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arXiv:quant-ph/0603270 · Physical Review A

One-way quantum key distribution: Simple upper bound on the secret key rate

Tobias Moroder, Marcos Curty, Norbert Lütkenhaus

Published Nov 1, 2006• 34 citations
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Abstract

We present a simple method to obtain an upper bound on the achievable secret key rate in quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that use only unidirectional classical communication during the public-discussion phase. This method is based on a necessary precondition for one-way secret key distillation; the legitimate users need to prove that there exists no quantum state having a symmetric extension that is compatible with the available measurements results. The main advantage of the obtained upper bound is that it can be formulated as a semidefinite program, which can be efficiently solved. We illustrate our results by analyzing two well-known qubit-based QKD protocols: the four-state protocol and the six-state protocol.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.74.052301

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Upper bounds for the secure key rate of the decoy-state quantum key distribution

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The use of decoy states in quantum key distribution (QKD) has provided a method for substantially increasing the secret key rate and distance that can be covered by QKD protocols with practical signals. The security analysis of these schemes, however, leaves open the possibility that the development of better proof techniques or better classical postprocessing methods might further improve their performance in realistic scenarios. In this paper, we derive upper bounds on the secure key rate for decoy-state QKD. These bounds are based basically only on the classical correlations established by the legitimate users during the quantum communication phase of the protocol. The only assumption about the possible postprocessing methods is that double click events are randomly assigned to single click events. Further, we consider only secure key rates based on the uncalibrated device scenario which assigns imperfections such as detection inefficiency to the eavesdropper. Our analysis relies on two preconditions for secure two-way and one-way QKD. The legitimate users need to prove that there exists no separable state (in the case of two-way QKD) or that there exists no quantum state having a symmetric extension (one-way QKD) that is compatible with the available measurements results. Both criteria have been previously applied to evaluate single-photon implementations of QKD. Here we use them to investigate a realistic source of weak coherent pulses. The resulting upper bounds can be formulated as a convex optimization problem known as a semidefinite program which can be efficiently solved. For the standard four-state QKD protocol, they are quite close to known lower bounds, thus showing that there are clear limits to the further improvement of classical postprocessing techniques in decoy-state QKD.

arXiv:0901.4669•Physical Review A•Mar 26, 2009•12 citations

Lower and Upper Bounds on the Secret-Key Rate for Quantum Key Distribution Protocols Using One-Way Classical Communication

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We investigate a general class of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols using one-way classical communication. We show that full security can be proven by considering only collective attacks. We derive computable lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate of those QKD protocols involving only entropies of two-qubit density operators. As an illustration of our results, we determine new bounds for the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the 6-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols. We show that in all these cases the first classical processing that the legitimate partners should apply consists in adding noise.

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Numerical evidence for bound secrecy from two-way postprocessing in quantum key distribution

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Bound secret information is classical information that contains secrecy but from which secrecy cannot be extracted. The existence of bound secrecy has been conjectured but is currently unproven, and in this work we provide analytical and numerical evidence for its existence. Specifically, we consider two-way postprocessing protocols in prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution based on the well-known six-state signal states. In terms of the quantum bit-error rate $Q$ of the classical data, such protocols currently exist for $Q<\frac{5\ensuremath{-}\sqrt{5}}{10}\ensuremath{\approx}27.6%$. On the other hand, for $Q\ensuremath{\ge}\frac{1}{3}$ no such protocol can exist as the observed data are compatible with an intercept-resend attack. This leaves the interesting question of whether successful protocols exist in the interval $\frac{5\ensuremath{-}\sqrt{5}}{10}\ensuremath{\le}Q<\frac{1}{3}$. Previous work has shown that a necessary condition for the existence of two-way postprocessing protocols for distilling secret keys is breaking the symmetric extendability of the underlying quantum state shared by Alice and Bob. Using this result, it has been proven that symmetric extendability can be broken up to the $27.6%$ lower bound using the advantage distillation protocol. In this work, we first show that to break symmetric extendability it is sufficient to consider a generalized form of advantage distillation consisting of one round of postselection by Bob on a block of his data. We then provide evidence that such generalized protocols cannot break symmetric extendability beyond $27.6%$. We thus have evidence to believe that $27.6%$ is an upper bound on two-way postprocessing and that the interval $\frac{5\ensuremath{-}\sqrt{5}}{10}\ensuremath{\le}Q<\frac{1}{3}$ is a domain of bound secrecy.

