Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:0808.2775 · IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity (CCC)

Parallel Approximation of Non-interactive Zero-sum Quantum Games

Rahul Jain, John Watrous

Published Jul 1, 2009• 50 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This paper studies a simple class of zero-sum games played by two competing quantum players: each player sends a mixed quantum state to a referee, who performs a joint measurement on the two states to determine the players' payoffs. We prove that an equilibrium point of any such game can be approximated by means of an efficient parallel algorithm, which implies that one-turn quantum refereed games, wherein the referee is specified by a quantum circuit, can be simulated in polynomial space.

DOI
10.1109/ccc.2009.26

Related papers

A study of one-turn quantum refereed games

Soumik Ghosh

This thesis studies one-turn quantum refereed games, which are abstract zero-sum games with two competing computationally unbounded quantum provers and a computationally bounded quantum referee. The provers send quantum states to the referee, who plugs the two states into his quantum circuit, measures the output of the circuit in the standard basis, and declares one of the two players as the winner depending on the outcome of the measurement. The complexity class QRG(1) comprises of those promise problems for which there exists a one-turn quantum refereed game such that one of the players wins with high probability for the yes-instances, and the other player wins with high probability for the no-instances, irrespective of the opponent’s strategy. QRG(1) is a generalization of QMA (or co-QMA), and can informally be viewed as QMA with a no-prover (or co-QMA with a yes-prover). \n \nWe have given a full characterization of QRG(1), starting with appropriate definitions and known results, and building on to two new results about this class. Previously, the best known upper bound on QRG(1) was PSPACE. We have proved that if one of the provers is completely classical, sending a classical probability distribution instead of a quantum state, the new class, which we name CQRG(1), is contained in Ǝ · PP (non- deterministic polynomial-time operator applied to the class PP). We have also defined another restricted version of QRG(1) where both provers send quantum states, but the referee measures one of the quantum states first, and plugs the classical outcome into the measurement, along with the other prover’s quantum state, into a quantum circuit, before measuring the output of the quantum circuit in the standard basis. The new class, which we name MQRG(1), is contained in P · PP (the probabilistic polynomial time operator applied to PP). Ǝ · PP is contained in P · PP, which is, in turn, contained in PSPACE. Hence, our results give better containments than PSPACE for restricted versions of QRG(1).

•Jul 13, 2020•0 citations

Quantum algorithms for zero-sum games

Joran van Apeldoorn, András Gilyén

We derive sublinear-time quantum algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of two-player zero-sum games, based on efficient Gibbs sampling methods. We are able to achieve speed-ups for both dense and sparse payoff matrices at the cost of a mildly increased dependence on the additive error compared to classical algorithms. In particular we can find $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium strategies in complexity $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n+m}/\varepsilon^3)$ and $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{s}/\varepsilon^{3.5})$ respectively, where $n\times m$ is the size of the matrix describing the game and $s$ is its sparsity. Our algorithms use the LP formulation of the problem and apply techniques developed in recent works on quantum SDP-solvers. We also show how to reduce general LP-solving to zero-sum games, resulting in quantum LP-solvers that have complexities $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n+m}γ^3)$ and $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{s}γ^{3.5})$ for the dense and sparse access models respectively, where $γ$ is the relevant "scale-invariant" precision parameter

arXiv:1904.03180•Apr 5, 2019•60 citations

Entangled Games are Hard to Approximate

Julia Kempe, Hirotada Kobayashi, Keiji Matsumoto +2 more

We establish the first hardness results for the problem of computing the value of one-round games played by a referee and a team of players who can share quantum entanglement. In particular, we show that it is NP-hard to approximate within an inverse polynomial the value of a one-round game with (i) quantum referee and two entangled players or (ii) classical referee and three entangled players. Previously it was not even known if computing the value exactly is NP-hard. We also describe a mathematical conjecture, which, if true, would imply hardness of approximation to within a constant.We start our proof by describing two ways to modify classical multi-player games to make them resistant to entangled players. We then show that a strategy for the modified game that uses entanglement can be "rounded'' to one that does not. The results then follow from classical inapproximability bounds. Our work implies that, unless P = NP, the values of entangled-player games cannot be computed by semidefinite programs that are polynomial in the size of the referee's system, a method that has been successful for more restricted quantum games.

Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science•Oct 1, 2008•56 citations

Space-efficient Simulations of Quantum Interactive Proofs.

