J.S. Bell's work has convinced many that correlations in violation of CHSH inequalities show that the world itself is non-local, and that there is an apparently essential conflict between any sharp formulation of quantum theory and relativity. Against this consensus, this paper argues that there is no conflict between quantum theory and relativity. Quantum theory itself helps us explain such (otherwise) puzzling correlations in a way that contradicts neither Bell's intuitive locality principle nor his local causality condition. The argument depends on understanding quantum theory along pragmatist lines, and on a more general view of how that theory helps us explain. Quantum theory is compatible with Bell's intuitive locality principle and with his local causality condition not because it conforms to them, but because they are simply inapplicable to quantum theory, as so understood.
J.S. Bell's work has convinced many that correlations in violation of CHSH inequalities show that the world itself is non-local, and that there is an apparently essential conflict between any sharp formulation of quantum theory and relativity. Against this consensus, this paper argues that there is no conflict between quantum theory and relativity. Quantum theory itself helps us explain such (otherwise) puzzling correlations in a way that contradicts neither Bell's intuitive locality principle nor his local causality condition. The argument depends on understanding quantum theory along pragmatist lines, and on a more general view of how that theory helps us explain. Quantum theory is compatible with Bell's intuitive locality principle and with his local causality condition not because it conforms to them, but because they are simply inapplicable to quantum theory, as so understood.
Abstract This essay sketches a pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory and shows how to use it to explain EPR-Bell correlations consistently with relativity. Quantum theory is not a locally causal theory, not because it violates Bell’s local causality condition, but because that condition is simply inapplicable to it. Any agent can use quantum theory to show why EPR-Bell correlations are to be expected. For space-like separated measurements of vertical/horizontal polarization of each photon from a pair in Bell state Φ+, an agent’s explanation of why the distant measurement outcome matches his own appeals neither to a preferred frame nor to any direct connection or influence between these events. Here, as elsewhere, quantum theory helps one explain an initially puzzling phenomenon not by locating it in a causal net but by showing why its occurrence is just what one should have expected in the circumstances.
By moving to the context of relativistic space-time structure, this chapter completes the argument of Chapter 4 that we can use quantum theory locally to explain correlations that violate Bell inequalities with no instantaneous action at a distance. Chance here must be relativized not just to time but to a space-time point, so that an event may have more than one chance at the same time—it may even be certain relative to one space-time point but ‘at the same time’ completely uncertain relative to another. This renders Bell’s principle of Local Causality either inapplicable or intuitively unmotivated. Counterfactual dependence between the outcomes of measurements on systems assigned an entangled state is not causal since neither outcome is subject to intervention: but it may still be appealed to in a non-causal explanation of one in terms of the other.
It has been claimed that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, i.e., that the predictions of quantum mechanics are at odds with a conception of the world where all the interactions are mediated by local mechanisms. The cited reason is the violation of the Bell inequality in cases where measurements are performed on quantum systems of particles that have interacted in the past. Quantum mechanics predicts that the state of the particles in such a system are correlated, a result obtained from considering a thought-experiment often known as EPR. In this thesis, I will argue that the violation of the Bell inequality in EPR forces us to either accept that causes sometimes act both backwards and forwards in time, or give up some widely-held assumptions about causal relations or the role of causal explanations. First, I will present three principles regarding causality that I take be widely accepted. I will then present the background for the claim the quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, and discuss the implications of non-local causal influences in light of the Special Theory of Relativity. One argument against a causal explanation of the EPR-correlations will be discussed, and different models for the causal structure of EPR will be assessed. I will argue that a retrocausal model – models that include instances of retrocausation, where the direction of causation is the opposite of the direction of time – is the only viable option if we want to uphold the three principles presented in chapter 1. I will discuss the plausibility of rejecting one of these principles, and argue that at least one of the can be restricted in a way that still accounts for our commitment to it. Finally, I will assess the non-local models against the retrocausal models, and argue that a retrocausal model offers interpretational advantages over the non-local alternatives.