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Experimentally feasible quantum-key-distribution scheme using qubit-like qudits and its comparison with existing qubit- and qudit-based protocols

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Recently, Chau [Phys. Rev. A 92, 062324 (2015)] introduced an experimentally feasible qudit-based quantum-key-distribution (QKD) scheme. In that scheme, one bit of information is phase encoded in the prepared state in a ${2}^{n}$-dimensional Hilbert space in the form $(|i\ensuremath{\rangle}\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}|j\ensuremath{\rangle})/\sqrt{2}$ with $n\ensuremath{\ge}2$. For each qudit prepared and measured in the same two-dimensional Hilbert subspace, one bit of raw secret key is obtained in the absence of transmission error. Here we show that by modifying the basis announcement procedure, the same experimental setup can generate $n$ bits of raw key for each qudit prepared and measured in the same basis in the noiseless situation. The reason is that in addition to the phase information, each qudit also carries information on the Hilbert subspace used. The additional $(n\ensuremath{-}1)$ bits of raw key comes from a clever utilization of this extra piece of information. We prove the unconditional security of this modified protocol and compare its performance with other existing provably secure qubit- and qudit-based protocols on market in the one-way classical communication setting. Interestingly, we find that for the case of $n=2$, the secret key rate of this modified protocol using nondegenerate random quantum code to perform one-way entanglement distillation is equal to that of the six-state scheme.

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Symmetric Extendability of Quantum States and the Extreme Limits of Quantum Key Distribution

Sumeet Khatri

We investigate QKD protocols with two-way classical post-processing that are based on the well-known six-state and BB84 signal states. In these QKD protocols, the source (Alice) sends quantum signals to the receiver (Bob), who measures them, leaving only classical data on both sides. Our goal is to find the highest value of the quantum bit-error rate (QBER) $Q$ for which two-way classical post-processing protocols on the data can distill secret keys. Using the BB84 signal states, such protocols currently exist for $Q<\\frac{1}{5}$. On the other hand, for $Q\\geq\\frac{1}{4}$ no such protocol can exist as the observed data is compatible with an intercept-resend attack. This leaves the interesting question of whether successful two-way protocols exist in the interval $\\frac{1}{5}\\leq Q<\\frac{1}{4}$. For the six-state signal states, the corresponding interval is known to be $\\frac{5-\\sqrt{5}}{10}\\leq Q<\\frac{1}{3}$. \n\t \n\tWe search for two-way protocols because it turns out that within these intervals Alice and Bob's correlations are symmetrically extendable, meaning that Bob and the eavesdropper (Eve) are completely indistinguishable from Alice's point of view, making any one-way Alice-to-Bob post-processing protocol insecure. A two-way protocol might be able to break the symmetry between Bob and Eve, and it must do so in order to distill a secret key because any two-way protocol will necessarily terminate with a one-way communication step, at which point the symmetric extendability of Alice and Bob's updated correlations must be checked again. \n \nWe first show that the search for two-way protocols breaking the symmetric extendability of Alice and Bob's correlations can be restricted to a search over post-selection protocols if all we care about is whether secret key can at all be distilled and not about the rate of distillation. We then provide strong analytical and numerical evidence to suggest that no two-way classical post-processing protocol exists within the gap when the six-state signal states are used. \n\t \n\tUnder quantum entanglement distillation protocols, it is known that secret key can be distilled right up to the intercept-resend bounds of $\\frac{1}{4}$ and $\\frac{1}{3}$ for the BB84 and six-state signal states, respectively. We therefore want to know whether classical post-processing protocols are just as good at distilling secret keys as quantum ones. Our results appear to indicate that they are not.

