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arXiv:quant-ph/9710046

Can a falling tree make a noise in two forests at the same time?

Aephraim M. Steinberg

Published Oct 21, 1997• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

It is a commonplace to claim that quantum mechanics supports the old idea that a tree falling in a forest makes no sound unless there is a listener present. In fact, this conclusion is far from obvious. Furthermore, if a tunnelling particle is observed in the barrier region, it collapses to a state in which it is no longer tunnelling. Does this imply that while tunnelling, the particle can not have any physical effects? I argue that this is not the case, and moreover, speculate that it may be possible for a particle to have effects on two spacelike separate apparatuses simultaneously. I discuss the measurable consequences of such a feat, and speculate about possible statistical tests which could distinguish this view of quantum mechanics from a ``corpuscular'' one. Brief remarks are made about an experiment underway at Toronto to investigate these issues.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9710046

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Quantum Mechanics without Nonlocality

Nikolay Leonidovich Chuprikov

We argue that quantum nonlocality of entangled states is not an actual phenomenon. It appears in quantum mechanics as a consequence of the inconsistency of its superposition principle with the corpuscular properties of a quantum particle. In the existing form, this principle does not distinguish between macroscopically distinct states of a particle and their superpositions: it implies introducing observables for a particle, even if it is in an entangled state. However, a particle cannot take part simultaneously in two or more alternative macroscopically distinct sub-processes. Thus, calculating the expectation values of the one-particle's observables, for entangled states, is physically meaningless: Born's formula is not applicable to such states. The same concerns the entangled states of compound quantum systems. In the {\it existing} quantum mechanics, introducing Bell's inequalities is fully legal. However, these inequalities imply averaging over an entangled state, and, hence, they have no basis for their clear physical interpretation. Experiments to confirm the violation of Bell's inequalities do not prove the existence of nonlocality in microcosm. They confirm only that correlations introduced in the existing theory of entangled states have no physical sense, for they contradict special relativity.

arXiv:quant-ph/0602173•Feb 21, 2006•1 citation

Time-symmetric quantum mechanics questioned and defended

Yakir Aharonov, Sandu Popescu, Jeff Tollaksen

Aharonov, Popescu, and Tollaksen reply: We thank the letter writers for their interest and for the opportunity to better clarify our ideas.Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson make essentially the same point—namely, that our ideas are completely wrong. To put their criticism in the right context, we point out that the outcome of our research program is twofold. First, we have discovered an entirely new class of quantum effects; second, we present a new way of thinking about quantum mechanics.The fact that quantum mechanics predicts the effects we discovered is just that, a fact. The effects are computed using standard quantum mechanics, without additions or modifications. As such, their prediction by quantum mechanics is beyond doubt (unless one suspects algebraic mistakes). Furthermore, many of our effects have been verified experimentally; in particular, different versions of our amplification method have been used as novel technological tools. Both Nauenberg and Hobson completely ignore our effects. But one should not ignore them. They are novel and they are strange. Even more, they don’t appear in isolation, but they form a well-structured pattern. Surely there is a lesson here that quantum mechanics wants to teach us; one ignores it at one’s peril.On the other hand, our way of looking at quantum mechanics is certainly unconventional; it introduces new concepts, and it approaches old concepts in a new way. That is essentially what the two letter writers point out, Hobson most emphatically when he writes that our article “is riddled with errors.” We are criticized for thinking in a different way and for asking new questions. But our way of thinking leads to the same predictions as the conventional way, so as far as experiments are concerned they are completely equivalent. As Richard Feynman says in his book The Character of Physical Law (Modern Library, 1994), suppose we have “two theories” that “have all the consequences . . . exactly the same. . . . How are we going to decide which one is right? There is no way by science, because they both agree with the experiment to the same extent.” So the criticism is baseless.At the same time, if our approach is completely equivalent to the standard one, why bother? Again Feynman gives the best answer: “For psychological reasons . . . , these two things may be far from equivalent, because one gives a man different ideas from the other. . . . There will be something, for instance, in theory A that talks about something, . . . but to find out what the corresponding thing is . . . in [theory] B may be very complicated—it may not be a very simple idea at all.” As a consequence, a new way of thinking allows one to ask new questions that, although they could be asked in the old theory as well, would have been very difficult to even envisage. That is precisely what we did. First, we raised the issue of the physics in pre- and postselected ensembles. And to reply to Hobson, no, there is nothing “erroneous” in the process of postselection. Postselection is a question about results of experiments, and every question about the results of actual measurements is legitimate. Subsequently, we discovered the concept of weak measurements, which in turn led us to discover the various effects we presented. Since the power of any new approach is given by its ability to predict new effects, one should conclude that ours is strong indeed.Furthermore, as many physicists agree, an intuitive understanding of quantum mechanics is still missing. That is why quantum physicists are surprised over and over again by the discovery of strange and unexpected fundamental effects. We hope that our new way of thinking is a step toward the long-sought intuition. Even more important, the new way of thinking may give us new ideas about what to change, if experiments ever turn out to contradict quantum mechanics and therefore require its modification. In particular, since we tinker with the idea of time— one of the most important concepts in physics—starting the change from there may be a very potent method.Shaul Mukamel refers to our experiment in which the component along some given axis of a spin-1⁄2 particle is found, by a weak measurement, to have the value √2‾/2 which is √2‾ times larger than the largest eigenvalue. He suggests an alternative explanation based on a classical vector model of spin. According to his explanation, values up to √3‾/2 should be possible. However, we presented the experiment showing √2‾/2 only because it was mathematically simple; by choosing a different postselection, we could have obtained, as results of weak measurements, values as large as we wanted. Hence the above simple classical-vector view doesn’t work.Robert Griffiths points out that there are two other time-symmetric formulations of quantum mechanics besides ours—“consistent histories” and “decoherent histories.” In particular, Griffiths is right when he emphasizes a major difference in spirit between our theory and consistent histories. The main goal of consistent histories is to find an explanation for the (apparent?) collapse of the wavefunction during a quantum measurement; although that solution is hotly disputed, as are all other solutions to the collapse problem, it is certainly a very ingenious one. However, an answer to the collapse problem is not our primary interest (though we are starting to see glimmers of an alternative answer to it using our approach).The letter by Griffiths, however, runs the risk of being misread as implying that solving the collapse problem will by itself clarify most or all of the counterintuitive aspects of quantum mechanics. That conclusion would be wrong. Quantum mechanics is strange and unusual and defies intuition in many ways; solving the collapse problem is by no means its only interesting fundamental issue. Nor can the solution of that one problem lead to a complete understanding of quantum phenomena. That particles tunnel in the first place is surprising by itself; even more so is the fact that, as we showed, perfectly good measuring devices, working with arbitrarily high precision, indicate consistently that the tunneling particles have negative kinetic energy. Equally surprising is that we can arrange a situation in which perfectly good measurements, made with as high a precision as we want, indicate that spin-1⁄2 particles have arbitrarily large spin. And these are only two examples. As far as we are aware, none of the many proposed solutions to the collapse problem make these effects seem less surprising, let alone predict them.© 2011 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•May 1, 2011•7 citations

