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arXiv:1004.2525 · Lecture notes in computer science

A Quantum-Conceptual Explanation of Violations of Expected Utility in Economics

Diederik Aerts, Jan Broekaert, Marek Czachor, Bart D’Hooghe

Published Jan 1, 2011• 19 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-24971-6_19

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QUANTUM STRUCTURE IN ECONOMICS: RISK VERSUS AMBIGUITY

Diederik Aerts, Jan Broekaert, Bart D’Hooghe +1 more

The expected utility hypothesis is one of the building blocks of classical economic theory and founded on Savage's Sure-Thing Principle. It has been put forward, e.g. by situations such as the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, that real-life situations can violate Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and hence also expected utility. We analyze how this violation is connected to the presence of the 'disjunction effect' of decision theory and use our earlier study of this effect in concept theory to put forward an explanation of the violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle, namely the presence of 'quantum conceptual thought' next to 'classical logical thought' within a double layer structure of human thought during the decision process. Quantum conceptual thought can be modeled mathematically by the quantum mechanical formalism, which we illustrate by modeling the Hawaii problem situation, a well-known example of the disjunction effect, and we show how the dynamics in the Hawaii problem situation is generated by the whole conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation. We analyze the Ellsberg paradox situation, taking into account our hypothesis of the presence of quantum conceptual thought. We put forward a model for the conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation of the Ellsberg paradox by making use of the data we gathered by conducting an experimental test of the Ellsberg paradox situation. We show how this gives rise to the violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and explain its dynamics.

•Dec 1, 2011•0 citations
The expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions, as shown by the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes. The popular explanation in terms of ambiguity aversion is not completely accepted. As a consequence, uncertainty is still problematical in economics. To overcome these difficulties a distinction between risk and ambiguity has been introduced which depends on the existence of a Kolmogorovian probabilistic structure modeling these uncertainties. On the other hand, evidence of everyday life suggests that context plays a fundamental role in human decisions under uncertainty. Moreover, it is well known from physics that any probabilistic structure modeling contextual interactions between entities structurally needs a non-Kolmogorovian framework admitting a quantum-like representation. For this reason, we have recently introduced a notion of contextual risk to mathematically capture situations in which ambiguity occurs. We prove in this paper that the contextual risk approach can be applied to the Ellsberg paradox, and elaborate a sphere model within our hidden measurement formalism which reveals that it is the overall conceptual landscape that is responsible of the disagreement between actual human decisions and the predictions of expected utility theory, which generates the paradox. This result points to the presence of a quantum conceptual layer in human thought which is superposed to the usually assumed classical logical layer, and conceptually supports the thesis of several authors suggesting the presence of quantum structure in economics and decision theory.
The expected utility hypothesis is one of the building blocks of classical economic theory and founded on Savage's Sure-Thing Principle. It has been put forward, e.g. by situations such as the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, that real-life situations can violate Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and hence also expected utility. We analyze how this violation is connected to the presence of the 'disjunction effect' of decision theory and use our earlier study of this effect in concept theory to put forward an explanation of the violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle, namely the presence of 'quantum conceptual thought' next to 'classical logical thought' within a double layer structure of human thought during the decision process. Quantum conceptual thought can be modeled mathematically by the quantum mechanical formalism, which we illustrate by modeling the Hawaii problem situation, a well-known example of the disjunction effect, and we show how the dynamics in the Hawaii problem situation is generated by the whole conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation. We analyze the Ellsberg paradox situation, taking into account our hypothesis of the presence of quantum conceptual thought. We put forward a model for the conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation of the Ellsberg paradox by making use of the data we gathered by conducting an experimental test of the Ellsberg paradox situation. We show how this gives rise to the violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and explain its dynamics.