Xiaodi Wu

Interactive proof systems form an important complexity model that has been central to many prominent results in computational complexity theory, such as those on probabilistically checkable proofs, hardness of approximation, and fundamental cryptographic primitives. In this thesis, we study the quantum-enhanced version of interactive proof systems, in which each party has access to quantum computing resources. We focus on its power and limitations, which lead us to the following results. (*) We provide an alternative and conceptually simpler proof of Jain et al.’s recent breakthrough result, which demonstrates that the expressive power of quantum interactive proof systems coincides with that of its classical counterpart, and therefore PSPACE. (*) We determine the complexity of several variants of quantum competing-prover interactive proof systems, which introduce zero-sum games into interactive proof systems. In particular, we prove that the complexity class of two-turn quantum refereed games coincides with PSPACE, answering an important open problem of Jain et al.’s. Our result suggests that a more general model called double quantum interactive proof systems coincides with PSPACE, which subsumes and unifies all previous results on short refereed games. (*) We contribute to the study of two-prover quantum Merlin-Arthur games (QMA(2)), which exhibit an intriguing tradeoff between an intrinsic quantum ingredient, entanglement, and computational power. We prove a PSPACE upper bound for a variant of QMA(2) that is to date the most general one known in PSPACE. We also provide a quasi-polynomial time algorithm for optimizing linear functions over separable states, giving an alternative to the one proposed by Brandao et al. Our main technical contribution behind the above results is the equilibrium value method for obtaining space-efficient algorithms for a class of optimization problems that arise naturally in quantum computation. We also contribute to QMA-complete problems, where we demonstrate that the “Non-Identity Check” problem remains QMA-complete on circuits of poly-logarithmic depths, improving upon polynomial depths from previous results.

•Jan 1, 2013•0 citations

Quantum Strategies

David Meyer

We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in classical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). While not every two-person zero-sum finite game has an equilibrium in the set of pure strategies, von Neumann showed that there is always an equilibrium at which each player follows a mixed strategy. A mixed strategy deviating from the equilibrium strategy cannot increase a player's expected payoff. We show by example, however, that a player who implements a quantum strategy can increase his expected payoff, and explain the relation to efficient quantum algorithms.

arXiv:quant-ph/9804010•Physical Review Letters•Feb 1, 1999•781 citations

Tripartite Dynamic Zero-Sum Quantum Games

Huimin Cheng, Ming-Xing Luo

The Nash equilibrium plays a crucial role in game theory. Most of results are based on classical resources. Our goal in this paper is to explore multipartite zero-sum game with quantum settings. We find that in two different settings there is no strategy for a tripartite classical game being fair. Interestingly, this is resolved by providing dynamic zero-sum quantum games using single quantum state. Moreover, the gains of some players may be changed dynamically in terms of the committed state. Both quantum games are robust against the preparation noise and measurement errors.