Can we hear the sounds of quantum superpositions?

Vlatko Vedral

In this article I explore the possibility of being able to hear the sound of a quantum superposition of two sounds. What would it mean and is it feasible to explore performing an experiment that would allow us to test this notion?

Muzikologija•Jan 1, 2018•2 citations

The subtle sound of quantum jumps

Antoine Tilloy

Could we hear the pop of a wave-function collapse, and if so, what would it sound like? There exist reconstructions or modifications of quantum mechanics (collapse models) where this archetypal signature of randomness exists and can in principle be witnessed. But, perhaps surprisingly, the resulting sound is disappointingly banal, indistinguishable from any other click. The problem of finding the right description of the world between two completely different classes of models -- where wave functions jump and where they do not -- is empirically undecidable. Behind this seemingly trivial observation lie deep lessons about the rigidity of quantum mechanics, the difficulty to blame unpredictability on intrinsic randomness, and more generally the physical limitations to our knowledge of reality.

arXiv:2007.15420•Jul 30, 2020•1 citation

Speculation on Gibb's Paradox

Francesco R. Ruggeri

Gibb’s paradox seems to arise when one considers an ideal gas of N particles, energy E, temperature T in a box of volume V and compares its entropy to two subsystems created by inserting a partition into the middle of the container without doing work. Each subsystem has N/2 particles, occupies V/2 and has E/2 and T. The issue is that one wishes to have 2 S subsystem = S full system, i.e. to have entropy be extensive. To do so, a function of N is inserted into the entropy formula and it is argued that this has to do with identical particles and ultimately with quantum mechanics. We argue that there seems to be a problem with this picture, namely the assignment of N/2 particles to each subsystem as this involves a measurement and hence changes entropy. To simplify matters, we consider a full system of 2 particles. Boltzmann’s notion of entropy is - k ln( number of states). Here the issue primarily seems to be with volume states, i.e. a particle can be in any tiny volume cell with equal probability. In the full V case, each of the two particles can be in any volume cell in V, but the same is true if one inserts a partition separating V into two V/2 cells. One cannot possibly know if one particle is in each cell unless one makes a measurement before inserting the partition and making a measurement changes entropy. When writing the number of states, these are probabilistic scenarios. It is possible that 2 particles are on one side of the partition and 0 on the other or 1 on each. The number of possible states for the partitioned system is the same as for the full volume. As a result, there is no paradox. There is only a paradox if one assumes that there is 1 particle on each side which is an assumption which cannot be made without making a measurement.

