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arXiv:quant-ph/0505059

On the Everett programme and the Born rule

P. Van Esch

Published May 9, 2005• 6 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Proponents of the Everett interpretation of Quantum Theory have made efforts to show that to an observer in a branch, everything happens as if the projection postulate were true without postulating it. In this paper, we will indicate that it is only possible to deduce this rule if one introduces another postulate that is logically equivalent to introducing the projection postulate as an extra assumption. We do this by examining the consequences of changing the projection postulate into an alternative one, while keeping the unitary part of quantum theory, and indicate that this is a consistent (although strange) physical theory.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0505059

Related papers

The Born Rule Without a Measurement Postulate

D. Ring

The Born rule governs the probability of outcomes of measurements of quantum systems. Many attempts have been made to derive the Born rule from other postulates. We perform such an analysis in an Everett interpretation without any measurement postulates at all. We explain that probability is an ill defined concept and that an agent who nevertheless wishes to make approximate predictions will have no alternative measure to weigh the alternatives without subjecting herself to a dutch book. Our demonstration is complete for projective measurements of pure states in a finite dimensional Hilbert space and we discuss how it might be applied to generalized measurements. A similar demonstration is impossible for mixed states. Nevertheless, following the standard convention, probability for mixed states has the same validity and issues as it does in classical physics.

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General Relativity and the Probability Interpretation of Everett’s Relative State Formulation

David Strayhorn

One of the primary conceptual difficulties facing the multiple worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics is the interpretation of the Born rule measure as a probability. Given that each world in the MWI is typically envisioned as being equally “real,” a more natural rule would be to assign each of the N branches associated with a measurement the equivalent probability 1/N, rather than the probability |a|^2 prescribed by the Born rule. This approach, the “alternate projection postulate” (APP), has been paid scant attention, however, since it leads to predictions that contradict those of standard quantum mechanics. In this paper, a further modification of the MWI is presented that not only incorporates the aesthetic advantages of the APP, but also is compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. This further modification involves an alternative method of enumerating branches that satisfies what is termed here the “Born identity,” according to which there is not a single branch associated with a given experimental outcome, but rather more than one branch, with each branch being physically distinct and the number of branches being proportional to |a|2. In place of the assumption of the Born identity, however, a feasibility argument for the derivation of the Born identity from more fundamental field-theoretic principles (such as those provided by general relativity) is sought. In this manner, it is proposed that quantum statistics may be derived from a purely classical (general relativistic) foundation without injecting the Born rule – either directly or in disguised form – as an independent postulate.

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The Born rule stands as the fundamental probability postulate of quantum mechanics, yet its first-principle derivation remains a longstanding open problem. This paper presents a rigorous, collapse-free, and observer-independent derivation of the Born rule. Starting from four physically natural and minimal axioms—unitary dynamics, uniqueness of classical records, unitary invariance, and consistency with the classical limit and ergodicity—we uniquely deduce the Born rule from first principles. We prove that the Born rule is not an independent postulate, but a necessary mathematical consequence of the core axiomatic structure. Our approach is self-contained, assumption-free, and purely unitary, establishing that the Born rule is canonically determined by the fundamental mathematical and physical principles of quantum mechanics.

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Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality

Robert M. Wald

Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.

