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arXiv:1312.0979 · Physical Review A

Attacks on fixed-apparatus quantum-key-distribution schemes

Michel Boyer, Ran Gelles, Tal Mor

Published Jul 21, 2014• 9 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We consider quantum-key-distribution implementations in which the receiver's apparatus is fixed and does not depend on his choice of basis at each qubit transmission. We show that, although theoretical quantum key distribution is proven secure, such implementations are totally insecure against a strong eavesdropper that has one-time (single) access to the receiver's equipment. The attack we present here, the ``fixed-apparatus attack,'' causes a potential risk to the usefulness of several recent implementations.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.90.012329

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We consider quantum-key-distribution implementations in which the receiver's apparatus is fixed and does not depend on his choice of basis at each qubit transmission. We show that, although theoretical quantum key distribution is proven secure, such implementations are totally insecure against a strong eavesdropper that has one-time (single) access to the receiver's equipment. The attack we present here, the ``fixed-apparatus attack,'' causes a potential risk to the usefulness of several recent implementations.
Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution (DDI-QKD) held the promise of being robust to detector side channels, a major security loophole in quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations. In contrast to what has been claimed, however, we demonstrate that the security of DDI-QKD is not based on postselected entanglement, and we introduce various eavesdropping strategies that show that DDI-QKD is in fact insecure against detector side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit devices' imperfections of the receiver. Our attacks are valid even when the QKD apparatuses are built by the legitimate users of the system themselves, and thus, free of malicious modifications, which is a key assumption in DDI-QKD.
It seems that quantum key distribution (QKD) may be completely insecure when the message sender Alice always encodes her key bits in a fixed basis. In this paper, we present a QKD protocol with classical Alice, i.e. Alice always encodes her key bit in the {|0〉,|1〉} basis (we call it classical {0,1} basis) and the eavesdropper Eve knows this fact. We prove that our protocol is completely robust against any eavesdropping attack and present the amount of tolerable noise against Eve's individual attack. Next, we present a QKD protocol to demonstrate that secure key bits can be distributed even if neither Alice nor Bob has quantum capacities, and extend this idea to a QKD network protocol with numerous parties who have only classical capacities. Finally, we discuss that quantum is necessary in QKD for security reasons, but both Alice and Bob may be classical.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic technique that enables secure private key exchange between geographically distant parties over an insecure channel, protecting confidentiality against potential eavesdroppers. QKD has evolved significantly since its inception with the BB84 protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984. Its theoretical foundation relies on quantum physics, particularly the uncertainty principle, the no-cloning theorem, and particle entanglement, which ensures its information-theoretic security when combined with the one-time-pad cryptographic algorithm. However, certain security loopholes persist in terms of practical implementation in commercial devices. Some vulnerabilities are associated with side-channel vectors linked to commonly used optical subcomponents, while others are more related to how existing protocols handle encoding and communication pipelines. In this work, we aim to comprehensively study the current state of security loopholes affecting QKD technology in commercial devices. We also provide a concise overview of the existing types of QKD implementations. Additionally, we offer insights into current trends and vulnerability countermeasures, paving the way for future research and novel mechanisms to enhance the implementation security of commercial QKD devices.
Secure and efficient communication between two parties always incents scholars for further research. Creation of such a means of communication yields commercial benefits for our society. With the creation of a quantum computer, some classical protocols used for secure communication is no longer secure. Quantum key distribution is created to solve this problem. Although a quantum key distribution protocol is in theory guaranteed to be secure, there has been ways to breach its security in real life application. Since the creation of the first quantum key distribution protocol, there has been a rival between the defending and attacking side of quantum key distribution. In this paper, we first seek to discuss the basics of the first quantum key distribution protocol. Secondly, we discuss about the attacks against that protocol and the modifications made to the protocol in response to these attacks. Currently, researchers have permanently closed one side of the implementation loophole that could give rise to potential means of hacking of the protocol.
In this paper so-called ‘large pulse attack’ is investigated. This attack is one of the possible methods of conventional optical eavesdropping, a new strategy of eavesdropping on quantum cryptosystems, which eliminates the need of immediate interaction with transmitted quantum states. It allows the eavesdropper to avoid inducing transmission errors that disclose her presence to the legal users. As an object of the eavesdropping, phase-state fibre optic schemes are considered. With large pulse attack, settings of transmitting and/ or receiving apparatus are interrogated by external high-power light pulses. Applicability conditions of this method are given. Type and amount of information learned by the eavesdropper is estimated, depending on parameters of the interrogating pulse and apparatus. An experimental set-up for an eavesdropping experiment is proposed and results of successful preliminary measurements are presented. It is concluded that additional protection is necessary for currently implemented quantum key distribution systems. The paper suggests several security measures against this kind of attack.
Quantum key distribution protocols typically make use of a one-way quantum channel to distribute a shared secret string to two distant users. However, protocols exploiting a two-way quantum channel have been proposed as an alternative route to the same goal, with the potential advantage of outperforming one-way protocols. Here we provide a strategy to prove security for two-way quantum key distribution protocols against the most general quantum attack possible by an eavesdropper. We utilize an entropic uncertainty relation, and only a few assumptions need to be made about the devices used in the protocol. We also show that a two-way protocol can outperform comparable one-way protocols.