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arXiv:quant-ph/0507028 · NCimB

On Realism and Quantum Mechanics

Giuliani, Giuseppe

Published Jul 4, 2005• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

A discussion of the quantum mechanical use of superposition or entangled states shows that descriptions containing only statements about state vectors and experiments outputs are the most suitable for Quantum Mechanics. In particular, it is shown that statements about the undefined values of physical quantities before measurement can be dropped without changing the predictions of the theory. If we apply these ideas to EPR issues, we find that the concept of non-locality with its 'instantaneous action at a distance' evaporates. Finally, it is argued that usual treatments of philosophical realist positions end up in the construction of theories whose major role is that of being disproved by experiment. This confutation proves simply that the theories are wrong; no conclusion about realism (or any other philosophical position) can be drawn, since experiments deal always with theories and these are never logical consequences of philosophical positions.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0507028

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A critical reconsideration of the EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) paper shows that the EPR argument can be developed without using the concept of `element of physical reality', thus eliminating any philosophical element in the logical chains of the paper. Deprived of its philosophical ornament, the EPR argument plainly reduces to require what quantum mechanics can not do: to assign definite values to two incompatible physical quantities. Hidden variables theories built up according to Bell - type theorems are formulated on the basis of the assumption that the locality condition implies the statistical independence between two measurements space - like separated. This assumption is valid only with the additional one that statistical dependence between two measurements requires a causal connection between them. This additional assumption rules out the possibility that statistical dependence may due to an intrinsic property of the physical system under study. Therefore, hidden variables theories are built up with a restriction which leads them to be disproved by experiment. Quantum mechanical non - locality, invoked for describing EPR - type experiments, is strictly connected to the hypothesis (NDV hypothesis) according to which the twin photons of entangled pairs do not have a definite polarization before measurements. Both hypotheses are used only for describing EPR experiments and not for making predictions. Therefore, they can be dropped without reducing the predictive power of quantum mechanics concerning entangled photons pairs. Furthermore, both hypotheses can be experimentally tested by a modification of a standard experimental apparatus designed for studying entangled photons pairs.

