Construed as an argument against hidden variable theories, Bell's Theorem assumes that hidden variables would be independent of future measurement settings. This Independence Assumption (IA) is rarely questioned. Bell considered relaxing it to avoid non-locality, but thought that the resulting view left no room for free will. However, Bell seems to have failed to distinguish two different strategies for giving up IA. One strategy takes for granted the Principle of the Common Cause, which requires that a correlation between hidden variables and measurement settings be explained by a joint correlation with some unknown factor in their common past. The other strategy rejects the Principle of the Common Cause, and argues that the required correlation might be due to the known interaction between the object system and the measuring device in their common future. Bell and most others who have discussed these issues have focussed on the former strategy, but because the two approaches have not been properly distinguished, it has not been well appreciated that there is a quite different way to relax IA. This paper distinguishes the two strategies, and argues that the latter is considerably more appealing than the former.
Construed as an argument against hidden variable theories, Bell's Theorem assumes that hidden variables would be independent of future measurement settings. This Independence Assumption (IA) is rarely questioned. Bell considered relaxing it to avoid non-locality, but thought that the resulting view left no room for free will. However, Bell seems to have failed to distinguish two different strategies for giving up IA. One strategy takes for granted the Principle of the Common Cause, which requires that a correlation between hidden variables and measurement settings be explained by a joint correlation with some unknown factor in their common past. The other strategy rejects the Principle of the Common Cause, and argues that the required correlation might be due to the known interaction between the object system and the measuring device in their common future. Bell and most others who have discussed these issues have focussed on the former strategy, but because the two approaches have not been properly distinguished, it has not been well appreciated that there is a quite different way to relax IA. This paper distinguishes the two strategies, and argues that the latter is considerably more appealing than the former.
Bell’s inequality is an empirical constraint on theories with hidden variables, which Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen argued are needed to explain observed perfect correlations if keeping locality. One way to deal with the empirical violation of Bell’s inequality is by openly embracing nonlocality, in a theory like the pilot-wave theory. Nonetheless, recent proposals have revived the possibility that one can avoid nonlocality by resorting to superdeterministic theories. These are local hidden variables theories which violate statistical independence which is one assumption of Bell’s inequality. In this paper I compare and contrast these two hidden variable strategies: the pilot-wave theory and superdeterminism. I show that even if the former is nonlocal and the other is not, both are contextual. Nonetheless, in contrast with the pilot-wave theory, superdeterminist contextuality makes it impossible to test the theory (which therefore becomes unfalsifiable and unconfirmable) and renders the theory uninformative (measurement results tell us nothing about the system). It is questionable therefore whether a theory with these features is worth its costs.
Besides well-known conditions of locality or factorisability, deriving the Bell inequalities requires assuming that the distribution of hidden variables and Alice's and Bob's measurement settings be independent of each other. We show that (analogously to violations of locality due to action at a distance) certain violations of this Measurement Independence assumption can be associated with a notion of signalling in principle, thus making them also testable in principle, and spell out the appropriate conditions. Accordingly, we show that by imposing no-signalling one can prove a version of Bell's theorem that does not require the assumption of Measurement Independence. We discuss the "Schulman model" as an example, as well as lessons for "experimental metaphysics".
By implicitly assuming that all possible Bell-measurements occur simultaneously, all proofs of Bell's Theorem violate Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. This assumption is made in the original form of Bell's inequality, in Wigner's probability inequalities, and in the ``nonlocality without inequalities'' arguments. The introduction of time into derivations of these variants of Bell's theorem results in extra terms related to the time order of the measurements used in constructing correlation coefficients. Since the same locality assumptions are made in the Heisenberg-compliant derivations of this paper, only time-independent classical local hidden variable theories are forbidden by violations of the original Bell inequalities; time-dependent quantum local hidden variable theories can satisfy this new bound and agree with experiment. We further point out that factorizable wavefunctions have been used to describe some EPR experiments and can be used to describe others. These will generate local de Broglie-Bohm trajectories in the description of the data. This second, independent, line of argument also shows that violation of Bell's inequality is only evidence that Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle cannot be ignored.
A 1964 paper by John Bell gave the first demonstration that quantum mechanics is incompatible with local hidden variables. There is an ongoing and vigorous debate on whether he relied on an assumption of determinism, or instead, as he later claimed, derived determinism from assumptions of locality and perfect correlation. This paper aims to bring clarity to the debate via simple examples and rigorous results. It is shown that the weak form of locality used in Bell's 1964 paper (parameter independence) is insufficient for such a derivation, whereas an independent form called outcome independence is sufficient even when weak locality does not hold. It further follows that outcome independence, by itself, implies that standard quantum mechanics is incomplete. It is also shown that an appeal by Bell to the Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky argument to support his claim fails, via examples that expose logical gaps in this argument. However, replacing the reality criterion underpinning the argument by a stronger criterion enables a rigorous derivation of both weak locality and determinism, as required for Bell's 1964 paper. Consequences for quantum interpretations, locality, and classical common causes are briefly discussed, with reference to an example of local classical indeterminism.
While initial versions of Bell's theorem captured the notion of locality with the assumption of factorizability, in later presentations, Bell argued that factorizability could be derived from the more fundamental principle of local causality. Here we show that, contrary to what is commonly assumed, in order to derive factorizability from the principle of local causality, a non-trivial assumption, similar but strictly independent of settings independence, is required. Loosely speaking, such an extra assumption demands independence between the states of the measurement apparatuses. We conclude that it is possible to construct a model, satisfying both the principle of local causality and settings independence, but that, in virtue of violating this additional assumption--and thus factorizability--is able to break Bell's inequality.
In a recent note, Hance and Hossenfelder (arXiv:2211.01331) recall that "locally causal completions of quantum mechanics are possible, if they violate the assumption [called statistical independence or measurement independence] that the hidden variables do not in any way depend on measurement settings" and that, consequently, the experimental violations of Bell inequalities "show that maintaining local causality requires violating statistical independence". However, Hance and Hossenfelder also argue that "we should (...) look for independent experimental evidence that can distinguish the two different options: non-locality and statistical independence, or locality and violations of statistical independence" and that "the unwillingness to consider theories without statistical independence may be the reason we do not yet have a locally causal theory for the foundations of physics that is consistent with general relativity". Here, we recall that there is a third option, namely, rejecting that measurement outcomes are governed in any way by hidden variables. Moreover, we argue that some recent results in the search for principles singling out the sets of quantum correlations for Bell and Kochen-Specker contextuality scenarios point out that this third option is scientifically more plausible and answers the question of why and how nature produces quantum nonlocality.