Entropy•Jan 27, 2021•6 citations
This paper studies a simple class of zero-sum games played by two competing quantum players: each player sends a mixed quantum state to a referee, who performs a joint measurement on the two states to determine the players' payoffs. We prove that an equilibrium point of any such game can be approximated by means of an efficient parallel algorithm, which implies that one-turn quantum refereed games, wherein the referee is specified by a quantum circuit, can be simulated in polynomial space.
This thesis studies one-turn quantum refereed games, which are abstract zero-sum games with two competing computationally unbounded quantum provers and a computationally bounded quantum referee. The provers send quantum states to the referee, who plugs the two states into his quantum circuit, measures the output of the circuit in the standard basis, and declares one of the two players as the winner depending on the outcome of the measurement. The complexity class QRG(1) comprises of those promise problems for which there exists a one-turn quantum refereed game such that one of the players wins with high probability for the yes-instances, and the other player wins with high probability for the no-instances, irrespective of the opponent’s strategy. QRG(1) is a generalization of QMA (or co-QMA), and can informally be viewed as QMA with a no-prover (or co-QMA with a yes-prover). \n \nWe have given a full characterization of QRG(1), starting with appropriate definitions and known results, and building on to two new results about this class. Previously, the best known upper bound on QRG(1) was PSPACE. We have proved that if one of the provers is completely classical, sending a classical probability distribution instead of a quantum state, the new class, which we name CQRG(1), is contained in Ǝ · PP (non- deterministic polynomial-time operator applied to the class PP). We have also defined another restricted version of QRG(1) where both provers send quantum states, but the referee measures one of the quantum states first, and plugs the classical outcome into the measurement, along with the other prover’s quantum state, into a quantum circuit, before measuring the output of the quantum circuit in the standard basis. The new class, which we name MQRG(1), is contained in P · PP (the probabilistic polynomial time operator applied to PP). Ǝ · PP is contained in P · PP, which is, in turn, contained in PSPACE. Hence, our results give better containments than PSPACE for restricted versions of QRG(1).
We derive sublinear-time quantum algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of two-player zero-sum games, based on efficient Gibbs sampling methods. We are able to achieve speed-ups for both dense and sparse payoff matrices at the cost of a mildly increased dependence on the additive error compared to classical algorithms. In particular we can find ε\varepsilonε-approximate Nash equilibrium strategies in complexity O~(n+m/ε3)\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n+m}/\varepsilon^3)O~(n+m​/ε3) and O~(s/ε3.5)\tilde{O}(\sqrt{s}/\varepsilon^{3.5})O~(s​/ε3.5) respectively, where n×mn\times mn×m is the size of the matrix describing the game and sss is its sparsity. Our algorithms use the LP formulation of the problem and apply techniques developed in recent works on quantum SDP-solvers. We also show how to reduce general LP-solving to zero-sum games, resulting in quantum LP-solvers that have complexities O~(n+mγ3)\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n+m}γ^3)O~(n+m​γ3) and O~(sγ3.5)\tilde{O}(\sqrt{s}γ^{3.5})O~(s​γ3.5) for the dense and sparse access models respectively, where γγγ is the relevant "scale-invariant" precision parameter
We establish the first hardness results for the problem of computing the value of one-round games played by a referee and a team of players who can share quantum entanglement. In particular, we show that it is NP-hard to approximate within an inverse polynomial the value of a one-round game with (i) quantum referee and two entangled players or (ii) classical referee and three entangled players. Previously it was not even known if computing the value exactly is NP-hard. We also describe a mathematical conjecture, which, if true, would imply hardness of approximation to within a constant.We start our proof by describing two ways to modify classical multi-player games to make them resistant to entangled players. We then show that a strategy for the modified game that uses entanglement can be "rounded'' to one that does not. The results then follow from classical inapproximability bounds. Our work implies that, unless P = NP, the values of entangled-player games cannot be computed by semidefinite programs that are polynomial in the size of the referee's system, a method that has been successful for more restricted quantum games.
Interactive proof systems form an important complexity model that has been central to many prominent results in computational complexity theory, such as those on probabilistically checkable proofs, hardness of approximation, and fundamental cryptographic primitives. In this thesis, we study the quantum-enhanced version of interactive proof systems, in which each party has access to quantum computing resources. We focus on its power and limitations, which lead us to the following results. (*) We provide an alternative and conceptually simpler proof of Jain et al.’s recent breakthrough result, which demonstrates that the expressive power of quantum interactive proof systems coincides with that of its classical counterpart, and therefore PSPACE. (*) We determine the complexity of several variants of quantum competing-prover interactive proof systems, which introduce zero-sum games into interactive proof systems. In particular, we prove that the complexity class of two-turn quantum refereed games coincides with PSPACE, answering an important open problem of Jain et al.’s. Our result suggests that a more general model called double quantum interactive proof systems coincides with PSPACE, which subsumes and unifies all previous results on short refereed games. (*) We contribute to the study of two-prover quantum Merlin-Arthur games (QMA(2)), which exhibit an intriguing tradeoff between an intrinsic quantum ingredient, entanglement, and computational power. We prove a PSPACE upper bound for a variant of QMA(2) that is to date the most general one known in PSPACE. We also provide a quasi-polynomial time algorithm for optimizing linear functions over separable states, giving an alternative to the one proposed by Brandao et al. Our main technical contribution behind the above results is the equilibrium value method for obtaining space-efficient algorithms for a class of optimization problems that arise naturally in quantum computation. We also contribute to QMA-complete problems, where we demonstrate that the “Non-Identity Check” problem remains QMA-complete on circuits of poly-logarithmic depths, improving upon polynomial depths from previous results.
We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in classical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). While not every two-person zero-sum finite game has an equilibrium in the set of pure strategies, von Neumann showed that there is always an equilibrium at which each player follows a mixed strategy. A mixed strategy deviating from the equilibrium strategy cannot increase a player's expected payoff. We show by example, however, that a player who implements a quantum strategy can increase his expected payoff, and explain the relation to efficient quantum algorithms.
The Nash equilibrium plays a crucial role in game theory. Most of results are based on classical resources. Our goal in this paper is to explore multipartite zero-sum game with quantum settings. We find that in two different settings there is no strategy for a tripartite classical game being fair. Interestingly, this is resolved by providing dynamic zero-sum quantum games using single quantum state. Moreover, the gains of some players may be changed dynamically in terms of the committed state. Both quantum games are robust against the preparation noise and measurement errors.