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arXiv:0904.3677

Quantum theory can be collectively verified

Arindam Mitra

Published Apr 23, 2009• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

No theory of physics has been collectively scientifically verified in an experiment so far. It is pointed out that probabilistic structure of quantum theory can be collectively scientifically verified in an experiment. It is also argued that experimentalist point of view quantum theory is a complete theory.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.0904.3677

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Quantum theory (QT) provides statistical predictions for various physical phenomena. To verify these predictions a considerable amount of data has been accumulated in the 'measurements' performed on the ensembles of identically prepared physical systems or in the repeated 'measurements' on some trapped 'individual physical systems'. The outcomes of these measurements are, in general, some numerical time series registered by some macroscopic instruments. The various empirical probability distributions extracted from these time series were shown to be consistent with the probabilistic predictions of QT. More than 70 years ago the claim was made that QT provided the most complete description of 'individual' physical systems and outcomes of the measurements performed on 'individual' physical systems were obtained in an intrinsically random way. Spin polarization correlation experiments (SPCEs), performed to test the validity of Bell inequalities, clearly demonstrated the existence of strong long-range correlations and confirmed that the beams hitting far away detectors somehow preserve the memory of their common source which would be destroyed if the individual counts of far away detectors were purely random. Since the probabilities describe the random experiments and are not the attributes of the 'individual' physical systems, the claim that QT provides a complete description of 'individual' physical systems seems not only unjustified but also misleading and counter productive. In this paper, we point out that we even do not know whether QT is predictably complete because it has not been tested carefully enough. Namely, it was not proven that the time series of existing experimental data did not contain some stochastic fine structures that could have been averaged out by describing them in terms of the empirical probability distributions. In this paper, we advocate various statistical tests that could be used to search for such fine structures in the data and to answer the title question of this paper. In our opinion a proper understanding of the statistical character of QT and of its limitations is crucial in the domains such as quantum optics and quantum information.
Quantum theory has been criticized for not being deterministic and therefore not universal: it cannot completely describe a measurement aimed at verifying its predictions (although any given apparatus can be considered as a quantum system). We investigate the possible alternatives. Theories where the observed world is deterministic but the observer is not (whatever the reason for that) lead to Bell’s nonseparability theorem. If, on the other hand, the observer too is deterministic, the theory is not verifiable. It follows that quantum theory must be the logically preferred option. Its inability to completely describe the measurement process appears to be not a flaw of the theory but a logical necessity which is analogous to Gödel’s undecidability theorem.
In this paper we discuss the principles of two fundamental theories of physics: mechanics and quantum mechanics. First, we consider two philosophical positions of the German physicist Heinrich Hertz. He established one of the both in the introduction of his well known Principles of Mechanics. This view - Hertz's "picture" concept - which has a long tradition in philosophy, particularly with regard to physics and later to other empirical sciences, serves as the starting point of an interpretation of the relationship between real systems and theoretical structures of modern science using the concept of fuzziness. This "fuzzy view" on philosophy of science gives particularly an interpretation of Hertz's earlier lecture on The Constitution of matter. Second we consider some principles of quantum mechanics, particularly Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty relation of subatomic object's position and momentum, and Max Born's probabilistic interpretation of the quantum mechanical wave function. These principles are parts of the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Third, we argue that the "fuzzy approach" is fruitful for a "fuzzy" interpretation of quantum mechanics because fuzziness fills the gap between systems and phenomena in reality and the scientific theory of quantum mechanics - as every other scientific theory.
Quantum theory is a mathematical formalism that allows physicists to predict the probability of observing different outcomes in experiments on sub-atomic systems. It has been tested more rigorously than any theory in science, and has never been wrong. However, strictly speaking it does not “explain” the behavior of sub-atomic systems, since it does not propose a mechanism to account for it. It tells us that they will behave in certain ways, but not why. Thus, quantum mechanics is not a theory in the sense familiar to social scientists, namely a body of laws that explains some part of reality. The explanatory question is the subject of the interpretive debates that surround the theory, not of the theory per se. That said, the literature routinely refers to quantum mechanics as a theory, and I shall use the terms interchangeably below.
There has been a surge of recent interest in the Wigner's Friend paradox, sparking several novel thought experiments and no-go theorems. The main narrative has been that Wigner's Friend highlights a counterintuitive feature that is unique to quantum theory, and which is closely related to the quantum measurement problem. Here, we challenge this view. We argue that the gist of the Wigner's Friend paradox can be reproduced without assuming quantum physics, and that it underlies a much broader class of enigmas in the foundations of physics and philosophy. To show this, we first consider several recently proposed Extended Wigner's Friend scenarios, and demonstrate that some of their implications for the absoluteness of observations can be reproduced by classical thought experiments that involve the duplication of agents. Crucially, some of these classical scenarios are technologically much easier to implement than their quantum counterparts. Then, we argue that the essential structural ingredient of all these scenarios is a feature that we call "Restriction A": that a physical theory cannot give us a probabilistic description of the observations of all agents. Finally, we argue that this difficulty is at the core of other puzzles in the foundations of physics and philosophy, and demonstrate this explicitly for cosmology's Boltzmann brain problem. Our analysis suggests that Wigner's Friend should be studied in a larger context, addressing a frontier of human knowledge beyond quantum foundations: to obtain reliable predictions for experiments in which these predictions can be privately but not intersubjectively verified.