Human languages employ constructions that tacitly assume specific properties of the limited range of phenomena they evolved to describe. These assumed properties are true features of that limited context, but may not be general or precise properties of all the physical situations allowed by fundamental physics. In brief, human languages contain `excess baggage' that must be qualified, discarded, or otherwise reformed to give a clear account in the context of fundamental physics of even the everyday phenomena that the languages evolved to describe. The surest route to clarity is to express the constructions of human languages in the language of fundamental physical theory, not the other way around. These ideas are illustrated by an analysis of the verb `to happen' and the word `reality' in special relativity and the modern quantum mechanics of closed systems.
Human languages employ constructions that tacitly assume specific properties of the limited range of phenomena they evolved to describe. These assumed properties are true features of that limited context, but may not be general or precise properties of all the physical situations allowed by fundamental physics. In brief, human languages contain excess baggage' that must be qualified, discarded, or otherwise reformed to give a clear account in the context of fundamental physics of even the everyday phenomena that the languages evolved to describe. The surest route to clarity is to express the constructions of human languages in the language of fundamental physical theory, not the other way around. These ideas are illustrated by an analysis of the verb to happen' and the word `reality' in special relativity and the modern quantum mechanics of closed systems.
Human languages employ constructions that tacitly assume specific properties of the limited range of phenomena they have evolved to describe. These assumed properties are true features of that limited context, but may not be general or precise properties of all the physical situations allowed by fundamental physics. In brief, human languages contain “excess baggage” that must be qualified, discarded, or otherwise reformed to give a clear account, in the context of fundamental physics, of even the everyday phenomena that languages have evolved to describe. The surest route to clarity is to express the constructions of human languages in the language of fundamental physical theory, not the other way around. These ideas are illustrated by an analysis of the verb “to happen” and the word “reality” in special relativity and the modern quantum mechanics of closed systems.
Quantum theory has created a fundamental change in our ideas as relativity theory had done before. But while relativity theory is essentially classical in its conceptions—it is in fact the culmination of classical physics—quantum mechanics is founded on some new principles. The quantum laws are very different in character from the laws we find in classical theory. In particular, quantum mechanics is a strictly statistical type of theory : from this arises the different conception of causality that marks the new outlook of modern physics. Classical theory describes the so-called macroscopic phenomena, that is, things and events which are more or less of the same size and kind as we find them in ordinary life; and so a description can be given in terms of concepts close to the ones we use in ordinary language. The language of quantum mechanics is based upon a duality principle ; and most of our ordinary language is equally dualistic.
Despite its power as the conceptual basis for a huge range of physical phenomena in atomic and subatomic physics, quantum mechanics still suffers from a lack of clarity regarding the physical meaning of its fundamental theoretical concepts, such as those of quantum state and of quantum theoretical quantities or variables , dealt with by the known mathematical-theoretical rules. These concepts have generally been considered as not giving a direct description of physical systems, for they do not correspond to what is usually understood by `physical states' or `physical properties', notably characterized by definite numerical values such as those obtained from measurement. The situation has been tentatively expressed in terms of various `interpretations', conceived not only with regard to the physical meanings of mathematical quantities, but also in connection with philosophical statements about `physical reality'. The question of whether or not quantum theoretical quantities describe definite physical systems existing in nature has therefore generally been considered as beyond the possibilities of physics, because of the definitions that are commonly taken for `physical state' and `physical quantity'. We sketch the main ideas on this problem and propose a possible way out of the puzzle, in terms of an extension of the meaning given to the concepts of the physical state and physical quantity of a system, which would allow one, without any theoretical change in quantum mechanics, to speak consistently of real quantum systems as having definite physical properties .
The job of a physicist is to describe Nature. General features, hypotheses and theories help to describe physics phenomena at a more abstract, fundamental level, and are sometimes tacitly assigned some sort of real existence; doing so appears to be of little harm in most of classical physics. However, missing any tangible connection to everyday experience, one better always bears in mind the descriptive nature of any efforts to grasp the quantum. And elementary particles interact in the quantum world, of course. When communicating the world of elementary particles to the general public, the Bayesian approach of an ever ongoing updating of the depiction of reality turns out to be virtually indispensable. The human experience of providing a series of increasingly better descriptions generates plenty of personal pleasures, for researchers as well as for amateurs. A suggestive analogy for improving our understanding of the world, even the seemingly paradoxical quantum world, may be found in recent insight into how congenitally blind children and young adults learn to see, after having received successful eye surgery.
When a physical theory is in its early stages of development, it presents many concepts and constructs that may not be necessary for its interpretation, or may simply be equivocal. As the theory is developed by the physics community, it hopefully passes through a depuration process that washes away many of these constructs and introduces others not initially devised. This process can be viewed, and modeled, as a semiotic process by which the suggested interpretations of the theory, initially dispersed in the space of concepts, taper off in a way that leaves only a small number of possibilities, ideally only one. However, to qualify this process and impose semiotic and epistemological constraints on the depuration process, it seems natural to consider a physical theory as an excerpt of a language and its suggested interpretations as texts, endowed with syntactics and semantics. In this paper we present this framing of general physical theories and apply the resulting semiotic and epistemological constraints we uphold to the special case of quantum mechanics, which shows particular resistance to interpretation tapering. We then show that the findings of this paper are especially important for allowing one to form a hierarchy of interpretations of the same formal structure of a physical theory, even in the case of an experimental underdetermination of these interpretations, which is precisely the case for quantum mechanics. This result is particularly important for more modern physical theories, which are becoming increasingly more abstract and difficult to interpret.
First published in 1956 The Language of Modern Physics gives a complete account of the concepts both of classical and quantum physics. The first part of the book deals with modern logic and semantics and discussion is based on the semantic conception of truth and leads up to the criterion of meaning. The second and main part of the book is about basic ideas of physics. Here the model which underlies a scientific theory is of greatest import; in most instances the model is tacitly assumed, but we must bring it into the open if we want to understand the theory. The third and last part deals with the methods scientists use for confirming their hypotheses. This book is a must read for students and scholars of philosophy of science and philosophy in general.