Recent experiments allow one to conclude that Bell-type inequalities are indeed violated; thus, it is important to understand what this means and how we can explain the existence of strong correlations between outcomes of distant measurements. Do we have to announce that Einstein was wrong, Nature is non-local and non-local correlations are produced due to quantum magic and emerge, somehow, from outside space-time? Fortunately, such conclusions are unfounded because, if supplementary parameters describing measuring instruments are correctly incorporated in a theoretical model, then Bell-type inequalities may not be proved. We construct a simple probabilistic model allowing these correlations to be explained in a locally causal way. In our model, measurement outcomes are neither predetermined nor produced in an irreducibly random way. We explain why, contrary to the general belief, the introduction of setting-dependent parameters does not restrict experimenters' freedom of choice. Since the violation of Bell-type inequalities does not allow the conclusion that Nature is non-local and that quantum theory is complete, the Bohr-Einstein quantum debate may not be closed. The continuation of this debate is important not only for a better understanding of Nature but also for various practical applications of quantum phenomena.This article is part of the themed issue 'Second quantum revolution: foundational questions'.
J.S. Bell believed that his famous theorem entailed a deep and troubling conflict between the empirically verified predictions of quantum theory and the notion of local causality that is motivated by relativity theory. Yet many physicists continue to accept, usually on the reports of textbook writers and other commentators, that Bell's own view was wrong, and that, in fact, the theorem only brings out a conflict with determinism or the hidden-variables program or realism or some other such principle that (unlike local causality), allegedly, nobody should have believed anyway. (Moreover, typically such beliefs arise without the person in question even being aware that the view they are accepting differs so radically from Bell's own.) Here we try to shed some light on the situation by focusing on the concept of local causality that is the heart of Bell's theorem, and, in particular, by contrasting Bell's own understanding with the analysis of Jon Jarrett which has been the most influential source, in recent decades, for the kinds of claims mentioned previously. We point out a crucial difference between Jarrett's and Bell's own understanding of Bell's formulation of local causality, which turns out to be the basis for the erroneous claim, made by Jarrett and many others, that Bell misunderstood the implications of his own theorem.
Between 1964 and 1990, the notion of nonlocality in Bell's papers underwent a profound change as his nonlocality theorem gradually became detached from quantum mechanics, and referred to wider probabilistic theories involving correlations between separated beables. The proposition that standard quantum mechanics is itself nonlocal (more precisely, that it violates ‘local causality’) became divorced from the Bell theorem per se from 1976 on, although this important point is widely overlooked in the literature. In 1990, the year of his death, Bell would express serious misgivings about themathematical form of the local causality condition and leave ill-defined the issue of the consistency between special relativity and violation of the Bell-type inequality. In our view, the significance of the Bell theorem, in both its deterministic and stochastic forms, can only be fully understood by taking into account the fact that a fully Lorentz covariant version of quantum theory, free of action at a distance, can be articulated in the Everett interpretation. Introduction John S. Bell's last word on his celebrated nonlocality theorem and its interpretation appeared in his 1990 paper ‘La nouvelle cuisine’, first published in the year of his untimely death. Bell was careful here to distinguish between the issue of ‘no superluminal signalling’ in quantum theory (both quantum field theory and quantum mechanics) and a principle he first introduced explicitly in 1976 and called ‘local causality’ [1]. In relation to the former, Bell expressed concerns that amplify doubts he had already expressed in 1976. These concerns touch on what is now widely known as the no-signalling theorem in quantum mechanics, and ultimately have to do with Bell's distaste for what he saw as an anthropocentric element in orthodox quantum thinking. In relation to local causality, Bell emphasised that his famous factorizability (no-correlations) condition is not to be seen ‘as the formulation of local causality, but as a consequence thereof’ and stressed how difficult he found it to articulate this consequence. He left the question of any strict inconsistency between violation of factorizability and special relativity theory unresolved, a not insignificant shift from his thinking up to the early 1980s.