Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:quant-ph/9709051

On the selection of preferred consistent sets

Charis Anastopoulos

Published Sep 24, 1997• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The theme of this paper is the multiplicity of the consistent sets appearing in the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics. We propose one criterion for choosing preferred families among them: that the physically realizable quasiclassical domain ought to be one corresponding to classical histories. We examine the way classical mechanics arises as a particular window and the important role played by the canonical group and the Hamiltonian. We finally discuss possible implications of our having a selection criterion generally and of our criterion in particular.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9709051

Related papers

Quantum Histories

Adrian Kent

There are good motivations for considering some type of quantum histories formalism. Several possible formalisms are known, defined by different definitions of event and by different selection criteria for sets of histories. These formalisms have a natural interpretation, according to which nature somehow chooses one set of histories from among those allowed, and then randomly chooses to realise one history from that set; other interpretations are possible, but their scientific implications are essentially the same. The selection criteria proposed to date are reasonably natural, and certainly raise new questions. For example, the validity of ordering inferences which we normally take for granted – such as that a particle in one region is necessarily in a larger region containing it – depends on whether or not our history respects the criterion of ordered consistency, or merely consistency. However, the known selection criteria, including consistency and medium decoherence, are very weak. It is not possible to derive the predictions of classical mechanics or Copenhagen quantum mechanics from the theories they define, even given observational data in an extended time interval. Attempts to refine the consistent histories approach so as to solve this problem by finding a definition of quasiclassicality have so far not succeeded. On the other hand, it is shown that dynamical collapse models, of the type originally proposed by Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber, can be re-interpreted as set selection criteria within a quantum histories framework, in which context they appear as candidate solutions to the set selection problem. This suggests a new route to relativistic generalisation of these models, since covariant definitions of a quantum event are known.

arXiv:gr-qc/9809026•Physica Scripta•Jan 1, 1998•37 citations

3 On the Consistency of the Consistent Histories Approach to Quantum Mechanics

Elias Okon, Daniel Sudarsky

Abstract: The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechani-cal framework which could be applied even to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative histories of a quantum system. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account, but that different realms can be mutually incom-patible. Finally, some of its proponents offer an “evolutionary ” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational prob-lems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality. 1

•Jan 11, 2013•30 citations

Is the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics consistent?

Elias Okon

The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism attempts to construct a quantum framework which can be used without the need to introduce observers external to the studied system. The prime motivation in mind is the application of the formalism to the universe as a whole. In order to achieve this, CH maintains that a formulation of quantum mechanics should allow for the assignment of probabilities to alternative histories of a system. Therefore, it provides an observer-independent criterion to decide which sets of histories can be given probabilities and states rules to determine them. The framework establishes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account of a system. Furthermore, the version of CH first presented in [1, 2] proposes an "evolutionary" explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work critically evaluates claims to the effect that the formalism offered in [1, 2] solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, it is pointed out that the interpretation of the proposed framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. The claim of this work is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality.

Journal of Physics Conference Series•Jun 10, 2013•0 citations

Equivalent Sets of Histories and Multiple Quasiclassical Realms

Murray Gell‐Mann, James B. Hartle

We consider notions of physical equivalence of sets of histories in the quantum mechanics of a closed system. We show first how the same set of histories can be relabeled in various ways, including the use of the Heisenberg equations of motion and of passive transformations of field variables. In the the usual approximate quantum mechanics of a measured subsystem, two observables re- presented by different Hermitian operators are physically distinguished by the different apparatus used to measure them. In the quantum mechanics of a closed system, however, any apparatus is part of the system and the notion of physically distinct situations has a different character. We show that a triple consisting of an initial condition, a Hamiltonian, and a set of histories is physically equivalent to another triple if the operators representing these initial conditions, Hamiltonians, and histories are related by any fixed unitary transformation. We apply this result to the question of whether the universe might exhibit physically inequivalent quasiclassical realms (which we earlier called quasiclassical domains), not just the one that includes familiar experience. We describe how the probabilities of alternative forms, behaviors, and evolutionary histories of information gathering and utilizing systems (IGUSes) using the usual quasiclassical realm could in principle be calculated in quantum cosmology, although it is, of course, impractical to perform the computations. We discuss how, in principle, the probabilities of occurence of IGUSes could be calculated in realms distinct from the usual quasiclassical one. We discuss how IGUSes adapted mainly to two different realms could draw inferences about each other using a hybrid realm consisting of alternatives drawn from each.