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A discussion of the quantum mechanical use of superposition or entangled states shows that descriptions containing only statements about state vectors and experiments outputs are the most suitable for Quantum Mechanics. In particular, it is shown that statements about the undefined values of physical quantities before measurement can be dropped without changing the predictions of the theory. If we apply these ideas to EPR issues, we find that the concept of non-locality with its 'instantaneous action at a distance' evaporates. Finally, it is argued that usual treatments of philosophical realist positions end up in the construction of theories whose major role is that of being disproved by experiment. This confutation proves simply that the theories are wrong; no conclusion about realism (or any other philosophical position) can be drawn, since experiments deal always with theories and these are never logical consequences of philosophical positions.
The article examines the controversial relation of scientific realism with quantum mechanics. To this end, two distinct discussions are invoked: the discussion about ‘realism’ in the context of quantum mechanics and the discussion about ‘scientific realism’ in the context of the general philosophy of science. The aim is to distinguish them in order, first, to argue that the former—revolving around ‘local realism’ and the theorems of Bell and Kochen–Specker—unjustifiably identifies realism with features of a particular worldview, and thereby fosters the impression that the failure of ‘local realism’ in quantum experiments constitutes a failure of scientific realism too; and, second, in light of the latter discussion, to claim that scientific realism and quantum mechanics can be compatible—there is ground for dealing with quantum measurement simply as a physical mind-independent interaction. Therefore, a realist approach to the theory is possible despite its notorious measurement problem, even if the issue of its interpretation is still disputed.
Quantum mechanics is widely believed to be inconsistent with local realism because J.S. Bell proved the contradiction between quantum mechanics and the hidden variable theories based on reality and locality of matter. As described herein, the relation between quantum mechanics and local realism is discussed. This paper presents the question of whether any version of local realism is contradicted by quantum mechanics. The answer is negative. An interpretation is proposed by which the contradiction is explained using physical variables of two types: (1) physical variables of the first type, such as positions and angles (i.e. coordinates), are realistic variables and always possess definite values independently of measurements; (2) those of the second type, such as momenta, angular momenta, and spins (i.e., conserved quantities), are non-realistic variables, which possess no value before measurement. Value definiteness of the first type provides a reliable basis to physical reality of matter, and non-reality of the second type might solve the problem of inconsistency between quantum mechanics and local realism.
I feel compelled to respond to the frequent references to spooky action at a distance that often accompany reports of experiments investigating entangled quantum mechanical states. Most, but not all, of these articles have appeared in the popular press. As an experimentalist I have great admiration for such experiments and the concomitant advances in quantum information and quantum computing, but accompanying claims of action at a distance are quite simply nonsense. Some physicists and philosophers of science have bought into the story by promoting the nonlocal nature of quantum mechanics. In 1964, John Bell proved that classical hidden variable theories cannot reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics unless they employ some type of action at a distance. I have no problem with this conclusion. Unfortunately, Bell later expanded his analysis and mistakenly deduced that quantum mechanics and by implication nature herself are nonlocal. In addition, some of these articles present Einstein in caricature, a tragic figure who neither understood quantum mechanics nor believed it to be an accurate theory of nature. Consequently, the current experiments have proven him wrong. This is also nonsense.
Despite its remarkable success in describing microscopic phenomena, quantum mechanics continues to pose unresolved foundational questions concerning measurement, nonlocality, wavefunction collapse, and the nature of physical reality. These issues were highlighted by the EPR paradox1-2, in which Einstein and his co-authors examined the measurement of entangled particles in space-like separation. Quantum mechanics predicts that measuring one particle’s observable instantaneously determines the state of the other, seemingly violating special relativity’s prohibition of faster-than-light influences and suggesting an incomplete description of physical reality. However, Bell’s theorem3-5, along with the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem6-10 and subsequent experiments, has largely ruled out local hidden variable theories. In this work, I apply the quantum decoherence framework11-13, pioneered by Zeh, Zurek, Joos and Leggett et al. to analyze an EPR-like system using system-environment interactions as a measurement model. I demonstrate that measurement on one entangled particle does not instantaneously collapse the system's wavefunction. Instead, the local wavefunctions of the measured particle and its environment evolve dynamically, while the remote particle’s wavefunction remains unchanged. Environment-induced decoherence selects pointer states and rapidly suppresses quantum correlations through local interactions, giving rise to the appearance of wavefunction collapse. These findings suggest that quantum mechanics can be reconciled with local realism if the wavefunction is treated as an ontic entity, offering a potential path toward a locally realistic quantum theory in alignment with Einstein’s vision.
On the Limits of “Undecidability”: Quantum Physics, Deconstruction, and Anti-realism Christopher Norris (bio) I Philosophers of science have responded in various ways to the conceptual and interpretative problems thrown up by quantum mechanics. These problems emerged a century ago from Planck’s researches into black-body radiation and have scarcely been resolved—rather, if anything, deepened and complicated—by the intensive debate that has surrounded them since that time.1 For some theorists, the resultant dilemmas (of observer “interference,” wave/particle dualism, quantum superposition, nonlocal causality, superluminal [faster-than-light] propagation, etc.) are such as to entail drastic revisions to our very idea of the physical world as existing and exerting its causal powers quite apart from our current best theories or investigative methods.2 For others again, quantum mechanics just is the best theory currently available, whatever the problems that it happens to create for our normal habits of logical thought or consistent reasoning on the evidence. Thus logic itself may have to be revised—right down to putative “laws of thought” such as noncontradiction and excluded middle—if these turn out to conflict with the results of quantum-mechanical theory or experiment.3 This is the view taken by Hilary Putnam in his writings on quantum logic and also by others, von Neumann among them, for whom the working rule in any such trade-off is to keep the physics as simple as possible even if the result is to complicate logic by introducing values other than those of determinate (bivalent) truth or falsehood.4 Very often it consorts with the argument that if quantum mechanics is right—at any rate on the standard Copenhagen interpretation—then we had best give up any hope of retaining a “classical” Einsteinian ontology, that is to say, a Lorentz-invariant account of space-time coordinates where the speed of light is the limiting value for assignments of position, velocity, and causal propagation.5 Hence Einstein’s famous series of debates with Niels Bohr when he devised a whole range of increasingly elaborate thought-experiments designed to prove that the quantum-mechnical description of reality had to be in some way “incomplete,” or not to have reckoned with some crucial factor that would bring it into line with logical reasoning and a causal-realist ontology. For on Einstein’s view there was simply no room in science for a theory—such as Bohr’s—that involved either the suspension of classical truth/falsehood [End Page 407] values or the idea of some “spooky action-at-a-distance” which contravened both commonsense realism and the requirements of Special Relativity.6 However it is Bohr who is generally thought to have carried the day in these debates. In which case—so it is argued—we are left with a choice between three possible “solutions.” These are (1) the hypothesis that quantum mechanics is “incomplete” or open to an alternative (“hidden-variables”) interpretation;7 (2) the adoption of an alternative (many-valued or non-bivalent) quantum logic that effectively conjures such problems away;8 or (3) the conclusion that realism may have to be abandoned in favour of some radically different ontology or worldview which counts this a price worth paying in order to conserve the predictive power of the standard quantum formalisms.9 On option (3) there is a further choice of interpretative views according to the theorist’s preferred choice between the various models (or possible-world scenarios) currently on offer. Thus the model may be one that embraces nonlocal simultaneous particle interaction, or which gives up space-time covariance (relative to the speed of light) as required by Einstein’s Special Theory. Or again it may be one that somehow envisions—strangest of all—the splitting-off of multiple coexistent but non-interacting “worlds” whenever the wave-packet collapses or whenever an act of measurement is performed upon any such quantum-system whose properties must be thought of as strictly indeterminate until that moment.10 For, according to its partisans, this theory is the most economical—i.e., involves least conflict with the standard quantum formalisms—despite its baroque proliferation of alternative worlds and its well-nigh unthinkable implications when applied...
A critical reconsideration of the EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) paper shows that the EPR argument can be developed without using the concept of `element of physical reality', thus eliminating any philosophical element in the logical chains of the paper. Deprived of its philosophical ornament, the EPR argument plainly reduces to require what quantum mechanics can not do: to assign definite values to two incompatible physical quantities. Hidden variables theories built up according to Bell - type theorems are formulated on the basis of the assumption that the locality condition implies the statistical independence between two measurements space - like separated. This assumption is valid only with the additional one that statistical dependence between two measurements requires a causal connection between them. This additional assumption rules out the possibility that statistical dependence may due to an intrinsic property of the physical system under study. Therefore, hidden variables theories are built up with a restriction which leads them to be disproved by experiment. Quantum mechanical non - locality, invoked for describing EPR - type experiments, is strictly connected to the hypothesis (NDV hypothesis) according to which the twin photons of entangled pairs do not have a definite polarization before measurements. Both hypotheses are used only for describing EPR experiments and not for making predictions. Therefore, they can be dropped without reducing the predictive power of quantum mechanics concerning entangled photons pairs. Furthermore, both hypotheses can be experimentally tested by a modification of a standard experimental apparatus designed for studying entangled photons pairs.