•Oct 13, 2016•3 citations
We present a simple method to obtain an upper bound on the achievable secret key rate in quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that use only unidirectional classical communication during the public-discussion phase. This method is based on a necessary precondition for one-way secret key distillation; the legitimate users need to prove that there exists no quantum state having a symmetric extension that is compatible with the available measurements results. The main advantage of the obtained upper bound is that it can be formulated as a semidefinite program, which can be efficiently solved. We illustrate our results by analyzing two well-known qubit-based QKD protocols: the four-state protocol and the six-state protocol.
The use of decoy states in quantum key distribution (QKD) has provided a method for substantially increasing the secret key rate and distance that can be covered by QKD protocols with practical signals. The security analysis of these schemes, however, leaves open the possibility that the development of better proof techniques or better classical postprocessing methods might further improve their performance in realistic scenarios. In this paper, we derive upper bounds on the secure key rate for decoy-state QKD. These bounds are based basically only on the classical correlations established by the legitimate users during the quantum communication phase of the protocol. The only assumption about the possible postprocessing methods is that double click events are randomly assigned to single click events. Further, we consider only secure key rates based on the uncalibrated device scenario which assigns imperfections such as detection inefficiency to the eavesdropper. Our analysis relies on two preconditions for secure two-way and one-way QKD. The legitimate users need to prove that there exists no separable state (in the case of two-way QKD) or that there exists no quantum state having a symmetric extension (one-way QKD) that is compatible with the available measurements results. Both criteria have been previously applied to evaluate single-photon implementations of QKD. Here we use them to investigate a realistic source of weak coherent pulses. The resulting upper bounds can be formulated as a convex optimization problem known as a semidefinite program which can be efficiently solved. For the standard four-state QKD protocol, they are quite close to known lower bounds, thus showing that there are clear limits to the further improvement of classical postprocessing techniques in decoy-state QKD.
We investigate a general class of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols using one-way classical communication. We show that full security can be proven by considering only collective attacks. We derive computable lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate of those QKD protocols involving only entropies of two-qubit density operators. As an illustration of our results, we determine new bounds for the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the 6-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols. We show that in all these cases the first classical processing that the legitimate partners should apply consists in adding noise.
Bound secret information is classical information that contains secrecy but from which secrecy cannot be extracted. The existence of bound secrecy has been conjectured but is currently unproven, and in this work we provide analytical and numerical evidence for its existence. Specifically, we consider two-way postprocessing protocols in prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution based on the well-known six-state signal states. In terms of the quantum bit-error rate QQQ of the classical data, such protocols currently exist for $Q<\frac{5\ensuremath{-}\sqrt{5}}{10}\ensuremath{\approx}27.6%$. On the other hand, for $Q\ensuremath{\ge}\frac{1}{3}$ no such protocol can exist as the observed data are compatible with an intercept-resend attack. This leaves the interesting question of whether successful protocols exist in the interval $\frac{5\ensuremath{-}\sqrt{5}}{10}\ensuremath{\le}Q<\frac{1}{3}$. Previous work has shown that a necessary condition for the existence of two-way postprocessing protocols for distilling secret keys is breaking the symmetric extendability of the underlying quantum state shared by Alice and Bob. Using this result, it has been proven that symmetric extendability can be broken up to the 27.627.6%27.6 lower bound using the advantage distillation protocol. In this work, we first show that to break symmetric extendability it is sufficient to consider a generalized form of advantage distillation consisting of one round of postselection by Bob on a block of his data. We then provide evidence that such generalized protocols cannot break symmetric extendability beyond 27.627.6%27.6. We thus have evidence to believe that 27.627.6%27.6 is an upper bound on two-way postprocessing and that the interval $\frac{5\ensuremath{-}\sqrt{5}}{10}\ensuremath{\le}Q<\frac{1}{3}$ is a domain of bound secrecy.
