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arXiv:quant-ph/0205141 · Physics Essays

State Vectors and Physical States

William N. Boog Watson

Published Mar 1, 2000• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Causality and the relativity of simultaneity seem at odds with the apparently sudden, acausal state-vector changes ("collapses") characteristic of quantum phenomena. The problem of how physical phenomena can be causally determined, have the probabilities predicted by quantum theory, and be consistent with special relativity appears to be solved by the assumption, essentially the same as one first used by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz to address a different problem, that the "initial" and "final" state vectors of a phenomenon or observation, along with certain other state vectors, all represent the system's state at all times. Each member of such an aggregate of state vectors is postulated to represent a different aspect of a physical state rather than a state, so that most of the state vectors in effect constitute a set of nonlocal hidden variables. Various implications of this assumption are illustrated through several physical situations. Among the results is a somewhat surprising resolution of a paradox in a three-spin Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger experiment (a "three-particle EPR" experiment), which involves a logical consequence that differs from familiar ideas of quantum physics that has no practical experimental consequence, and the prediction of new experimental phenomena related to the Zou-Wang-Mandel superposed-idler system. The potential value of the concepts described as heuristics for new predictions and for developing physical intuition by clarifying the interrelation and coherence of physical principles that would otherwise seem contradictory is briefly discussed.

