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arXiv:quant-ph/0307188 · Quantum Probability and Infinite Dimensional Analysis

ON AN ARGUMENT OF DAVID DEUTSCH

Richard David Gill

Published Jan 1, 2005• 17 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We analyse an argument of Deutsch, which purports to show that the deterministic part of classical quantum theory together with deterministic axioms of classical decision theory, together imply that a rational decision maker behaves as if the probabilistic part of quantum theory (Born's law) is true. We uncover two missing assumptions in the argument, and show that the argument also works for an instrumentalist who is prepared to accept that the outcome of a quantum measurement is random in the frequentist sense: Born's law is a consequence of functional and unitary invariance principles belonging to the deterministic part of quantum mechanics. Unfortunately, it turns out that after the necessary corrections we have done no more than give an easier proof of Gleason's theorem under stronger assumptions. However, for some special cases the proof method gives positive results while using different assumptions to Gleason. This leads to the conjecture that the proof could be improved to give the same conclusion as Gleason under unitary invariance together with a much weaker functional invariance condition.

DOI
10.1142/9789812702104_0019

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In a recent paper, Deutsch claims to derive the ‘probabilistic predictions of quantum theory’ from the ‘non–probabilistic axioms of quantum theory’ and the ‘nonprobabilistic part of classical decision theory.’ We show that his derivation includes a crucial hidden assumption that vitiates the force of his argument. Furthermore, we point out that in classical decision theory a standard set of non–probabilistic axioms is already sufficient to endow possible outcomes with a natural probability structure. Within that context we argue that Gleason's theorem, relying on fewer assumptions than Deutsch, provides a compelling derivation of the quantum probability law.

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In a recent article (quant-ph/9906015) Deutsch, using concepts of decision theory, provided a strikingly simple argument to explain why quantum-mechanical probabilities are squares of amplitudes. The decisiontheoretic reasoning was criticized by Barnum et al. (quant-ph/9907024). Taking a more conventional approach, we reinterpret a crucial substitution in Deutsch’s paper as the time evolution of an apparatus, capable of separating internal states of an “atom ” into a suitable number of “cavities”. Permutational symmetries play a central role in this analysis. PACS numbers: 03.65.BzIn a recent paper, Deutsch [1] invoked the non-probabilistic part of classical decision theory to deduce from only non-probabilistic axioms of quantum mechanics the Statistical Axiom: The probability for measuring xi in a superposition state |ψ 〉 = ∑ i ψi|xi 〉 is |ψi | 2. The paper has attracted some vehement criticism [2] relating to its decision-theoretic setting, but also to priorities. As pointed out by Ref. [2], in 1957 already Gleason [3] gave a mathematically rigorous proof for the redundance of the Statistical Axiom, showing that if normalized probabilities are to be assigned to the eigenvectors of each bounded hermitian operator, then the only solution is the usual quantum mechanical prescription. Unfortunately for a result of such fundamental importance to quantum physics, the existing proofs of Gleason’s theorem are not easily received by many physicists, although mathematically elementary [4], synoptical [5], and even textbook [6] elaborations have been presented. Ref. [1] has a strong point in this respect, suggesting that the mathematics behind amplitudes being square-roots of probabilities essentially is the Pythagorean theorem in Hilbert space. Consider a superposition state of the special form |ψ 〉 =