Classical and Quantum Gravity•Apr 21, 2011•28 citations

14. A critique of Born’s rule

Arnold Neumaier

Traditionally, some version of Born’s rule is always considered to be an indispensable part of any interpretation of quantum mechanics, either as a postulate, or as a result derived-not always on the basis of convincing reasoning-from other postulates. In this section, we have a close look at the possible forms of Born’s rule and discuss the limits of its validity. All traditional foundations of quantum mechanics heavily depend on the concept of (hypothetical, idealized) experiments-far too heavily. This is one of the reasons why these foundations are still unsettled, over 90 years after the discovery of the basic equations for modern quantum mechanics. No other theory has such controversial foundations. The main reason is that the starting point of the usual interpretations is an idealization of the measurement process that is taken too seriously, namely as the indisputable truth about everything measured. But in reality, this idealization is only a didactical trick for the newcomer to make the formal definitions of quantum mechanics a bit easier to swallow. Except in a few very simple cases, it is too far removed from experimental practice to tell much about real measurements, and hence about how quantum physics is used in real applications. In experimental physics, measurement is a very complex thing, far more complex than Born’s rule (the usual starting point) suggests. To measure the distance between two galaxies, the mass of the top quark, or the Lamb shift, just to mention three basic examples, cannot be captured by the idealistic measurement concept used there, nor by any of the refinements of it discussed in the literature. In each of the three cases mentioned, one assembles a lot of auxiliary information and ultimately calculates the measurement result from a best fit of a model to the data. Clearly, the theory must already be in place in order to do that. We do not even know what a top quark should be, whose mass we are measuring, unless we have a theory that tells us this! The two most accurately determined observables in the history of quantum physics, namely the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron and Lamb shift, are not even q-observables! To present the stage for the criticism of Born’s rule in Section 14.3, we first need to clarify the meaning of the term “Born’s rule”. To distinguish different useful meanings, we look in Sections 14.1-14.2 at the early history of Born’s rule.

De Gruyter eBooks•Oct 24, 2019•0 citations

The measurement postulates of quantum mechanics are operationally redundant

Lluís Masanes, Thomas D. Galley, Markus P. Müller

Understanding the core content of quantum mechanics requires us to disentangle the hidden logical relationships between the postulates of this theory. Here we show that the mathematical structure of quantum measurements, the formula for assigning outcome probabilities (Born's rule) and the post-measurement state-update rule, can be deduced from the other quantum postulates, often referred to as "unitary quantum mechanics", and the assumption that ensembles on finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces are characterized by finitely many parameters. This is achieved by taking an operational approach to physical theories, and using the fact that the manner in which a physical system is partitioned into subsystems is a subjective choice of the observer, and hence should not affect the predictions of the theory. In contrast to other approaches, our result does not assume that measurements are related to operators or bases, it does not rely on the universality of quantum mechanics, and it is independent of the interpretation of probability.

