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arXiv:quant-ph/0212055

Unconditionally Secure Quantum Key Distribution In Higher Dimensions

H. F. Chau

Published Dec 10, 2002• 7 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In search of a quantum key distribution scheme that could stand up for more drastic eavesdropping attack, I discover a prepare-and-measure scheme using $N$-dimensional quantum particles as information carriers where $N$ is a prime power. Using the Shor-Preskill-type argument, I prove that this scheme is unconditional secure against all attacks allowed by the laws of quantum physics. Incidentally, for $N = 2^n > 2$, each information carrier can be replaced by $n$ entangled qubits. And in this case, I discover an eavesdropping attack on which no unentangled-qubit-based prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution scheme known to date can generate a provably secure key. In contrast, this entangled-qubit-based scheme produces a provably secure key under the same eavesdropping attack whenever $N \geq 16$. This demonstrates the advantage of using entangled particles as information carriers to combat certain eavesdropping strategies.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0212055

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In search of a quantum key distribution scheme that could stand up for more drastic eavesdropping attack, I discover a prepare-and-measure scheme using NNN-dimensional quantum particles as information carriers where NNN is a prime power. Using the Shor-Preskill-type argument, I prove that this scheme is unconditional secure against all attacks allowed by the laws of quantum physics. Incidentally, for N=2n>2N = 2^n > 2N=2n>2, each information carrier can be replaced by nnn entangled qubits. And in this case, I discover an eavesdropping attack on which no unentangled-qubit-based prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution scheme known to date can generate a provably secure key. In contrast, this entangled-qubit-based scheme produces a provably secure key under the same eavesdropping attack whenever N≥16N \geq 16N≥16. This demonstrates the advantage of using entangled particles as information carriers to combat certain eavesdropping strategies.
This paper presents a prepare-and-measure scheme using N-dimensional quantum particles as information carriers where N is a prime power. One of the key ingredients used to resist eavesdropping in this scheme is to depolarize all Pauli errors introduced to the quantum information carriers. Using the Shor-Preskill-type argument, we prove that this scheme is unconditionally secure against all attacks allowed by the laws of quantum physics. For N=2/sup n/>2, each information carrier can be replaced by n entangled qubits. In this case, there is a family of eavesdropping attacks on which no unentangled-qubit-based prepare-and-measure (PM) quantum key distribution scheme known to date can generate a provably secure key. In contrast, under the same family of attacks, our entangled-qubit-based scheme remains secure whenever 2/sup n//spl ges/4. This demonstrates the advantage of using entangled particles as information carriers and of using depolarization of Pauli errors to combat eavesdropping attacks more drastic than those that can be handled by unentangled-qubit-based prepare-and-measure schemes.
All known qudit-based prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution (PMQKD) schemes are more error resilient than their qubit-based counterparts. Their high error resiliency comes partly from the careful encoding of multiple bits of signals used to generate the raw key in each transmitted qudit so that the same eavesdropping attempt causes a higher bit error rate (BER) in the raw key. Here I show that highly-error-tolerant PMQKD schemes can be constructed simply by encoding one bit of classical information in each transmitted qudit in the form $(|i\ensuremath{\rangle}\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}|j\ensuremath{\rangle})/\sqrt{2}$, where $|i\ensuremath{\rangle}$'s form an orthonormal basis of the 2n{2}^{n}2n-dimensional Hilbert space. Moreover, I prove that these schemes can tolerate up to the theoretical maximum of a 50% BER for $n\ensuremath{\ge}2$ provided the raw key is generated under a certain technical condition, making them extremely-error-tolerant PMQKD schemes involving the transmission of unentangled finite-dimensional qudits. This shows the potential of processing quantum information using lower-dimensional quantum signals encoded in a higher-dimensional quantum state.
Recently, Chau [Phys. Rev. A 92, 062324 (2015)] introduced an experimentally feasible qudit-based quantum-key-distribution (QKD) scheme. In that scheme, one bit of information is phase encoded in the prepared state in a 2n{2}^{n}2n-dimensional Hilbert space in the form $(|i\ensuremath{\rangle}\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}|j\ensuremath{\rangle})/\sqrt{2}$ with $n\ensuremath{\ge}2$. For each qudit prepared and measured in the same two-dimensional Hilbert subspace, one bit of raw secret key is obtained in the absence of transmission error. Here we show that by modifying the basis announcement procedure, the same experimental setup can generate nnn bits of raw key for each qudit prepared and measured in the same basis in the noiseless situation. The reason is that in addition to the phase information, each qudit also carries information on the Hilbert subspace used. The additional $(n\ensuremath{-}1)$ bits of raw key comes from a clever utilization of this extra piece of information. We prove the unconditional security of this modified protocol and compare its performance with other existing provably secure qubit- and qudit-based protocols on market in the one-way classical communication setting. Interestingly, we find that for the case of n=2n=2n=2, the secret key rate of this modified protocol using nondegenerate random quantum code to perform one-way entanglement distillation is equal to that of the six-state scheme.
Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically interesting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to prove the security of quantum key distribution, or whether its security can be based on other physical principles. The question would also be of practical interest if quantum mechanics were ever to fail in some regime, because a scientifically and technologically advanced eavesdropper could perhaps use postquantum physics to extract information from quantum communications without necessarily causing the quantum state disturbances on which existing security proofs rely. Here we describe a key distribution scheme provably secure against general attacks by a postquantum eavesdropper limited only by the impossibility of superluminal signaling. Its security stems from violation of a Bell inequality.
Key distribution plays a fundamental role in cryptography. Currently, the quantum scheme stands as the only known method for achieving unconditionally secure key distribution. This method has been demonstrated over distances of 508 and 1002 kilometers in the measurement-device-independent and twin-field configurations, respectively. However, quantum key distribution faces transmission distance issues and numerous side channel attacks since the basic physical picture requires the use of quantum channels between users. Even when quantum repeater and quantum constellation are used, commercializing quantum cryptography on a large scale remains unattainable due to the considerable expense and significant technical hurdles associated with establishing a global quantum network and facilitating mobile quantum communication. Here, by discovering the provable quantum one-way function, we propose another key distribution scheme with unconditional security, named probability key distribution, that promises users between any two distances to generate a fixed and high secret key rate. There are no quantum channels for exchanging quantum signals between two legitimate users. Non-local entangled states can be generated, identified and measured in the equivalent virtual protocol and can be used to extract secret keys. We anticipate that this discovery presents a paradigm shift in achieving unconditionally secure cryptography, thereby facilitating its widespread application on a global scale.