To understand the foundations of quantum mechanics, we have to think carefully about how theoretical concepts are rooted in -- and limited by -- the nature of experience, as Bohr attempted to show. Geometrical pictures of physical phenomena are favored because of their clarity. Quantum phenomena, however, do not permit them. Instead, the historical and dynamical aspects of description diverge and must be expressed in different but complementary languages. Objective historical facts are recorded in terms of objects, which necessarily have an imprecise, empirical quality. Dynamics is based on quantitative abstraction from recurring patterns. The "quantum of action" is the discontinuity between these two ways of looking at the physical world.
To understand the foundations of quantum mechanics, we have to think carefully about how theoretical concepts are rooted in -- and limited by -- the nature of experience, as Bohr attempted to show. Geometrical pictures of physical phenomena are favored because of their clarity. Quantum phenomena, however, do not permit them. Instead, the historical and dynamical aspects of description diverge and must be expressed in different but complementary languages. Objective historical facts are recorded in terms of objects, which necessarily have an imprecise, empirical quality. Dynamics is based on quantitative abstraction from recurring patterns. The "quantum of action" is the discontinuity between these two ways of looking at the physical world.
After some historical remarks concerning Schroedinger's discovery of wave mechanics, we present a unified formalism for the mathematical description of classical and quantum-mechanical systems, utilizing elements of the theory of operator algebras. We then review some basic aspects of quantum mechanics and, in particular, of its interpretation. We attempt to clarify what Quantum Mechanics tells us about Nature when appropriate experiments are made. We discuss the importance of the mechanisms of "dephasing" and "decoherence" in associating "facts" with possible events and rendering complementary possible events mutually exclusive.
The procedure used to "do physics" in the macroscopic world is familiar: You take an object, start it off with a particular position and velocity, subject it to known forces (say gravity or friction, or both), and follow its trajectory. You then measure the dynamical properties (say position or energy) of that object at a later time and compare those measurements with the prediction using Isaac Newton's laws of motion. Newton's laws directly predict what those quantities should be at that later time, so the comparison is straightforward. However, the microscopic laws of physics, quantum mechanics, aren't so simple. The quantum concepts are so alien and counterintuitive that the language used to describe the mathematics and physics is often ambiguous and confusing. Therefore, for you to \emph{really} understand what is going on, some mathematics must be used. This is my attempt to explain some "weird facts" using a minimum of mathematics, yet eliminating as much ambiguity as possible.
We take it for granted that our physical environment communicates information, making things observable and measurable. However, there are very strong constraints on the fundamental physics of any universe that can do this. Measuring or communicating any kind of information always requires an appropriate interactive context, and these contexts are necessarily complex, involving other kinds of information determined in different contexts. This makes measurement hard to grasp theoretically, since every measurement depends on other kinds of measurements. Even so, we can identify some basic functional requirements for a physics that determines and communicates facts. These are sufficient to explain the peculiar features of quantum mechanics, combining the unitary evolution of superpositions with the mysterious "collapse" that occurs whenever the context allows new facts to be defined. Moreover, the precise determinism of classical physics can be understood on the same basis. It seems likely, in fact, that most of the complexity and fine-tuning we see in our most fundamental theories is needed to make any kind of information measurable.
Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabiities for physical events: both state and probability are objective--not because they represent elements of phyiscal reality, but because each exerts norrmative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not "collapse" on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violations of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate "spooky" non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps us to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner's friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.
Since its inception Bohmian mechanics has been generally regarded as a hidden-variable theory aimed at providing an objective description of quantum phenomena. To date, this rather narrow conception of Bohm’s proposal has caused it more rejection than acceptance. Now, after 65 years of Bohmian mechanics, should still be such an interpretational aspect the prevailing appraisal? Why not favoring a more pragmatic view, as a legitimate picture of quantum mechanics, on equal footing in all respects with any other more conventional quantum picture? These questions are used here to introduce a discussion on an alternative way to deal with Bohmian mechanics at present, enhancing its aspect as an efficient and useful picture or formulation to tackle, explore, describe and explain quantum phenomena where phase and correlation ( entanglement ) are key elements. This discussion is presented through two complementary blocks. The first block is aimed at briefly revisiting the historical context that gave rise to the appearance of Bohmian mechanics, and how this approach or analogous ones have been used in different physical contexts. This discussion is used to emphasize a more pragmatic view to the detriment of the more conventional hidden-variable (ontological) approach that has been a leitmotif within the quantum foundations. The second block focuses on some particular formal aspects of Bohmian mechanics supporting the view presented here, with special emphasis on the physical meaning of the local phase field and the associated velocity field encoded within the wave function. As an illustration, a simple model of Young’s two-slit experiment is considered. The simplicity of this model allows to understand in an easy manner how the information conveyed by the Bohmian formulation relates to other more conventional concepts in quantum mechanics. This sort of pedagogical application is also aimed at showing the potential interest to introduce Bohmian mechanics in undergraduate quantum mechanics courses as a working tool rather than merely an alternative interpretation.
The spectacular successes of quantum physics have made it a commonplace to assert that we live in a quantum world. This idea seems to imply a kind of "quantum fundamentalism" according to which everything in the universe (if not the universe as a whole) is fundamentally of a quantum nature and ultimately describable in quantum-mechanical terms. Bohr's conception of quantum mechanics has traditionally been seen as opposed to such a view, not least because of his insistence on the necessity of the concepts of classical physics in the account of quantum phenomena. Recently, however, a consensus seems to be emerging among careful commentators on Bohr to the effect that he, after all, did subscribe to some version of quantum fundamentalism. Against this consensus, and by re-examining the historical record, I will defend a variant of the traditional reading of Bohr in which (1) the answer to what an object is (quantum or classical) depends on the experimental context; and (2) in principle, any physical system can be treated quantum-mechanically but not all systems can be treated that way at the same time.