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arXiv:quant-ph/0211053 · Theoretical and Mathematical Physics

Quantum Mechanics as a Complete Physical Theory

D. A. Slavnov

Published Sep 1, 2002• 6 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1023/a:1020272121372

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Based on a thought experiment the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper’s authors concluded that in quantum mechanics the mathematical objects called wave functions fail to describe the physical reality and consequently quantum theory is incomplete. They left open the question of whether or not a complete description of the physical reality exists, but expressed their belief that such a complete theory is possible. In this paper I show that indeed a theory that gives a complete description of the physical reality exists.
I distinguish two senses in which one can take a given physical theory to be `complete'. On the first, a complete physical theory is one that, in principle, completely describes physical reality. On the second, a complete physical theory is one that provides all of the conceptual resources one needs to describe any (in general probabilistic) physical phenomenon to any level of detail one likes, in principle. I argue that while the (neo-)Everettian approach to interpreting quantum mechanics aims to show that it is complete in the first sense, the (neo-)Bohrian approach begins from an understanding of quantum mechanics as being complete in the second sense. I then discuss some of the essential differences between how classical and quantum theory describe phenomena, and the way in which the quantum description can be thought of as a ``natural generalisation'' (to use Bohr's phrase) of the classical description. Finally, I elaborate upon the two visions of physics from which one can motivate the first and the second sense of completeness, respectively: \emph{metaphysical realism}, on the one hand, and what I will call \emph{methodological realism}, on the other -- and discuss what one can say about the significance of the differences between quantum and classical description from each of these points of view. I suggest that there is a sense in which the views of (neo-)Everett and the views of (neo-)Bohr can be understood to be mutually supporting positions, from their respective perspectives, even though they are diametrically opposed.
In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen published their thought experiment I a paper entitled, “Can Quantum – Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be considered complete?”. At that time, Bohr, Heisenberg, and the proponents of the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum mechanics, were saying that Quantum theory is a complete and the last theory in physics event though it does not provide any picture of the world separate from our observations of it. The message Einstein conveyed to his colleagues was that the quantum theory is not a “complete” theory because it does not describe certain important aspects of reality which are physically real event if they are not observed. In sympathy with Einstein's position, this paper argues that, the real nature of physical reality cannot be explained “at once” by a single theory. Reality is still unfolding and a new theory that will surpass the predictive ability of Quantum Mechanics will soon emerge. SOPHIA: An African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 8 (2) 2006: pp.14-19