We show the unconditional security of decoy-state method with whatever intensity error pattern if the intensity upper bound of decoy pulses and intensity lower bound of signal pulses are known. Our result immediately applies to the existing experimental data.
The decoy-state quantum-key-distribution method(based on a heralded single photon source) is frequently used in experiments serves as an object of study.Using the finite data,it is possible to derive the formula of the lower limit of the single-photon state and the upper limit of the error rate and to obtain the lower limit of key generation rate with unconditional security and the range of secure transmission distance.According to the conclusion drawn from the research,the unconditional security boundary of decoy-state quantum key distribution will be obtained if the number of data-set size is known.The number of transmitted data can also be decided according to the demands for quantum key distribution.In this way,the loop holes in security which are created by finite data can be avoided so as to improve the security and efficiency of quantum key distribution.
The existing theory of decoy-state quantum cryptography assumes the exact control of each state from Alice's source. Such exact control is impossible in practice. We develop the theory of decoy-state method so that it is unconditionally secure even if there are state errors of sources, if the range of a few parameters in the states are known. This theory simplifies the practical implementation of the decoy-state quantum key distribution because the unconditional security can be achieved with a slightly shortened final key, even though the small errors of pulses are not corrected.
The method of decoy-state quantum key distribution requests different intensities of light pulses. Existing theory has assumed exact control of intensities. Here the authors propose a simple protocol which is secure and efficient even there are errors in intensity control. In their protocol, decoy pulses and signal pulses are generated from the same father pulses with a two-value attenuation. Given the upper bound of fluctuation of the father pulses, their protocol is secure provided that the two-value attenuation is done exactly. They propose to use unbalanced beam splitters for a stable attenuation.
We show how to do decoy-state quantum key distribution efficiently with large random errors in the intensity control. We present a theorem for efficiently calculating the lower bound of single-photon counts with many undetermined parameters. In the calculation of the single-photon counts of our protocol, the linear terms of the intensity fluctuation disappear and only the quadratic terms take effect. Given that the intensity fluctuation is upper bounded by $\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}5%$, $\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}10%$, and $\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}15%$, the verified lower bound of the percentage of untagged bits from our protocol is as large as 99.7%, 99.0%, and 97.9% of that from an ideal protocol where the light intensity is exactly controlled.
Quantum key distribution provides a promising solution for sharing secure keys between two distant parties with unconditional security. Nevertheless, quantum key distribution is still severely threatened by the imperfections of devices. In particular, the classical pulse correlation threatens security when sending decoy states. To address this problem and simplify experimental requirements, we propose a phase-matching quantum key distribution protocol without intensity modulation. Instead of using decoy states, we propose an alternative method to estimate the theoretical upper bound on the phase error rate contributed by even-photon-number components. Simulation results show that the transmission distance of our protocol could reach 305 km in telecommunication fiber. Furthermore, we perform a proof-of-principle experiment to demonstrate the feasibility of our protocol, and the key rate reaches 22.5 bit/s under a 45-dB channel loss. Addressing the security loophole of pulse intensity correlation and replacing continuous random phase with a six- or eight-slice random phase, our protocol provides a promising solution for constructing quantum networks.
One of the most prominent techniques to enhance the performance of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems with laser sources is the decoy-state method. Current decoy-state QKD setups operate at gigahertz repetition rates, a regime where memory effects in the modulators and electronics that control them create correlations between the intensities of the emitted pulses. This translates into information leakage about the selected intensities, which cripples a crucial premise of the decoy-state method, thus invalidating the use of standard security analyzes. To overcome this problem, a security proof that exploits the Cauchy-Schwarz constraint has been introduced recently. Its main drawback is, however, that the achievable key rate is significantly lower than that of the ideal scenario without intensity correlations. Here, we improve this security proof technique by combining it with a fine-grained decoy-state analysis, which can deliver a tight estimation of the relevant parameters that determine the secret key rate. This results in a notable performance enhancement, being now the attainable distance double that of previous analyzes for certain parameter regimes. Also, we show that when the probability density function of the intensity fluctuations, conditioned on the current and previous intensity choices, is known, our approach provides a key rate very similar to the ideal scenario, which highlights the importance of an accurate experimental characterization of the correlations.