have identical efficiencies and an eavesdropper Eve may be able to exploit this efficiency mismatch to steal information about the final secret key. We analyze the security of the attack and show that it is possible for Eve to acquire some information on the final secret key if Alice and Bob are unaware of this attack.
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proven for different protocols, in particular for the BB84 protocol. It has been shown that this scheme is robust against eventual imperfections in the state preparation, and sending only three different states delivers the same secret key rate achievable with four states. In this work, we prove in a finite-key scenario that the security of this protocol can be maintained even with fewer measurement operators on the receiver. This allows us to implement a time-bin encoding scheme with a minimum amount of resources.
Based on the basic principles of quantum mechanics, quantum key distribution (QKD) provides unconditional security for long-distance communication. However, existing QKD with relevant source protocols have limited tolerance for source correlation, which greatly reduces the key generation rate and limits the secure transmission distance, thereby limiting their practical deployment. In this work, we propose an improved QKD with correlated source protocol to overcome these limitations by discarding the traditional loss-tolerant security frameworks. Our approach adopts the standard BB84 protocol for the security analysis, under the assumption that the source correlation has a bounded range and characterized inner product of the states. We theoretically analyze the performance of the improved protocol at different levels of source correlation and channel loss. Numerical simulations show that our protocol achieves a much higher secret key rate and longer transmission distance than traditional schemes. In the case of typical parameters and 0 dB loss, our protocol achieves about 1.5–3 times improvement in secret key rate. Additionally, the maximum tolerable loss is enhanced by about 2–6 dB. This highlights a promising direction for enhancing the robustness and practicality of QKD with correlated sources systems, paving the way for their deployment in real-world quantum communication networks.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a technique that enables secure communication between two parties by sharing a secret key. One of the most well-known QKD protocols is the BB84 protocol, proposed by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984. In this protocol, Alice and Bob use a quantum channel to exchange qubits, allowing them to generate a shared key that is resistant to eavesdropping. This paper presents a comparative study of existing QKD schemes, including the BB84 protocol, and highlights the advancements made in the BB84 protocol over the years. The study aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the different QKD schemes and their strengths and weaknesses and demonstrate QKDs working principles through existing simulations and implementations. Through this study, we show that the BB84 protocol is a highly secure QKD scheme that has been extensively studied and implemented in various settings. Furthermore, we discuss the improvements made to the BB84 protocol to enhance its security and practicality, including the use of decoy states and advanced error correction techniques. Overall, this paper provides a comprehensive analysis of QKD schemes, focusing on the BB84 protocol in secure communication technologies.
This paper prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. This proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. The estimation of the key generation rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.