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arXiv:quant-ph/0501062 · International Journal of Quantum Information

FEASIBILITY OF THE INTERLOCK PROTOCOL AGAINST MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS ON QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY

Karl Svozil

Published Dec 1, 2005• 20 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

If an eavesdropper succeeds in compromising the quantum as well as the classical channels and mimics the receiver "Bob" for the sender "Alice" and vice versa, one defence strategy is the successive, temporally interlocked partial transmission of the entire encrypted message.
DOI
10.1142/s0219749905001511

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