arXiv:gr-qc/9404013•Apr 8, 1994•67 citations

Choice of consistent family, and quantum incompatibility

Robert B. Griffiths

In consistent-history quantum theory, a description of the time development of a quantum system requires choosing a framework or consistent family, and then calculating probabilities for the different histories that it contains. It is argued that the framework is chosen by the physicist constructing a description of a quantum system on the basis of questions he wishes to address, in a manner analogous to choosing a coarse-graining of the phase space in classical statistical mechanics. The choice of framework is not determined by some law of nature, though it is limited by quantum incompatibility, a concept that is discussed using a two-dimensional Hilbert space (spin half particle). Thus certain questions of physical interest can only be addressed using frameworks in which they make (quantum-mechanical) sense. The physicist's choice does not influence reality, nor does the presence of choices render the theory subjective. On the contrary, predictions of the theory can, in principle, be verified by experimental measurements. These considerations are used to address various criticisms and possible misunderstandings of the consistent-history approach, including its predictive power, whether it requires a new logic, whether it can be interpreted realistically, the nature of ``quasiclassicality,'' and the possibility of ``contrary'' inferences.

arXiv:quant-ph/9708028•Physical Review A•Mar 1, 1998•179 citations

Equivalent sets of histories and multiple quasiclassical domains

Murray Gell‐Mann, James B. Hartle

We consider notions of physical equivalence of sets of histories in the quantum mechanics of a closed system. We show how the same set of histories can be relabeled in various ways including the use of the Heisenberg equations of motion and of passive transformations of the field operators. In the usual quantum mechanics of a measured subsystem, two observables represented by different Hermitian operators are physically distinguished by the different pieces of apparatus used to measure them even if they are related by a unitary transformation. In the quantum mechanics of a closed system, however, any apparatus is part of the system and the notion of physically distinct situations has a different character. Making our previous suggestions more precise, we show that triple consisting of an initial condition, a Hamiltonian, and a set of histories is physically equivalent to another triple if the operators representing these initial conditions, Hamiltonians, and histories are related by a fixed unitary transformation. We apply this result to the question of whether the universe might exhibit physically inequivalent quasiclassical domains, not just the one of familiar experience. We describe, in more detail than we have before, how the probabilities of alternative forms, behaviors and evolutionary histories of information gathering and utilizing systems (IGUSes), including their adaptation to the usual quasiclassical domain or other domains, could in principle be calculated in quantum cosmology, although we do not, of course, supply the computations. We discuss how, if the universe exhibits essentially inequivalent quasiclassical domains, there could be IGUSes utilizing different domains yet able to communicate with each other.

