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arXiv:quant-ph/9802025 · Journal of the ACM

Unconditional security in quantum cryptography

Dominic Mayers

Published May 1, 2001• 1,135 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Basic techniques to prove the unconditional security of quantum crypto graphy are described. They are applied to a quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard [1984]. The proof considers a practical variation on the protocol in which the channel is noisy and photos may be lost during the transmission. Each individual signal sent into the channel must contain a single photon or any two-dimensional system in the exact state described in the protocol. No restriction is imposed on the detector used at the receiving side of the channel, except that whether or not the received system is detected must be independent of the basis used to measure this system.

DOI
10.1145/382780.382781

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Basic techniques to prove the unconditional security of quantum crypto graphy are described. They are applied to a quantum key distribution protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard [1984]. The proof considers a practical variation on the protocol in which the channel is noisy and photos may be lost during the transmission. Each individual signal sent into the channel must contain a single photon or any two-dimensional system in the exact state described in the protocol. No restriction is imposed on the detector used at the receiving side of the channel, except that whether or not the received system is detected must be independent of the basis used to measure this system.
In this paper I present a protocol for quantum cryptography which is secure against attacks on individual signals. It is based on the Bennett-Brassard protocol of 1984. The security proof is complete as far as the use of single photons as signal states is concerned. Emphasis is placed on the practicability of the resulting protocol. For each run of the quantum key distribution the security statement gives the probability of a successful key generation and the probability for an eavesdropper's knowledge, measured as change in Shannon entropy, to be below a specified maximal value.
We prove the unconditional security of the original Bennett 1992 protocol with strong reference pulse. We show that we may place a projection onto suitably defined qubit spaces before the receiver, which makes the analysis as simple as qubit-based protocols. Unlike the single-photon-based qubits, the qubits identified in this scheme are almost surely detected by the receiver even after a lossy channel. This leads to the key generation rate that is proportional to the channel transmission rate for proper choices of experimental parameters.
It is generally accepted that quantum key distribution (QKD) could supply legitimate users with unconditional security during their communication. Quite a lot of satisfactory efforts have been achieved on experimentations with quantum cryptography. However, when the eavesdropper has extra-powerful computational ability, has access to a quantum computer, for example, and can carry into execution any eavesdropping measurement that is allowed by the laws of physics, the security against such attacks has not been widely studied and rigorously proved for most QKD protocols. Quite recently, Shor and Preskill proved concisely the unconditional security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol. Their method is highly valued for its clarity of concept and concision of form. In order to take advantage of the Shor-Preskill technique in their proof of the unconditional security of the BB84 QKD protocol, we introduced in this paper a transformation that can translate the Bennett 1992 (B92) protocol into the BB84 protocol. By proving that the transformation leaks no more information to the eavesdropper, we proved the unconditional security of the B92 protocol. We also settled the problem proposed by Lo about how to prove the unconditional security of the B92 protocol with the Shor-Preskill method.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the leading example in the field of quantum information that shows, how the explicit use of quantum mechanics allows to solve tasks that cannot be solved in the classical regime. Despite noisy and lossy transmission lines and detectors, we can make these systems work with todays technology. In doing so, we are able to maintain the rigorous notion of unconditional security that characterizes the idealized protocol by Bennett and Brassard 1 . In this article I introduce the concept of QKD and show the problems that occur in the realizations. These problems impose limitations on what we can achieve with QKD which we review together with a recent positive security proof.