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arXiv:quant-ph/9603015

The Trouble with Quantum Bit Commitment

Dominic Mayers

Published Mar 11, 1996• 136 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In a recent paper, Lo and Chau explain how to break a family of quantum bit commitment schemes, and they claim that their attack applies to the 1993 protocol of Brassard, Crépeau, Jozsa and Langlois (BCJL). The intuition behind their attack is correct, and indeed they expose a weakness common to all proposals of a certain kind, but the BCJL protocol does not fall in this category. Nevertheless, it is true that the BCJL protocol is insecure, but the required attack and proof are more subtle. Here we provide the first complete proof that the BCJL protocol is insecure.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9603015

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Modern Physics Letters A•Nov 10, 2021•3 citations
In a recent paper, Lo and Chau explain how to break a family of quantum bit commitment schemes, and they claim that their attack applies to the 1993 protocol of Brassard, Crépeau, Jozsa and Langlois (BCJL). The intuition behind their attack is correct, and indeed they expose a weakness common to all proposals of a certain kind, but the BCJL protocol does not fall in this category. Nevertheless, it is true that the BCJL protocol is insecure, but the required attack and proof are more subtle. Here we provide the first complete proof that the BCJL protocol is insecure.
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen- (EPR) and the more powerful Mayers-Lo-Chau attack impose a serious constraint on quantum bit commitment (QBC). As a way to circumvent them, it is proposed that the quantum system encoding the commitment chosen by the committer (Alice) should be initially prepared in a seperable quantum state known to and furnished by the acceptor (Bob), rather than Alice. Classical communication is used to conclude the commitment phase and bind Alice's subsequent unveiling. Such a class of secure protocols can be built upon currently proposed QBC schemes impervious to a simple EPR attack. A specific scheme based on the Brassard-Crepeau-Josza-Langlois protocol is presented here as an example.
Quantum bit commitment has been known to be impossible by the independent proofs of Mayers, and Lo and Chau, even though several quantum bit commitment protocols have been proposed. However, we here point out that their proof is available only for one-way quantum bit commitment protocols, and present a simple and efficient quantum bit commitment protocol with two-way quantum communications. The unconditional security of our protocol is guaranteed by the additional unknownness and randomness generated by both users.
The existence of unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) is excluded by the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem. Here we look for the second-best: a QBC protocol that can defeat certain quantum attacks. By breaking the knowledge symmetry between the participants with quantum algorithm, a QBC protocol is proposed and is proven to be secure against a major kind of coherent attacks---the dummy attack, in which the participant makes an empty promise instead of committing to a specific bit. Therefore it surpasses previous QBC protocols which are secure against individual attacks only.
As a fundamental cryptographic primitive, bit commitment has lots of important and practical applications in modern cryptography. All previously proposed non-relativistic quantum bit commitment protocols cannot evade the Lo–Chau and Mayers attacks. Furthermore, relativistic quantum bit commitment protocols require rigorous spacetime constraints. In this paper, we present a simple, feasible but practically secure quantum bit commitment protocol without any spacetime constraint. The security of the proposed protocol is based on non-relativistic quantum mechanics, but it can resist all known attacks, including the Lo–Chau and Mayers attacks in practice.