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arXiv:quant-ph/9805047

Is quantum mechanics non-local?

Henry Pierce Stapp

Published May 15, 1998• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

A recent proof, couched in the symbolic language of modal logic, shows that a well-defined formulation of the question posed in the title is answered affirmatively. In a paper with the same title Unruh has tried in various ways to translate the symbolic proof into normal prose, and has claimed that the proof must fail in some way or another. A correct translation is given here, and it is explained why the difficulties encountered by Unruh do not actually arise.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9805047

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A recent proof, couched in the symbolic language of modal logic, shows that a well-defined formulation of the question posed in the title is answered affirmatively. In a paper with the same title Unruh has tried in various ways to translate the symbolic proof into normal prose, and has claimed that the proof must fail in some way or another. A correct translation is given here, and it is explained why the difficulties encountered by Unruh do not actually arise.
A recent proof, formulated in the symbolic language of modal logic, shows that a well-defined formulation of the possibility mentioned in the title is answered affirmatively. In the paper being commented upon several proposals were made about how to translate this symbolic proof into prose, and it was concluded, on the basis of those proposed translations, that either the proof was invalid or that an unwarranted reality assumption was made. However, those interpretations deviate in small but important ways from the precise logical path followed in the proof. It is explained here how by staying on this path one avoids the difficulties that those deviations engendered.
A recent proof [H. P. Stapp, Am. J. Phys. 65, 300 (1997)], formulated in the symbolic language of modal logic, claims to show that contemporary quantum theory, viewed as a set of rules that allow us to calculate statistical predictions among certain kinds of observations, cannot be imbedded in any rational framework that conforms to the principles that (1) the experimenters' choices of which experiments they will perform can be considered to be free choices, (2) outcomes of measurements are unique, and (3) the free choices just mentioned have no backward-in-time effects of any kind. This claim is similar to Bell's theorem, but much stronger, because no reality assumption alien to quantum philosophy is used. The paper being commented on [W. Unruh, Phys. Rev. A 59, 126 (1999)] argues that some such reality assumption has been ``smuggled'' in. That argument is examined here and shown, I believe, to be defective.
William Unruh has commented on my recent proof of the incompatibility of certain predictions of quantum theory with the idea that no influence of any kind can act backward in time in any Lorentz frame.He argues that my proof contains, contrary to my explicit claim, a tacit reality assumption that conflicts with the ideas quantum theory.I show here that Unruh's argument fails to draw a necessary distinction between statements that make an assertion about actual values and statements that make an assertion about correlations between possible values, and that consequently his argument fails demonstrate the occurrence in my proof of any reality assumption that is alien to the principles of quantum theory.