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arXiv:1212.4631 · Journal of Physics Conference Series

Realist model approach to quantum mechanics

Petr Hájíček

Published Jun 10, 2013• 1 citation
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Abstract

The paper proves that quantum mechanics is compatible with the constructive realism of modern philosophy of science. The proof is based on the observation that properties of quantum systems that are uniquely determined by their preparations can be assumed objective without the difficulties that are encountered by the same assumption about values of observables. The resulting realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is made rigorous by studying the space of quantum states—the convex set of state operators. Prepared states are classified according to their statistical structure into indecomposable and decomposable instead of pure and mixed. Simple objective properties are defined and showed to form a Boolean lattice.

DOI
10.1088/1742-6596/442/1/012043

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The paper proves that quantum mechanics is compatible with the constructive realism of modern philosophy of science. The proof is based on the observation that properties of quantum systems that are uniquely determined by their preparations can be assumed objective without the difficulties that are encountered by the same assumption about values of observables. The resulting realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is made rigorous by studying the space of quantum states—the convex set of state operators. Prepared states are classified according to their statistical structure into indecomposable and decomposable instead of pure and mixed. Simple objective properties are defined and showed to form a Boolean lattice.
The paper reviews and discusses four ideas scattered in previous papers of the author. First, objective properties of quantum systems are not associated with observables but are defined by preparations. Second, measurable results of classical theories are not sharp. All such results can be obtained as high-entropy limits of quantum mechanics. Third, a careful study of exchange symmetry requires a modification of the theory of measurement. Fourth, screens and detectors are closely associated with state reduction. A new, rather improved understanding of quantum mechanics is achieved without any deep changes of the theory itself. In the framework of a model approach to the philosophy of science, the RCU interpretation is developed step by step by adding specific supplementary hypotheses to the Minimum Interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The belief that quantum mechanics (QM) does not admit a realistic interpretation is widespread. According to some scholars concerned with the foundations of QM all existing interpretations of this theory (except for the statistical interpretation) presuppose instead a form of realism which consists in assuming that QM deals with individual objects and their properties. We uphold in the present paper that the arguments supporting the contextuality and the nonlocality of QM are a significant clue to the implicit adoption of stronger forms of realism (realism of theoretical entities and realism of theories). If these kinds of realism are substituted by a simpler and more intuitive semantic realism one can contrive a noncontextual and local interpretation of the formalism of QM (SR interpretation). Moreover one can provide a model for such an interpretation (ESR model) in which local realism and QM do not conflict and some fundamental problems of the standard interpretation of QM are avoided.
I argue for a realist interpretation of the quantum state. I begin by reviewing and critically evaluating two arguments for an antirealist interpretation of the quantum state, the first derived from the so-called ‘measurement problem’, and the second from the concept of local causality. I argue that existing antirealist interpretations do not solve the measurement problem. Furthermore, I argue that it is possible to construct a local, realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, using methods borrowed from quantum field theory and based on John S. Bell’s concept of ‘local beables’.\nIf the quantum state is interpreted subjectively, then the probabilities it associates with experimental outcomes are themselves subjective. I address the prospects for developing a subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanical probabilities based on the Quantum de Finetti Representation Theorem. Epistemic interpretations of the quantum state can be divided into those that are epistemic with respect to underlying ontic states, and those that are epistemic with respect to measurement outcomes. The Pusey Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) theorem places serious constraints on the former family of interpretations. I identify an important explanatory gap in the latter sort of interpretation. In particular, if the quantum state is a subjective representation of beliefs about future experimental outcomes, then it is not clear why those experimenters who use quantum mechanics should be better able to negotiate the world than those who do not.\nI then turn to the task of articulating a positive argument for the thesis of quantum state realism. I begin by articulating a minimal set of conditions that any realist interpretation must meet. One assumption built into the PBR result is that systems prepared in a given quantum state have a well-defined set of physical properties, which may be completely or incompletely described by the quantum state. Antirealist interpretations that reject this assumption are therefore compatible with the PBR result. A compelling case for quantum state realism must therefore be made on more general grounds. I consider two concrete examples of phenomena described by quantum mechanics that strongly suggest that the quantum state is genuinely representational in character.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
In this thesis, I erect a generalized interpretation- scheme, called a Realist Kinematics, that mathematically describes a number of extant interpretations of quantum mechanics, from Orthodoxy, at one extreme, to Naive Realism, at the other. A particular value of this approach is that conclusions reached within the scheme apply at once to all of the member interpretations. As an illustration of the framework, I establish that interpretations based on Realist Kinematics can never simultaneously attribute definite values to observables that are represented within the theory by irreducible operators. An important application of this result is to the case of canonically conjugate observables. Here I obtain a supra-Orthodox statement of the Uncertainty Principle, according to which one cannot simultaneously ascribe definite values to position and momentum, even if one is willing to give up the eigenstate- eigenvalue rule. The Realist Kinematics (RK) framework is very powerful for proving statements about a wide array of interpretations. However, its generality becomes a weakness when one wishes to understand why certain RK interpretations are viable while others are not. Therefore, I present here a characterization theorem that goes part of the way towards classifying those mathematical structures that form the basis for viable interpretations; and in a section on open problems, I describe what a full solution to this problem might look like.
Two conceptions of the contemporary philosophy of science are taken under consideration: scientific realism and constructive empiricism. Scientific realism presupposes 1) the conception of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality, 2) the real existence of entities postulated by a theory. The constructive empiricism puts forward the idea of empirical adequacy: science aims to give us the theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of the theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. To compare methodological resources of these two positions in the philosophy of science the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is involved. As a methodological realization of scientific realism the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics is taken under consideration. K.Popper’s version