•Jun 21, 2026•0 citations

The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy

Eddy Keming Chen

In this thought-provoking book, Richard Healey proposes a new interpretation of quantum theory inspired by pragmatist philosophy. Healey puts forward the interpretation as an alternative to realist quantum theories on the one hand such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse theories, and many-worlds interpretations, which are different proposals for describing what the quantum world is like and what the basic laws of physics are, and nonrealist interpretations on the other hand such as quantum Bayesianism, which proposes to understand quantum theory as describing agents’ subjective epistemic states. The central idea of Healey's proposal is to understand quantum theory as providing not a description of the physical world but a set of authoritative and objectively correct prescriptions about how agents should act. The book provides a detailed development and defense of that idea, and it contains interesting discussions about a wide range of philosophical issues such as representation, probability, explanation, causation, objectivity, meaning, and fundamentality.Healey's project is at the intersection of physics and philosophy. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 of the book discusses the foundational questions in quantum theory from the perspective of the prescriptive interpretation. In part 2, Healey discusses the philosophical implications of the view. Both parts are written in a way that is largely accessible to nonspecialists. In this brief book review, I will focus on two questions:1. How does Healey's interpretation work?2. What are the costs and benefits of accepting his interpretation?To understand Healey's ideas, we should provide some background for nonspecialists. Quantum theory has been subject to intense scrutiny and philosophical investigations in the last century. There has been enormous progress on several fronts, including the empirical tests about Bell inequalities and the development of several realist interpretations. It has been proposed that what is revolutionary about quantum theory and what sets it apart from classical physics are quantum entanglement and quantum nonlocality. For many realists, it seems that quantum theory describes a different kind of ontology and a different kind of laws of nature. They are introduced briefly below.Quantum entanglement describes the phenomenon that some physical systems have irreducibly holistic properties that are not the logical sums of the properties of the parts. For example, two electrons A and B are entangled when the pair has a quantum state that cannot be reduced to some combination of the state of A and the state of B. Quantum entanglement, a manifestation of quantum nonseparability, is reflected in the way quantum states, which are typically represented by “wave functions,” get assigned to different systems.Quantum nonlocality (also called “spooky action at a distance”) describes the phenomenon that events that are arbitrarily far apart can influence one another and the strength of the influence does not depend on their distance. Quantum nonlocality is a strange feature, and its falsity was assumed in the 1935 argument by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen for the incompleteness of quantum theory. Remarkably, Bell (1964) proved that if the quantum predictions are accurate, then nature is nonlocal. Subsequent experimental tests since the 1980s have verified the quantum predictions to a high level of precision, reinforcing the conclusion that nature is nonlocal.1Among the realist theories of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories are nonlocal. Moreover, all three realist theories, including the many-worlds interpretation, affirm the reality of quantum entanglement. The reality of quantum entanglement follows from the reality of the quantum state. After all, the quantum state is so successful in application. If one wants to be a realist, it seems that the most natural way is to accept the reality of the quantum state and its consequences. But what is represented by the wave function? What is its nature? How does it relate to things in the physical world? Some recent discussions in philosophy of physics concern exactly those questions.2I think the key to understanding Healey's interpretation is to think of it as a proposal for an alternative foundation of quantum theory—a proposal to use normative facts instead of descriptive facts as the foundation and to replace “what there is” with “what we ought to expect” as what is fundamental to physical theory. Healey's approach would sound alien to many people, since it is not realist in any traditional sense. It is common to think that fundamental physics, and in particular quantum theory, is in the business of saying what the world is like (even though it may be difficult to discern what it says). It is true that we can learn useful advice from a correct physical theory, such as:one should avoid falling into a black holeone should place detectors far away from sources of interferenceone should get away from a nuclear explosionone should be almost certain to see this particle decay in 1 monthA correct physical theory may explain the correctness of useful practical advices such as above. Such advices are objectively correct insofar as they are derived from the conjunction of some accurate descriptions of physical reality and some correct theories of human rationality.3 For Healey, that might be a fine interpretation of classical physics, but that is not the correct interpretation of quantum theory. Quantum theory, for Healey, directly offers authoritative advice about what we should believe and expect, and such advice is not derived in any way from some underlying descriptive facts. Still, such advice can be objectively true (unlike the quantum Bayesian's emphasis on subjective epistemic states). The advice has the form “one should assign quantum state ψ to the physical system s,” and “one should have 0.5 confidence in M,” where M is some kind of magnitude claim about the physical system s. On Healey's interpretation, quantum theory is about such advice, not some descriptions about what nature is like. Although the magnitude claims are descriptions of nature, they are not contained in quantum theory. Instead, they are assumed to be the targets of explanation, and they are somewhat prior to the application of quantum theory. However, they will be suitably constrained by quantum theory, and only a subclass of them will be empirically significant.There are many parts to Healey's proposal. To simplify our discussions below, here is a short summary of the key points (mostly from chapter 5):Advice on state assignments: agents should follow the standard practice in quantum physics and assign an appropriate quantum state (e.g., a wave function ψ) to a system relative to their physical situation.Magnitude claims: a canonical magnitude claim has the form “the value of dynamical variable M on physical system s lies in set Δ.” One example would be “the position of the particle is on the left side of the box.” Magnitude claims are assumed in the theory and they are the targets of explanation. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and chap. 12, sec. 3, for elaborations.)Empirical significance: a magnitude claim is empirically significant if the relevant quantum state the agent should assign to the system has properly experienced decoherence due to interactions with the environment, where decoherence is a mathematical property of the quantum state. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and appendix C for more discussions on decoherence.)Advice on credences: agents should adopt credences about empirically significant magnitude claims according to the Born rule (setting one's credence about an empirically significant magnitude claim to be the squared modulo of the appropriate wave function).Descriptions of nature: none of the above, except for the magnitude claims, describes anything in nature. However, magnitude claims are not contained or entailed by quantum theory. They are given prior to the theory.Let us walk through a simple example. Suppose our physicist Alice sets up an experiment for the position measurement of a particle s. Alice wants to explain some magnitude claim about the particle's position (say, that it is on the left side of the box). Quantum theory tells her that she ought to assign a particular wave function ψ to the particle. (The magnitude claim about the particle's position will only become empirically significant when the particle has appropriately interacted with the environment such that different parts of the wave function are almost separated into macroscopically distinct regions as described by decoherence.) Her expectation about the (empirically significant) magnitude claim should match the probability given by the Born rule, which is the squared modulo of the wave function at this moment.Many questions arise at this point. For example: What makes a particular quantum state assignment appropriate? It is standard to assume that a state assignment is appropriate or correct in virtue of representational accuracy, that is, the system indeed has the particular quantum state. But Healey disagrees; it is more or less a basic fact, and if we want to explain it we can appeal to the practice within the scientific community, not some metaphysical facts about what nature is like. It seems to me that on Healey's project the correctness of state assignments is a fundamental normative fact, and any further inquiry about it may be a metanormative project. This is certainly hard to swallow for many realists, but it sheds light on how Healey tries to solve (or dissolve) traditional problems in quantum foundation. In the following, we discuss how Healey applies his interpretation to the quantum measurement problem, quantum entanglement, and Bell nonlocality.The quantum measurement problem is often presented as an inconsistency among three propositions: (1) the quantum state is a complete description of nature; (2) the quantum state always changes according to some unitary equation (e.g., the Schrödinger equation); and (3) experiments have determinate (unique) outcomes. Applying this to the above experimental setup involving Alice, we can derive a contradiction. If the quantum state is complete and it changes unitarily, then quantum theory implies there is no determinate outcome of the position measurement of the particle, since it will always be in a superposition of ψleft and ψright, which is inconsistent with (3)—the particle is measured to be either on the left side or the right side of the box. For Healey, (1) and (2) are simply nonstarters, and (3) is obviously true so that the measurement problem is a nonproblem. (See chap. 6 and especially p. 99.) This is because, in Healey's view, quantum theory is prescriptive, and it is a mistake to think that the quantum state describes the world, much less describes it completely. Moreover, in typical measurement contexts, such as in Alice's case, the appropriate quantum state has decohered after measurement, giving Alice permission to apply the Born rule to make probabilistic predictions. There is a determinate outcome of measurement, but it is not entailed or contained in quantum theory. Instead, determinate outcomes are something confirmed by our direct experiences. Furthermore, if the outcome were not determinate, quantum theory would lose its empirical justification. So in order to apply quantum theory, we have to assume that experimental outcomes are unique and determinate (in typical cases). This, again, is difficult to accept as a realist conception of quantum mechanics. It stands in sharp contrast to other single-world theories such as Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories that aim to justify (3) from a physical point of view. They seek to derive (3) as a theorem, by applying the precise mathematical equations to the microscopic ontology.For Healey, quantum entanglement is no longer metaphysically revolutionary. State assignments may be entangled and nonseparable in the sense that the complete state of the system does not supervene on the states of its parts. However, it seems that Healey would say that the failure of supervenience has no metaphysical significance but only normative significance. The advice about which state to assign to the whole system does not supervene, in general, on any advice on what to assign to the parts.Healey thinks that Bell nonlocality becomes more digestible on the prescriptive view (chap. 4). Healey does not dispute Bell's proof as a demonstration of the existence of nonlocal correlations, that is, probabilities of events happening in region A may depend on events happening in region B, which can be arbitrarily far away from A. But Healey does not think nonlocal correlations imply nonlocal influences or causation. What Bell's theorem (and the subsequent empirical tests) really shows is that the quantum probability of an event localized in some region must be “relativized to arbitrarily distant places and times” (71). Here it would seem that Healey's suggestion runs contrary to the kind of normal inferences we routinely make in science. It is standard to infer there are some goings-on in the world that account for the nonlocal correlations—some kind of underlying physical mechanism of nonlocal influence. For example, the mechanism is accounted for, in explicit physical details, by the guidance equation in Bohmian mechanics and the collapse mechanism in spontaneous collapse theories. But that is a mistake from Healey's perspective. Quantum theory postulates such nonlocal correlations as reliable prescriptions for agents who want to use quantum theory successfully, and it is a mistake to try to describe in virtue of what such correlations obtain.What are the reasons for accepting Healey's new interpretation of quantum theory? I think the main reason, for Healey, is that it allows us to avoid the surprising metaphysical consequences such as nonlocality and the reality of the quantum state. But at what cost? If Healey is right, then quantum theory is no longer in the business of describing nature. For most people, I think, that would be too costly.What about alternatives to Healey's theory? How do they compare to it? Healey gives reasons for thinking that they are inadequate (chap. 7). He thinks that spontaneous collapse theories are too speculative, and that they do not qualify as “interpretations.” He suggests that many-worlds theories still face the conceptual problems of probability and emergence of macroscopic branches. He notes that Bohmian mechanics faces problems in relativistic contexts. (Interestingly, Healey's objection to Bohmian mechanics is that it would postulate theoretical structure [e.g., preferred foliation of space-time, particle motion, and the universal wave function] that is empirically inaccessible, even though Healey himself postulates fundamental normative facts to be the foundation of quantum theory when normative facts have controversial epistemological and metaphysical standing in metaethics.) Healey does not discuss whether these are more costly than abandoning the descriptive role of quantum theory, but I think he would think they are. It is important to note that all of them are not only candidate descriptions of nature but are also in principle applicable to the universe as a whole, while Healey's interpretation is neither descriptive of nature nor applicable to the universe as a whole, since on his theory, the application of the Born rule is appropriate only when there is environmental decoherence (and the universe as a whole by definition has no external environment to interact with) (227).4As is the case with Healey's previous books, this one contains many interesting and controversial ideas that will generate much debate in the years to come. Above all, Healey should be applauded for writing a clear, accessible, and engaging introduction to the prescriptive interpretation of quantum theory. There are many issues that Healey discusses at length in the book that I do not have space to comment on. Even though we may not agree on the truth of the matter, we can certainly agree that Healey's book will be useful to anyone interested in the intersection of physics and philosophy.