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We analyse an argument of Deutsch, which purports to show that the deterministic part of classical quantum theory together with deterministic axioms of classical decision theory, together imply that a rational decision maker behaves as if the probabilistic part of quantum theory (Born's law) is true. We uncover two missing assumptions in the argument, and show that the argument also works for an instrumentalist who is prepared to accept that the outcome of a quantum measurement is random in the frequentist sense: Born's law is a consequence of functional and unitary invariance principles belonging to the deterministic part of quantum mechanics. Unfortunately, it turns out that after the necessary corrections we have done no more than give an easier proof of Gleason's theorem under stronger assumptions. However, for some special cases the proof method gives positive results while using different assumptions to Gleason. This leads to the conjecture that the proof could be improved to give the same conclusion as Gleason under unitary invariance together with a much weaker functional invariance condition.
In a recent paper, Deutsch claims to derive the ‘probabilistic predictions of quantum theory’ from the ‘non–probabilistic axioms of quantum theory’ and the ‘nonprobabilistic part of classical decision theory.’ We show that his derivation includes a crucial hidden assumption that vitiates the force of his argument. Furthermore, we point out that in classical decision theory a standard set of non–probabilistic axioms is already sufficient to endow possible outcomes with a natural probability structure. Within that context we argue that Gleason's theorem, relying on fewer assumptions than Deutsch, provides a compelling derivation of the quantum probability law.
A major problem facing no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics in the tradition of Everett is how to understand the probabilistic axiom of quantum mechanics (the Born rule) in the context of a deterministic theory in which every outcome of a measurement occurs. Deutsch claims to derive a decision-theoretic analogue of the Born rule from the non-probabilistic part of quantum mechanics and some non-probabilistic axioms of classical decision theory, and hence concludes that no probabilistic axiom is needed. I argue that Deutsch’s derivation begs the question.
In a recent article (quant-ph/9906015) Deutsch, using concepts of decision theory, provided a strikingly simple argument to explain why quantum-mechanical probabilities are squares of amplitudes. The decisiontheoretic reasoning was criticized by Barnum et al. (quant-ph/9907024). Taking a more conventional approach, we reinterpret a crucial substitution in Deutsch’s paper as the time evolution of an apparatus, capable of separating internal states of an “atom ” into a suitable number of “cavities”. Permutational symmetries play a central role in this analysis. PACS numbers: 03.65.BzIn a recent paper, Deutsch [1] invoked the non-probabilistic part of classical decision theory to deduce from only non-probabilistic axioms of quantum mechanics the Statistical Axiom: The probability for measuring xi in a superposition state |ψ 〉 = ∑ i ψi|xi 〉 is |ψi | 2. The paper has attracted some vehement criticism [2] relating to its decision-theoretic setting, but also to priorities. As pointed out by Ref. [2], in 1957 already Gleason [3] gave a mathematically rigorous proof for the redundance of the Statistical Axiom, showing that if normalized probabilities are to be assigned to the eigenvectors of each bounded hermitian operator, then the only solution is the usual quantum mechanical prescription. Unfortunately for a result of such fundamental importance to quantum physics, the existing proofs of Gleason’s theorem are not easily received by many physicists, although mathematically elementary [4], synoptical [5], and even textbook [6] elaborations have been presented. Ref. [1] has a strong point in this respect, suggesting that the mathematics behind amplitudes being square-roots of probabilities essentially is the Pythagorean theorem in Hilbert space. Consider a superposition state of the special form |ψ 〉 =
Abstract Critics object that the Everett view cannot make sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two ways: either it cannot make sense of probability at all, or it cannot explain why probability should be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these objections by appealing to an Everettian version of Savage's rational decision theory. Deutsch argues not only that an analogue of classical decision under uncertainty makes sense in an Everett world; but also that under reasonable assumptions, the betting odds of a rational Everettian agent should be constrained by the Born rule. Deutsch's proposal has been defended and developed by David Wallace, and in a different form by Hilary Greaves. This chapter offers some objections to the Deutsch–Wallace–Greaves argument, focussing in particular on the supposed analogy with classical decision under uncertainty.
It is often objected that the Everett interpretation of QM cannot make adequate sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two senses: either it cannot make sense of probability at all, or cannot explain why probability should be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these objections. He argues not only that rational decision under uncertainty makes sense in the Everett interpretation, and that under reasonable assumptions, the credences of a rational agent in an Everett world should be constrained by the Born rule. David Wallace has recently developed and defended Deutsch's proposal, and greatly clarified its conceptual basis. In this note I outline some concerns about the Deutsch argument, as presented by Wallace, and about related proposals by Hilary Greaves. In particular, I argue that the argument is circular, at a crucial point.
The emergence of intrinsic probability has long been one of the most important and puzzling problems in quantum mechanics, and the law most directly related to this problem is the Born rule. For a century, there have been many attempts to derive the Born rule as a theorem rather than postulating it. However, existing derivations of the Born rule are each based on different frameworks and have attracted different criticisms. The assumptions from which they start are also highly divergent, and the connections between them have not been sufficiently studied. These possible connections are very likely to be the key to answering questions about the origin of probability in quantum mechanics. This paper focuses on proving the necessity and indispensability of the additivity assumption in the derivation of the Born rule. This supports the view that the Born rule cannot be derived solely from other non-probabilistic quantum or additional postulates. We first prove that additivity cannot be derived from two other commonly used non-probabilistic additional assumptions, non-contextuality and normalization. Then we analyze the crucial role of the additivity assumption in five important existing derivations of the Born rule. These include Gleason's Theorem, Busch's extension of Gleason's Theorem, the Deutsch-Wallace Theorem, Zurek's envariance proof, and the Finkelstein-Hartle Theorem. We show that these derivations either depend heavily on the additivity assumption or lead to obvious loopholes due to the lack of additivity. We also point out some problems arised from the lack of a non-contextuality assumption. Our results provide a novel insight into the important role of additivity assumption in quantum measurement, as well as into the origin of probability in quantum mechanics.