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arXiv:1303.4993

The quantum de Finetti representation for the Bayesian Quantum Tomography and the Quantum Discord

V. S. Shchesnovich, Dmitri S. Mogilevtsev

Published Mar 20, 2013• 0 citations
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Abstract

We point out that the quantum de Finetti representation, unique for infinitely extendable exchangeable systems, assigns a non-zero Quantum Discord to uncorrelated systems and thus cannot serve as an universal prior distribution in the Bayesian Quantum Tomography. This apparent paradox stems from linearity of the Born rule for the probability assignment in Quantum Mechanics, which results in mixing of one's knowledge about the quantum state and the representative of the state in one density matrix.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1303.4993

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We point out that the quantum de Finetti representation, unique for infinitely extendable exchangeable systems, assigns a non-zero Quantum Discord to uncorrelated systems and thus cannot serve as an universal prior distribution in the Bayesian Quantum Tomography. This apparent paradox stems from linearity of the Born rule for the probability assignment in Quantum Mechanics, which results in mixing of one's knowledge about the quantum state and the representative of the state in one density matrix.
We present an elementary proof of the quantum de Finetti representation theorem, a quantum analog of de Finetti’s classical theorem on exchangeable probability assignments. This contrasts with the original proof of Hudson and Moody [Z. Wahrschein. verw. Geb. 33, 343 (1976)], which relies on advanced mathematics and does not share the same potential for generalization. The classical de Finetti theorem provides an operational definition of the concept of an unknown probability in Bayesian probability theory, where probabilities are taken to be degrees of belief instead of objective states of nature. The quantum de Finetti theorem, in a closely analogous fashion, deals with exchangeable density-operator assignments and provides an operational definition of the concept of an “unknown quantum state” in quantum-state tomography. This result is especially important for information-based interpretations of quantum mechanics, where quantum states, like probabilities, are taken to be states of knowledge rather than states of nature. We further demonstrate that the theorem fails for real Hilbert spaces and discuss the significance of this point.
In quantum-process tomography it is possible to express the experimenter's prior information as a sequence of quantum operations, i.e., trace-preserving completely positive maps. In analogy to de Finetti's concept of exchangeability for probability distributions, we give a definition of exchangeability for sequences of quantum operations. We then state and prove a representation theorem for such exchangeable sequences. The theorem leads to a simple characterization of admissible priors for quantum process tomography and solves to a Bayesian's satisfaction the problem of an unknown quantum operation.
The classical de Finetti theorem provides an operational definition of the concept of an unknown probability in Bayesian probability theory, where probabilities are taken to be degrees of belief instead of objective states of nature. In this paper, we motivate and review two results that generalize de Finetti's theorem to the quantum mechanical setting: Namely a de Finetti theorem for quantum states and a de Finetti theorem for quantum operations. The quantum-state theorem, in a closely analogous fashion to the original de Finetti theorem, deals with exchangeable density-operator assignments and provides an operational definition of the concept of an "unknown quantum state" in quantum-state tomography. Similarly, the quantum-operation theorem gives an operational definition of an "unknown quantum operation" in quantum-process tomography. These results are especially important for a Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics, where quantum states and (at least some) quantum operations are taken to be states of belief rather than states of nature.
Abstract This paper reviews arguments for the claim that all probabilities arising in quantum mechanics are Bayesian degrees of belief. The starting point is the observation that there is a one-to-one map from quantum states to points on the probability simplex. Bayes’s rule remains valid in quantum theory, provided it is kept in mind that the outcomes of quantum measurements have no preassigned values. The probabilities of quantum measurement outcomes depend explicitly on a quantum prior whose general form will be discussed. Similar to the classical case, the quantum de Finetti theorem simplifies the analysis of repeated quantum trials if the prior is exchangeable. The Bayesian approach to quantum theory described here solves the problem of the ‘collapse of the wave function’. It also provides almost trivial explanations of a number of phenomena in quantum information theory, including the no-cloning theorem and quantum teleportation.
In a quantum-Bayesian take on quantum mechanics, the Born Rule cannot be interpreted as a rule for setting measurement-outcome probabilities from an objective quantum state. But if not, what is the role of the rule? In this paper, we argue that it should be seen as an empirical addition to Bayesian reasoning itself. Particularly, we show how to view the Born Rule as a normative rule in addition to usual Dutch-book coherence. It is a rule that takes into account how one should assign probabilities to the consequences of various intended measurements on a physical system, but explicitly in terms of prior probabilities for and conditional probabilities consequent upon the imagined outcomes of a special counterfactual reference measurement. This interpretation is seen particularly clearly by representing quantum states in terms of probabilities for the outcomes of a fixed, fiducial symmetric informationally complete (SIC) measurement. We further explore the extent to which the general form of the new normative rule implies the
In the Bayesian approach to probability theory, probability quantifies a degree of belief for a single trial, without any a priori connection to limiting frequencies. In this paper, we show that, despite being prescribed by a fundamental law, probabilities for individual quantum systems can be understood within the Bayesian approach. We argue that the distinction between classical and quantum probabilities lies not in their definition, but in the nature of the information they encode. In the classical world, maximal information about a physical system is complete in the sense of providing definite answers for all possible questions that can be asked of the system. In the quantum world, maximal information is not complete and cannot be completed. Using this distinction, we show that any Bayesian probability assignment in quantum mechanics must have the form of the quantum probability rule, that maximal information about a quantum system leads to a unique quantum-state assignment, and that quantum theory provides a stronger connection between probability and measured frequency than can be justified classically. Finally, we give a Bayesian formulation of quantum-state tomography.