arXiv:2110.12102•The Philosophical Review•Apr 1, 2020•0 citations
It is a commonplace to claim that quantum mechanics supports the old idea that a tree falling in a forest makes no sound unless there is a listener present. In fact, this conclusion is far from obvious. Furthermore, if a tunnelling particle is observed in the barrier region, it collapses to a state in which it is no longer tunnelling. Does this imply that while tunnelling, the particle can not have any physical effects? I argue that this is not the case, and moreover, speculate that it may be possible for a particle to have effects on two spacelike separate apparatuses simultaneously. I discuss the measurable consequences of such a feat, and speculate about possible statistical tests which could distinguish this view of quantum mechanics from a ``corpuscular'' one. Brief remarks are made about an experiment underway at Toronto to investigate these issues.
We argue that quantum nonlocality of entangled states is not an actual phenomenon. It appears in quantum mechanics as a consequence of the inconsistency of its superposition principle with the corpuscular properties of a quantum particle. In the existing form, this principle does not distinguish between macroscopically distinct states of a particle and their superpositions: it implies introducing observables for a particle, even if it is in an entangled state. However, a particle cannot take part simultaneously in two or more alternative macroscopically distinct sub-processes. Thus, calculating the expectation values of the one-particle's observables, for entangled states, is physically meaningless: Born's formula is not applicable to such states. The same concerns the entangled states of compound quantum systems. In the {\it existing} quantum mechanics, introducing Bell's inequalities is fully legal. However, these inequalities imply averaging over an entangled state, and, hence, they have no basis for their clear physical interpretation. Experiments to confirm the violation of Bell's inequalities do not prove the existence of nonlocality in microcosm. They confirm only that correlations introduced in the existing theory of entangled states have no physical sense, for they contradict special relativity.
Aharonov, Popescu, and Tollaksen reply: We thank the letter writers for their interest and for the opportunity to better clarify our ideas.Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson make essentially the same point—namely, that our ideas are completely wrong. To put their criticism in the right context, we point out that the outcome of our research program is twofold. First, we have discovered an entirely new class of quantum effects; second, we present a new way of thinking about quantum mechanics.The fact that quantum mechanics predicts the effects we discovered is just that, a fact. The effects are computed using standard quantum mechanics, without additions or modifications. As such, their prediction by quantum mechanics is beyond doubt (unless one suspects algebraic mistakes). Furthermore, many of our effects have been verified experimentally; in particular, different versions of our amplification method have been used as novel technological tools. Both Nauenberg and Hobson completely ignore our effects. But one should not ignore them. They are novel and they are strange. Even more, they don’t appear in isolation, but they form a well-structured pattern. Surely there is a lesson here that quantum mechanics wants to teach us; one ignores it at one’s peril.On the other hand, our way of looking at quantum mechanics is certainly unconventional; it introduces new concepts, and it approaches old concepts in a new way. That is essentially what the two letter writers point out, Hobson most emphatically when he writes that our article “is riddled with errors.” We are criticized for thinking in a different way and for asking new questions. But our way of thinking leads to the same predictions as the conventional way, so as far as experiments are concerned they are completely equivalent. As Richard Feynman says in his book The Character of Physical Law (Modern Library, 1994), suppose we have “two theories” that “have all the consequences . . . exactly the same. . . . How are we going to decide which one is right? There is no way by science, because they both agree with the experiment to the same extent.” So the criticism is baseless.At the same time, if our approach is completely equivalent to the standard one, why bother? Again Feynman gives the best answer: “For psychological reasons . . . , these two things may be far from equivalent, because one gives a man different ideas from the other. . . . There will be something, for instance, in theory A that talks about something, . . . but to find out what the corresponding thing is . . . in [theory] B may be very complicated—it may not be a very simple idea at all.” As a consequence, a new way of thinking allows one to ask new questions that, although they could be asked in the old theory as well, would have been very difficult to even envisage. That is precisely what we did. First, we raised the issue of the physics in pre- and postselected ensembles. And to reply to Hobson, no, there is nothing “erroneous” in the process of postselection. Postselection is a question about results of experiments, and every question about the results of actual measurements is legitimate. Subsequently, we discovered the concept of weak measurements, which in turn led us to discover the various effects we presented. Since the power of any new approach is given by its ability to predict new effects, one should conclude that ours is strong indeed.Furthermore, as many physicists agree, an intuitive understanding of quantum mechanics is still missing. That is why quantum physicists are surprised over and over again by the discovery of strange and unexpected fundamental effects. We hope that our new way of thinking is a step toward the long-sought intuition. Even more important, the new way of thinking may give us new ideas about what to change, if experiments ever turn out to contradict quantum mechanics and therefore require its modification. In particular, since we tinker with the idea of time— one of the most important concepts in physics—starting the change from there may be a very potent method.Shaul Mukamel refers to our experiment in which the component along some given axis of a spin-1⁄2 particle is found, by a weak measurement, to have the value √2‾/2 which is √2‾ times larger than the largest eigenvalue. He suggests an alternative explanation based on a classical vector model of spin. According to his explanation, values up to √3‾/2 should be possible. However, we presented the experiment showing √2‾/2 only because it was mathematically simple; by choosing a different postselection, we could have obtained, as results of weak measurements, values as large as we wanted. Hence the above simple