We investigate the resilience to noise of single-qubit quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols in the scenario of security against independent eavesdropping attacks and key distillation based on one-way classical communication. To this end, we introduce a noise-based metric that quantifies the efficiency of QKD protocols. Within this framework, we analyze the maximal noise levels that allow Alice and Bob to asymptotically establish a secure secret key. Using this assumption, we compare the noise tolerance of general single-qubit QKD protocols, in particular the BB84, B92, E91, and six-state protocols. Our main result determines the noise level threshold for QKD allowing one to distill an asymptotically secure secret key. Additionally, we demonstrate that the six-state protocol achieves the greatest resistance to noise while simultaneously yielding a higher post-selection efficiency than the other analyzed single-qubit protocols, confirming its robustness within the considered security model. Finally, we perform an analysis of the proposed noise-based metric and the conventional quantum bit error rate (QBER) metric.
Recently, Chau [Phys. Rev. A 92, 062324 (2015)] introduced an experimentally feasible qudit-based quantum-key-distribution (QKD) scheme. In that scheme, one bit of information is phase encoded in the prepared state in a 2n{2}^{n}2n-dimensional Hilbert space in the form $(|i\ensuremath{\rangle}\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}|j\ensuremath{\rangle})/\sqrt{2}$ with $n\ensuremath{\ge}2$. For each qudit prepared and measured in the same two-dimensional Hilbert subspace, one bit of raw secret key is obtained in the absence of transmission error. Here we show that by modifying the basis announcement procedure, the same experimental setup can generate nnn bits of raw key for each qudit prepared and measured in the same basis in the noiseless situation. The reason is that in addition to the phase information, each qudit also carries information on the Hilbert subspace used. The additional $(n\ensuremath{-}1)$ bits of raw key comes from a clever utilization of this extra piece of information. We prove the unconditional security of this modified protocol and compare its performance with other existing provably secure qubit- and qudit-based protocols on market in the one-way classical communication setting. Interestingly, we find that for the case of n=2n=2n=2, the secret key rate of this modified protocol using nondegenerate random quantum code to perform one-way entanglement distillation is equal to that of the six-state scheme.
We investigate QKD protocols with two-way classical post-processing that are based on the well-known six-state and BB84 signal states. In these QKD protocols, the source (Alice) sends quantum signals to the receiver (Bob), who measures them, leaving only classical data on both sides. Our goal is to find the highest value of the quantum bit-error rate (QBER) QQQ for which two-way classical post-processing protocols on the data can distill secret keys. Using the BB84 signal states, such protocols currently exist for Q<frac15Q<\\frac{1}{5}Q<frac15. On the other hand, for Qgeqfrac14Q\\geq\\frac{1}{4}Qgeqfrac14 no such protocol can exist as the observed data is compatible with an intercept-resend attack. This leaves the interesting question of whether successful two-way protocols exist in the interval frac15leqQ<frac14\\frac{1}{5}\\leq Q<\\frac{1}{4}frac15leqQ<frac14. For the six-state signal states, the corresponding interval is known to be frac5−sqrt510leqQ<frac13\\frac{5-\\sqrt{5}}{10}\\leq Q<\\frac{1}{3}frac5−sqrt510leqQ<frac13. \n\t \n\tWe search for two-way protocols because it turns out that within these intervals Alice and Bob's correlations are symmetrically extendable, meaning that Bob and the eavesdropper (Eve) are completely indistinguishable from Alice's point of view, making any one-way Alice-to-Bob post-processing protocol insecure. A two-way protocol might be able to break the symmetry between Bob and Eve, and it must do so in order to distill a secret key because any two-way protocol will necessarily terminate with a one-way communication step, at which point the symmetric extendability of Alice and Bob's updated correlations must be checked again. \n \nWe first show that the search for two-way protocols breaking the symmetric extendability of Alice and Bob's correlations can be restricted to a search over post-selection protocols if all we care about is whether secret key can at all be distilled and not about the rate of distillation. We then provide strong analytical and numerical evidence to suggest that no two-way classical post-processing protocol exists within the gap when the six-state signal states are used. \n\t \n\tUnder quantum entanglement distillation protocols, it is known that secret key can be distilled right up to the intercept-resend bounds of frac14\\frac{1}{4}frac14 and frac13\\frac{1}{3}frac13 for the BB84 and six-state signal states, respectively. We therefore want to know whether classical post-processing protocols are just as good at distilling secret keys as quantum ones. Our results appear to indicate that they are not.