•Apr 11, 1994•38 citations
The theme of this paper is the multiplicity of the consistent sets appearing in the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics. We propose one criterion for choosing preferred families among them: that the physically realizable quasiclassical domain ought to be one corresponding to classical histories. We examine the way classical mechanics arises as a particular window and the important role played by the canonical group and the Hamiltonian. We finally discuss possible implications of our having a selection criterion generally and of our criterion in particular.
There are good motivations for considering some type of quantum histories formalism. Several possible formalisms are known, defined by different definitions of event and by different selection criteria for sets of histories. These formalisms have a natural interpretation, according to which nature somehow chooses one set of histories from among those allowed, and then randomly chooses to realise one history from that set; other interpretations are possible, but their scientific implications are essentially the same. The selection criteria proposed to date are reasonably natural, and certainly raise new questions. For example, the validity of ordering inferences which we normally take for granted – such as that a particle in one region is necessarily in a larger region containing it – depends on whether or not our history respects the criterion of ordered consistency, or merely consistency. However, the known selection criteria, including consistency and medium decoherence, are very weak. It is not possible to derive the predictions of classical mechanics or Copenhagen quantum mechanics from the theories they define, even given observational data in an extended time interval. Attempts to refine the consistent histories approach so as to solve this problem by finding a definition of quasiclassicality have so far not succeeded. On the other hand, it is shown that dynamical collapse models, of the type originally proposed by Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber, can be re-interpreted as set selection criteria within a quantum histories framework, in which context they appear as candidate solutions to the set selection problem. This suggests a new route to relativistic generalisation of these models, since covariant definitions of a quantum event are known.
Abstract: The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechani-cal framework which could be applied even to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative histories of a quantum system. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account, but that different realms can be mutually incom-patible. Finally, some of its proponents offer an “evolutionary ” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational prob-lems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality. 1
The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism attempts to construct a quantum framework which can be used without the need to introduce observers external to the studied system. The prime motivation in mind is the application of the formalism to the universe as a whole. In order to achieve this, CH maintains that a formulation of quantum mechanics should allow for the assignment of probabilities to alternative histories of a system. Therefore, it provides an observer-independent criterion to decide which sets of histories can be given probabilities and states rules to determine them. The framework establishes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account of a system. Furthermore, the version of CH first presented in [1, 2] proposes an "evolutionary" explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work critically evaluates claims to the effect that the formalism offered in [1, 2] solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, it is pointed out that the interpretation of the proposed framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. The claim of this work is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality.
We consider notions of physical equivalence of sets of histories in the quantum mechanics of a closed system. We show first how the same set of histories can be relabeled in various ways, including the use of the Heisenberg equations of motion and of passive transformations of field variables. In the the usual approximate quantum mechanics of a measured subsystem, two observables re- presented by different Hermitian operators are physically distinguished by the different apparatus used to measure them. In the quantum mechanics of a closed system, however, any apparatus is part of the system and the notion of physically distinct situations has a different character. We show that a triple consisting of an initial condition, a Hamiltonian, and a set of histories is physically equivalent to another triple if the operators representing these initial conditions, Hamiltonians, and histories are related by any fixed unitary transformation. We apply this result to the question of whether the universe might exhibit physically inequivalent quasiclassical realms (which we earlier called quasiclassical domains), not just the one that includes familiar experience. We describe how the probabilities of alternative forms, behaviors, and evolutionary histories of information gathering and utilizing systems (IGUSes) using the usual quasiclassical realm could in principle be calculated in quantum cosmology, although it is, of course, impractical to perform the computations. We discuss how, in principle, the probabilities of occurence of IGUSes could be calculated in realms distinct from the usual quasiclassical one. We discuss how IGUSes adapted mainly to two different realms could draw inferences about each other using a hybrid realm consisting of alternatives drawn from each.
In consistent-history quantum theory, a description of the time development of a quantum system requires choosing a framework or consistent family, and then calculating probabilities for the different histories that it contains. It is argued that the framework is chosen by the physicist constructing a description of a quantum system on the basis of questions he wishes to address, in a manner analogous to choosing a coarse-graining of the phase space in classical statistical mechanics. The choice of framework is not determined by some law of nature, though it is limited by quantum incompatibility, a concept that is discussed using a two-dimensional Hilbert space (spin half particle). Thus certain questions of physical interest can only be addressed using frameworks in which they make (quantum-mechanical) sense. The physicist's choice does not influence reality, nor does the presence of choices render the theory subjective. On the contrary, predictions of the theory can, in principle, be verified by experimental measurements. These considerations are used to address various criticisms and possible misunderstandings of the consistent-history approach, including its predictive power, whether it requires a new logic, whether it can be interpreted realistically, the nature of ``quasiclassicality,'' and the possibility of ``contrary'' inferences.
We consider notions of physical equivalence of sets of histories in the quantum mechanics of a closed system. We show how the same set of histories can be relabeled in various ways including the use of the Heisenberg equations of motion and of passive transformations of the field operators. In the usual quantum mechanics of a measured subsystem, two observables represented by different Hermitian operators are physically distinguished by the different pieces of apparatus used to measure them even if they are related by a unitary transformation. In the quantum mechanics of a closed system, however, any apparatus is part of the system and the notion of physically distinct situations has a different character. Making our previous suggestions more precise, we show that triple consisting of an initial condition, a Hamiltonian, and a set of histories is physically equivalent to another triple if the operators representing these initial conditions, Hamiltonians, and histories are related by a fixed unitary transformation. We apply this result to the question of whether the universe might exhibit physically inequivalent quasiclassical domains, not just the one of familiar experience. We describe, in more detail than we have before, how the probabilities of alternative forms, behaviors and evolutionary histories of information gathering and utilizing systems (IGUSes), including their adaptation to the usual quasiclassical domain or other domains, could in principle be calculated in quantum cosmology, although we do not, of course, supply the computations. We discuss how, if the universe exhibits essentially inequivalent quasiclassical domains, there could be IGUSes utilizing different domains yet able to communicate with each other.