classical-vector view doesn’t work.Robert Griffiths points out that there are two other time-symmetric formulations of quantum mechanics besides ours—“consistent histories” and “decoherent histories.” In particular, Griffiths is right when he emphasizes a major difference in spirit between our theory and consistent histories. The main goal of consistent histories is to find an explanation for the (apparent?) collapse of the wavefunction during a quantum measurement; although that solution is hotly disputed, as are all other solutions to the collapse problem, it is certainly a very ingenious one. However, an answer to the collapse problem is not our primary interest (though we are starting to see glimmers of an alternative answer to it using our approach).The letter by Griffiths, however, runs the risk of being misread as implying that solving the collapse problem will by itself clarify most or all of the counterintuitive aspects of quantum mechanics. That conclusion would be wrong. Quantum mechanics is strange and unusual and defies intuition in many ways; solving the collapse problem is by no means its only interesting fundamental issue. Nor can the solution of that one problem lead to a complete understanding of quantum phenomena. That particles tunnel in the first place is surprising by itself; even more so is the fact that, as we showed, perfectly good measuring devices, working with arbitrarily high precision, indicate consistently that the tunneling particles have negative kinetic energy. Equally surprising is that we can arrange a situation in which perfectly good measurements, made with as high a precision as we want, indicate that spin-1⁄2 particles have arbitrarily large spin. And these are only two examples. As far as we are aware, none of the many proposed solutions to the collapse problem make these effects seem less surprising, let alone predict them.© 2011 American Institute of Physics.
Could we hear the pop of a wave-function collapse, and if so, what would it sound like? There exist reconstructions or modifications of quantum mechanics (collapse models) where this archetypal signature of randomness exists and can in principle be witnessed. But, perhaps surprisingly, the resulting sound is disappointingly banal, indistinguishable from any other click. The problem of finding the right description of the world between two completely different classes of models -- where wave functions jump and where they do not -- is empirically undecidable. Behind this seemingly trivial observation lie deep lessons about the rigidity of quantum mechanics, the difficulty to blame unpredictability on intrinsic randomness, and more generally the physical limitations to our knowledge of reality.
Gibb’s paradox seems to arise when one considers an ideal gas of N particles, energy E, temperature T in a box of volume V and compares its entropy to two subsystems created by inserting a partition into the middle of the container without doing work. Each subsystem has N/2 particles, occupies V/2 and has E/2 and T. The issue is that one wishes to have 2 S subsystem = S full system, i.e. to have entropy be extensive. To do so, a function of N is inserted into the entropy formula and it is argued that this has to do with identical particles and ultimately with quantum mechanics. We argue that there seems to be a problem with this picture, namely the assignment of N/2 particles to each subsystem as this involves a measurement and hence changes entropy. To simplify matters, we consider a full system of 2 particles. Boltzmann’s notion of entropy is - k ln( number of states). Here the issue primarily seems to be with volume states, i.e. a particle can be in any tiny volume cell with equal probability. In the full V case, each of the two particles can be in any volume cell in V, but the same is true if one inserts a partition separating V into two V/2 cells. One cannot possibly know if one particle is in each cell unless one makes a measurement before inserting the partition and making a measurement changes entropy. When writing the number of states, these are probabilistic scenarios. It is possible that 2 particles are on one side of the partition and 0 on the other or 1 on each. The number of possible states for the partitioned system is the same as for the full volume. As a result, there is no paradox. There is only a paradox if one assumes that there is 1 particle on each side which is an assumption which cannot be made without making a measurement.
In this thought-provoking book, Richard Healey proposes a new interpretation of quantum theory inspired by pragmatist philosophy. Healey puts forward the interpretation as an alternative to realist quantum theories on the one hand such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse theories, and many-worlds interpretations, which are different proposals for describing what the quantum world is like and what the basic laws of physics are, and nonrealist interpretations on the other hand such as quantum Bayesianism, which proposes to understand quantum theory as describing agents’ subjective epistemic states. The central idea of Healey's proposal is to understand quantum theory as providing not a description of the physical world but a set of authoritative and objectively correct prescriptions about how agents should act. The book provides a detailed development and defense of that idea, and it contains interesting discussions about a wide range of philosophical issues such as representation, probability, explanation, causation, objectivity, meaning, and fundamentality.Healey's project is at the intersection of physics and philosophy. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 of the book discusses the foundational questions in quantum theory from the perspective of the prescriptive interpretation. In part 2, Healey discusses the philosophical implications of the view. Both parts are written in a way that is largely accessible to nonspecialists. In this brief book review, I will focus on two questions:1. How does Healey's interpretation work?2. What are the costs and benefits of accepting his interpretation?To understand Healey's ideas, we should provide some background for nonspecialists. Quantum theory has been subject to intense scrutiny and philosophical investigations in the last century. There has been enormous progress on several fronts, including the empirical tests about Bell inequalities and the development of several realist interpretations. It has been proposed that what is revolutionary about quantum theory and what sets it apart from classical physics are quantum entanglement and quantum nonlocality. For many realists, it seems that quantum theory describes a different kind of ontology and a different kind of laws of nature. They are introduced briefly below.Quantum entanglement describes the phenomenon that some physical systems have irreducibly holistic properties that are not the logical