arXiv:1811.11060•Nature Communications•Mar 25, 2019•72 citations
Proponents of the Everett interpretation of Quantum Theory have made efforts to show that to an observer in a branch, everything happens as if the projection postulate were true without postulating it. In this paper, we will indicate that it is only possible to deduce this rule if one introduces another postulate that is logically equivalent to introducing the projection postulate as an extra assumption. We do this by examining the consequences of changing the projection postulate into an alternative one, while keeping the unitary part of quantum theory, and indicate that this is a consistent (although strange) physical theory.
The Born rule governs the probability of outcomes of measurements of quantum systems. Many attempts have been made to derive the Born rule from other postulates. We perform such an analysis in an Everett interpretation without any measurement postulates at all. We explain that probability is an ill defined concept and that an agent who nevertheless wishes to make approximate predictions will have no alternative measure to weigh the alternatives without subjecting herself to a dutch book. Our demonstration is complete for projective measurements of pure states in a finite dimensional Hilbert space and we discuss how it might be applied to generalized measurements. A similar demonstration is impossible for mixed states. Nevertheless, following the standard convention, probability for mixed states has the same validity and issues as it does in classical physics.
One of the primary conceptual difficulties facing the multiple worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics is the interpretation of the Born rule measure as a probability. Given that each world in the MWI is typically envisioned as being equally “real,” a more natural rule would be to assign each of the N branches associated with a measurement the equivalent probability 1/N, rather than the probability |a|^2 prescribed by the Born rule. This approach, the “alternate projection postulate” (APP), has been paid scant attention, however, since it leads to predictions that contradict those of standard quantum mechanics. In this paper, a further modification of the MWI is presented that not only incorporates the aesthetic advantages of the APP, but also is compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. This further modification involves an alternative method of enumerating branches that satisfies what is termed here the “Born identity,” according to which there is not a single branch associated with a given experimental outcome, but rather more than one branch, with each branch being physically distinct and the number of branches being proportional to |a|2. In place of the assumption of the Born identity, however, a feasibility argument for the derivation of the Born identity from more fundamental field-theoretic principles (such as those provided by general relativity) is sought. In this manner, it is proposed that quantum statistics may be derived from a purely classical (general relativistic) foundation without injecting the Born rule – either directly or in disguised form – as an independent postulate.
The Born rule stands as the fundamental probability postulate of quantum mechanics, yet its first-principle derivation remains a longstanding open problem. This paper presents a rigorous, collapse-free, and observer-independent derivation of the Born rule. Starting from four physically natural and minimal axioms—unitary dynamics, uniqueness of classical records, unitary invariance, and consistency with the classical limit and ergodicity—we uniquely deduce the Born rule from first principles. We prove that the Born rule is not an independent postulate, but a necessary mathematical consequence of the core axiomatic structure. Our approach is self-contained, assumption-free, and purely unitary, establishing that the Born rule is canonically determined by the fundamental mathematical and physical principles of quantum mechanics.
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.
Traditionally, some version of Born’s rule is always considered to be an indispensable part of any interpretation of quantum mechanics, either as a postulate, or as a result derived-not always on the basis of convincing reasoning-from other postulates. In this section, we have a close look at the possible forms of Born’s rule and discuss the limits of its validity. All traditional foundations of quantum mechanics heavily depend on the concept of (hypothetical, idealized) experiments-far too heavily. This is one of the reasons why these foundations are still unsettled, over 90 years after the discovery of the basic equations for modern quantum mechanics. No other theory has such controversial foundations. The main reason is that the starting point of the usual interpretations is an idealization of the measurement process that is taken too seriously, namely as the indisputable truth about everything measured. But in reality, this idealization is only a didactical trick for the newcomer to make the formal definitions of quantum mechanics a bit easier to swallow. Except in a few very simple cases, it is too far removed from experimental practice to tell much about real measurements, and hence about how quantum physics is used in real applications. In experimental physics, measurement is a very complex thing, far more complex than Born’s rule (the usual starting point) suggests. To measure the distance between two galaxies, the mass of the top quark, or the Lamb shift, just to mention three basic examples, cannot be captured by the idealistic measurement concept used there, nor by any of the refinements of it discussed in the literature. In each of the three cases mentioned, one assembles a lot of auxiliary information and ultimately calculates the measurement result from a best fit of a model to the data. Clearly, the theory must already be in place in order to do that. We do not even know what a top quark should be, whose mass we are measuring, unless we have a theory that tells us this! The two most accurately determined observables in the history of quantum physics, namely the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron and Lamb shift, are not even q-observables! To present the stage for the criticism of Born’s rule in Section 14.3, we first need to clarify the meaning of the term “Born’s rule”. To distinguish different useful meanings, we look in Sections 14.1-14.2 at the early history of Born’s rule.
Understanding the core content of quantum mechanics requires us to disentangle the hidden logical relationships between the postulates of this theory. Here we show that the mathematical structure of quantum measurements, the formula for assigning outcome probabilities (Born's rule) and the post-measurement state-update rule, can be deduced from the other quantum postulates, often referred to as "unitary quantum mechanics", and the assumption that ensembles on finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces are characterized by finitely many parameters. This is achieved by taking an operational approach to physical theories, and using the fact that the manner in which a physical system is partitioned into subsystems is a subjective choice of the observer, and hence should not affect the predictions of the theory. In contrast to other approaches, our result does not assume that measurements are related to operators or bases, it does not rely on the universality of quantum mechanics, and it is independent of the interpretation of probability.