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arXiv:quant-ph/9710032

Is Quantum Mechaincs Non-Local?

William George Unruh

Published Oct 10, 1997• 17 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Stapp has recently argued from a version of the Hardy type experiments that quantum mechanics must be non-local, independent of any additional assumptions like realism or hidden variables. I argue that either his conclusions do not follow from his assumptions, or that his assumptions are not true of quantum mechanics and can be interpreted as assigning an unwarranted level of reality to the value of certain quantum attributes.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9710032

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Stapp [Am. J. Phys. 65, 300 (1997)] has recently argued from a version of the Hardy-type experiments that quantum mechanics must be nonlocal, independent of any additional assumptions such as realism or hidden variables. I argue either that his conclusions do not follow from his assumptions or that his assumptions are not true of quantum mechanics and can be interpreted as assigning an unwarranted level of reality to the value of certain quantum attributes.

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Stapp has recently argued from a version of the Hardy type experiments that quantum mechanics must be non-local, independent of any additional assumptions like realism or hidden variables. I argue that either his conclusions do not follow from his assumptions, or that his assumptions are not true of quantum mechanics and can be interpreted as assigning an unwarranted level of reality to the value of certain quantum attributes.
The debate about the non-locality of quantum mechanics is old, but still lively. Numerous people use non-locality as (bad) shorthand for quantum entanglement. But some have a long-standing commitment to the validity of this characterization. This paper examines two separate streams in this debate. The first is the arguments of Stapp, and especially his recent paper where he simplifies his contractual argument in the Hardy situation to argue for the non-locality of quantum mechanics. He has maintained his contention that an analysis of a Hardy-type correlation between two spatially separated observers proves that quantum mechanics itself is non-local, without any additional assumption of realism or hidden variables. In the second section, I try to carefully examine the Bell argument in the CHSH variant to see where the difference between the quantum and classical situations differ. Asher Peres was one of the great physicists of the late 20th century, especially for his intense concern with the fundamental nature of quantum mechanics. His courage in devoting his life to an area many considered "philosophical" (i.e. non-physical) paved the way for the rest of us to reveal our interests and confusions about this area. I am not sure that he would agree with everything in this paper, but I offer it as a tribute to him.
A recent proof [H. P. Stapp, Am. J. Phys. 65, 300 (1997)], formulated in the symbolic language of modal logic, claims to show that contemporary quantum theory, viewed as a set of rules that allow us to calculate statistical predictions among certain kinds of observations, cannot be imbedded in any rational framework that conforms to the principles that (1) the experimenters' choices of which experiments they will perform can be considered to be free choices, (2) outcomes of measurements are unique, and (3) the free choices just mentioned have no backward-in-time effects of any kind. This claim is similar to Bell's theorem, but much stronger, because no reality assumption alien to quantum philosophy is used. The paper being commented on [W. Unruh, Phys. Rev. A 59, 126 (1999)] argues that some such reality assumption has been ``smuggled'' in. That argument is examined here and shown, I believe, to be defective.
The conceptually puzzling features of quantum mechanics as a statistical theory all have their source in the impossibility of relating the probability assignments defined by the quantum state to distributions over determinate values of the physical magnitudes. While some interpretations of quantum mechanics, as well as “hidden variable” modifications of the theory, have proposed several constructions for assigning values to magnitudes (beyond the value assignments defined by the quantum state alone), a variety of theorems exist which impose severe restrictions on such theoretical constructions. This note will deal with Bell's proof (in [2]), that any hidden variable theory satisfying a physically reasonable locality condition is characterized by an inequality which is inconsistent with the quantum statistics. Bell's result has initiated a series of experiments designed to refute the entire class of local hidden variable theories. We show that Bell's inequality actually characterizes a feature of hidden variable theories which is much weaker than locality in the sense considered physically motivated.
Quantum mechanics is widely believed to be inconsistent with local realism because J.S. Bell proved the contradiction between quantum mechanics and the hidden variable theories based on reality and locality of matter. As described herein, the relation between quantum mechanics and local realism is discussed. This paper presents the question of whether any version of local realism is contradicted by quantum mechanics. The answer is negative. An interpretation is proposed by which the contradiction is explained using physical variables of two types: (1) physical variables of the first type, such as positions and angles (i.e. coordinates), are realistic variables and always possess definite values independently of measurements; (2) those of the second type, such as momenta, angular momenta, and spins (i.e., conserved quantities), are non-realistic variables, which possess no value before measurement. Value definiteness of the first type provides a reliable basis to physical reality of matter, and non-reality of the second type might solve the problem of inconsistency between quantum mechanics and local realism.