sums of the properties of the parts. For example, two electrons A and B are entangled when the pair has a quantum state that cannot be reduced to some combination of the state of A and the state of B. Quantum entanglement, a manifestation of quantum nonseparability, is reflected in the way quantum states, which are typically represented by “wave functions,” get assigned to different systems.Quantum nonlocality (also called “spooky action at a distance”) describes the phenomenon that events that are arbitrarily far apart can influence one another and the strength of the influence does not depend on their distance. Quantum nonlocality is a strange feature, and its falsity was assumed in the 1935 argument by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen for the incompleteness of quantum theory. Remarkably, Bell (1964) proved that if the quantum predictions are accurate, then nature is nonlocal. Subsequent experimental tests since the 1980s have verified the quantum predictions to a high level of precision, reinforcing the conclusion that nature is nonlocal.1Among the realist theories of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories are nonlocal. Moreover, all three realist theories, including the many-worlds interpretation, affirm the reality of quantum entanglement. The reality of quantum entanglement follows from the reality of the quantum state. After all, the quantum state is so successful in application. If one wants to be a realist, it seems that the most natural way is to accept the reality of the quantum state and its consequences. But what is represented by the wave function? What is its nature? How does it relate to things in the physical world? Some recent discussions in philosophy of physics concern exactly those questions.2I think the key to understanding Healey's interpretation is to think of it as a proposal for an alternative foundation of quantum theory—a proposal to use normative facts instead of descriptive facts as the foundation and to replace “what there is” with “what we ought to expect” as what is fundamental to physical theory. Healey's approach would sound alien to many people, since it is not realist in any traditional sense. It is common to think that fundamental physics, and in particular quantum theory, is in the business of saying what the world is like (even though it may be difficult to discern what it says). It is true that we can learn useful advice from a correct physical theory, such as:one should avoid falling into a black holeone should place detectors far away from sources of interferenceone should get away from a nuclear explosionone should be almost certain to see this particle decay in 1 monthA correct physical theory may explain the correctness of useful practical advices such as above. Such advices are objectively correct insofar as they are derived from the conjunction of some accurate descriptions of physical reality and some correct theories of human rationality.3 For Healey, that might be a fine interpretation of classical physics, but that is not the correct interpretation of quantum theory. Quantum theory, for Healey, directly offers authoritative advice about what we should believe and expect, and such advice is not derived in any way from some underlying descriptive facts. Still, such advice can be objectively true (unlike the quantum Bayesian's emphasis on subjective epistemic states). The advice has the form “one should assign quantum state ψ to the physical system s,” and “one should have 0.5 confidence in M,” where M is some kind of magnitude claim about the physical system s. On Healey's interpretation, quantum theory is about such advice, not some descriptions about what nature is like. Although the magnitude claims are descriptions of nature, they are not contained in quantum theory. Instead, they are assumed to be the targets of explanation, and they are somewhat prior to the application of quantum theory. However, they will be suitably constrained by quantum theory, and only a subclass of them will be empirically significant.There are many parts to Healey's proposal. To simplify our discussions below, here is a short summary of the key points (mostly from chapter 5):Advice on state assignments: agents should follow the standard practice in quantum physics and assign an appropriate quantum state (e.g., a wave function ψ) to a system relative to their physical situation.Magnitude claims: a canonical magnitude claim has the form “the value of dynamical variable M on physical system s lies in set Δ.” One example would be “the position of the particle is on the left side of the box.” Magnitude claims are assumed in the theory and they are the targets of explanation. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and chap. 12, sec. 3, for elaborations.)Empirical significance: a magnitude claim is empirically significant if the relevant quantum state the agent should assign to the system has properly experienced decoherence due to interactions with the environment, where decoherence is a mathematical property of the quantum state. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and appendix C for more discussions on decoherence.)Advice on credences: agents should adopt credences about empirically significant magnitude claims according to the Born rule (setting one's credence about an empirically significant magnitude claim to be the squared modulo of the appropriate wave function).Descriptions of nature: none of the above, except for the magnitude claims, describes anything in nature. However, magnitude claims are not contained or entailed by quantum theory. They are given prior to the theory.Let us walk through a simple example. Suppose our physicist Alice sets up an experiment for the position measurement of a particle s. Alice wants to explain some magnitude claim about the particle's position (say, that it is on the left side of the box). Quantum theory tells her that she ought to assign a particular wave function ψ to the particle. (The magnitude claim about the particle's position will only become empirically significant when the particle has appropriately interacted with the environment such that different parts of the wave function are almost separated into macroscopically distinct regions as described by decoherence.) Her expectation about the (empirically significant) magnitude claim should match the probability given by the Born rule, which is the squared modulo of the wave function at this moment.Many questions arise at this point. For example: What makes a particular quantum state assignment appropriate? It is standard to assume that a state assignment is appropriate or correct in virtue of representational accuracy, that is, the system indeed has the particular quantum state. But Healey disagrees; it is more or less a basic fact, and if we want to explain it we can appeal to the practice within the scientific community, not some metaphysical facts about what nature is like. It seems to me that on Healey's project the correctness of state assignments is a fundamental normative fact, and any further inquiry about it may be a metanormative project. This is certainly hard to swallow for many realists, but it sheds light on how Healey tries to solve (or dissolve) traditional problems in quantum foundation. In the following, we discuss how Healey applies his interpretation to the quantum measurement problem, quantum entanglement, and Bell nonlocality.The quantum measurement problem is often presented as an inconsistency among three propositions: (1) the quantum state is a complete description of nature; (2) the quantum state always changes according to some unitary equation (e.g., the Schrödinger equation); and (3) experiments have determinate (unique) outcomes. Applying this to the above experimental setup involving Alice, we can derive a contradiction. If the quantum state is complete and it changes unitarily, then quantum theory implies there is no determinate outcome of the position measurement of the particle, since it will always be in a superposition of ψleft and ψright, which is inconsistent with (3)—the particle is measured to be either on the left side or the right side of the box. For Healey, (1) and (2) are simply nonstarters, and (3) is obviously true so that the measurement problem is a nonproblem. (See chap. 6 and especially p. 99.) This is because, in Healey's view, quantum theory is prescriptive, and it is a mistake to think that the quantum state describes the world, much less describes it completely. Moreover, in typical measurement contexts, such as in Alice's case, the appropriate quantum state has decohered after measurement, giving Alice permission to apply the Born rule to make probabilistic predictions. There is a determinate outcome of measurement, but it is not entailed or contained in quantum theory. Instead, determinate outcomes are something confirmed by our direct experiences. Furthermore, if the outcome were not determinate, quantum theory would lose its empirical justification. So in order to apply quantum theory, we have to assume that experimental outcomes are unique and determinate (in typical cases). This, again, is difficult to accept as a realist conception of quantum mechanics. It stands in sharp contrast to other single-world theories such as Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories that aim to justify (3) from a physical point of view. They seek to derive (3) as a theorem, by applying the precise mathematical equations to the microscopic ontology.For Healey, quantum entanglement is no longer metaphysically revolutionary. State assignments may be entangled and nonseparable in the sense that the complete state of the system does not supervene on the states of its parts. However, it seems that Healey would say that the failure of supervenience has no metaphysical significance but only normative significance. The advice about which state to assign to the whole system does not supervene, in general, on any advice on what to assign to the parts.Healey thinks that Bell nonlocality becomes more digestible on the prescriptive view (chap. 4). Healey does not dispute Bell's proof as a demonstration of the existence of nonlocal correlations, that is, probabilities of events happening in region A may depend on events happening in region B, which can be arbitrarily far away from A. But Healey does not think nonlocal correlations imply nonlocal influences or causation. What Bell's theorem (and the subsequent empirical tests) really shows is that the quantum probability of an event localized in some region must be “relativized to arbitrarily distant places and times” (71). Here it would seem that Healey's suggestion runs contrary to the kind of normal inferences we routinely make in science. It is standard to infer there are some goings-on in the world that account for the nonlocal correlations—some kind of underlying physical mechanism of nonlocal influence. For example, the mechanism is accounted for, in explicit physical details, by the guidance equation in Bohmian mechanics and the collapse mechanism in spontaneous collapse theories. But that is a mistake from Healey's perspective. Quantum theory postulates such nonlocal correlations as reliable prescriptions for agents who want to use quantum theory successfully, and it is a mistake to try to describe in virtue of what such correlations obtain.What are the reasons for accepting Healey's new interpretation of quantum theory? I think the main reason, for Healey, is that it allows us to avoid the surprising metaphysical consequences such as nonlocality and the reality of the quantum state. But at what cost? If Healey is right, then quantum theory is no longer in the business of describing nature. For most people, I think, that would be too costly.What about alternatives to Healey's theory? How do they compare to it? Healey gives reasons for thinking that they are inadequate (chap. 7). He thinks that spontaneous collapse theories are too speculative, and that they do not qualify as “interpretations.” He suggests that many-worlds theories still face the conceptual problems of probability and emergence of macroscopic branches. He notes that Bohmian mechanics faces problems in relativistic contexts. (Interestingly, Healey's objection to Bohmian mechanics is that it would postulate theoretical structure [e.g., preferred foliation of space-time, particle motion, and the universal wave function] that is empirically inaccessible, even though Healey himself postulates fundamental normative facts to be the foundation of quantum theory when normative facts have controversial epistemological and metaphysical standing in metaethics.) Healey does not discuss whether these are more costly than abandoning the descriptive role of quantum theory, but I think he would think they are. It is important to note that all of them are not only candidate descriptions of nature but are also in principle applicable to the universe as a whole, while Healey's interpretation is neither descriptive of nature nor applicable to the universe as a whole, since on his theory, the application of the Born rule is appropriate only when there is environmental decoherence (and the universe as a whole by definition has no external environment to interact with) (227).4As is the case with Healey's previous books, this one contains many interesting and controversial ideas that will generate much debate in the years to come. Above all, Healey should be applauded for writing a clear, accessible, and engaging introduction to the prescriptive interpretation of quantum theory. There are many issues that Healey discusses at length in the book that I do not have space to comment on. Even though we may not agree on the truth of the matter, we can certainly agree that Healey's book will be useful to anyone interested in the intersection of physics and philosophy.