DOI
10.4006/1.3025424

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Aharonov, Popescu, and Tollaksen reply: We thank the letter writers for their interest and for the opportunity to better clarify our ideas.Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson make essentially the same point—namely, that our ideas are completely wrong. To put their criticism in the right context, we point out that the outcome of our research program is twofold. First, we have discovered an entirely new class of quantum effects; second, we present a new way of thinking about quantum mechanics.The fact that quantum mechanics predicts the effects we discovered is just that, a fact. The effects are computed using standard quantum mechanics, without additions or modifications. As such, their prediction by quantum mechanics is beyond doubt (unless one suspects algebraic mistakes). Furthermore, many of our effects have been verified experimentally; in particular, different versions of our amplification method have been used as novel technological tools. Both Nauenberg and Hobson completely ignore our effects. But one should not ignore them. They are novel and they are strange. Even more, they don’t appear in isolation, but they form a well-structured pattern. Surely there is a lesson here that quantum mechanics wants to teach us; one ignores it at one’s peril.On the other hand, our way of looking at quantum mechanics is certainly unconventional; it introduces new concepts, and it approaches old concepts in a new way. That is essentially what the two letter writers point out, Hobson most emphatically when he writes that our article “is riddled with errors.” We are criticized for thinking in a different way and for asking new questions. But our way of thinking leads to the same predictions as the conventional way, so as far as experiments are concerned they are completely equivalent. As Richard Feynman says in his book The Character of Physical Law (Modern Library, 1994), suppose we have “two theories” that “have all the consequences . . . exactly the same. . . . How are we going to decide which one is right? There is no way by science, because they both agree with the experiment to the same extent.” So the criticism is baseless.At the same time, if our approach is completely equivalent to the standard one, why bother? Again Feynman gives the best answer: “For psychological reasons . . . , these two things may be far from equivalent, because one gives a man different ideas from the other. . . . There will be something, for instance, in theory A that talks about something, . . . but to find out what the corresponding thing is . . . in [theory] B may be very complicated—it may not be a very simple idea at all.” As a consequence, a new way of thinking allows one to ask new questions that, although they could be asked in the old theory as well, would have been very difficult to even envisage. That is precisely what we did. First, we raised the issue of the physics in pre- and postselected ensembles. And to reply to Hobson, no, there is nothing “erroneous” in the process of postselection. Postselection is a question about results of experiments, and every question about the results of actual measurements is legitimate. Subsequently, we discovered the concept of weak measurements, which in turn led us to discover the various effects we presented. Since the power of any new approach is given by its ability to predict new effects, one should conclude that ours is strong indeed.Furthermore, as many physicists agree, an intuitive understanding of quantum mechanics is still missing. That is why quantum physicists are surprised over and over again by the discovery of strange and unexpected fundamental effects. We hope that our new way of thinking is a step toward the long-sought intuition. Even more important, the new way of thinking may give us new ideas about what to change, if experiments ever turn out to contradict quantum mechanics and therefore require its modification. In particular, since we tinker with the idea of time— one of the most important concepts in physics—starting the change from there may be a very potent method.Shaul Mukamel refers to our experiment in which the component along some given axis of a spin-1⁄2 particle is found, by a weak measurement, to have the value √2‾/2 which is √2‾ times larger than the largest eigenvalue. He suggests an alternative explanation based on a classical vector model of spin. According to his explanation, values up to √3‾/2 should be possible. However, we presented the experiment showing √2‾/2 only because it was mathematically simple; by choosing a different postselection, we could have obtained, as results of weak measurements, values as large as we wanted. Hence the above simple classical-vector view doesn’t work.Robert Griffiths points out that there are two other time-symmetric formulations of quantum mechanics besides ours—“consistent histories” and “decoherent histories.” In particular, Griffiths is right when he emphasizes a major difference in spirit between our theory and consistent histories. The main goal of consistent histories is to find an explanation for the (apparent?) collapse of the wavefunction during a quantum measurement; although that solution is hotly disputed, as are all other solutions to the collapse problem, it is certainly a very ingenious one. However, an answer to the collapse problem is not our primary interest (though we are starting to see glimmers of an alternative answer to it using our approach).The letter by Griffiths, however, runs the risk of being misread as implying that solving the collapse problem will by itself clarify most or all of the counterintuitive aspects of quantum mechanics. That conclusion would be wrong. Quantum mechanics is strange and unusual and defies intuition in many ways; solving the collapse problem is by no means its only interesting fundamental issue. Nor can the solution of that one problem lead to a complete understanding of quantum phenomena. That particles tunnel in the first place is surprising by itself; even more so is the fact that, as we showed, perfectly good measuring devices, working with arbitrarily high precision, indicate consistently that the tunneling particles have negative kinetic energy. Equally surprising is that we can arrange a situation in which perfectly good measurements, made with as high a precision as we want, indicate that spin-1⁄2 particles have arbitrarily large spin. And these are only two examples. As far as we are aware, none of the many proposed solutions to the collapse problem make these effects seem less surprising, let alone predict them.© 2011 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•May 1, 2011•7 citations
Causality and the relativity of simultaneity seem at odds with the apparently sudden, acausal state-vector changes ("collapses") characteristic of quantum phenomena. The problem of how physical phenomena can be causally determined, have the probabilities predicted by quantum theory, and be consistent with special relativity appears to be solved by the assumption, essentially the same as one first used by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz to address a different problem, that the "initial" and "final" state vectors of a phenomenon or observation, along with certain other state vectors, all represent the system's state at all times. Each member of such an aggregate of state vectors is postulated to represent a different aspect of a physical state rather than a state, so that most of the state vectors in effect constitute a set of nonlocal hidden variables. Various implications of this assumption are illustrated through several physical situations. Among the results is a somewhat surprising resolution of a paradox in a three-spin Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger experiment (a "three-particle EPR" experiment), which involves a logical consequence that differs from familiar ideas of quantum physics that has no practical experimental consequence, and the prediction of new experimental phenomena related to the Zou-Wang-Mandel superposed-idler system. The potential value of the concepts described as heuristics for new predictions and for developing physical intuition by clarifying the interrelation and coherence of physical principles that would otherwise seem contradictory is briefly discussed.
This article presents a general discussion of several aspects of our present understanding of quantum mechanics. The emphasis is put on the very special correlations that this theory makes possible: They are forbidden by very general arguments based on realism and local causality. In fact, these correlations are completely impossible in any circumstance, except for very special situations designed by physicists especially to observe these purely quantum effects. Another general point that is emphasized is the necessity for the theory to predict the emergence of a single result in a single realization of an experiment. For this purpose, orthodox quantum mechanics introduces a special postulate: the reduction of the state vector, which comes in addition to the Schrödinger evolution postulate. Nevertheless, the presence in parallel of two evolution processes of the same object (the state vector) may be a potential source for conflicts; various attitudes that are possible to avoid this problem are discussed in this text. After a brief historical introduction, recalling how the very special status of the state vector has emerged in quantum mechanics, various conceptual difficulties are introduced and discussed. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) theorem is presented with the help of a botanical parable, in a way that emphasizes how deeply the EPR reasoning is rooted into what is often called “scientific method.” In another section the Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger argument, the Hardy impossibilities, as well as the Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem are introduced in simple terms. The final two sections attempt to give a summary of the present situation: One section discusses nonlocality and entanglement as we see it presently, with brief mention of recent experiments; the last section contains a (nonexhaustive) list of various attitudes that are found among physicists, and that are helpful to alleviate the conceptual difficulties of quantum mechanics.
It has been shown that quantum paradoxes have followed from one special assumption, i.e., from attributing basic physical meaning to Hamiltonian eigenfunctions and representing all physical states by vectors of the Hilbert space spanned on these eigenfunctions. However, any paradoxical properties disappear if the physical states are represented by vectors from the extended Hilbert space on which the scattering theory of Lax and Phillips has been based. On the other side, all stationary characteristics and experimentally verified quantum-mechanical predictions remain the same. The extended mathematical model is also in full agreement with results of EPR experiments, if one takes into account that a further assumption (in addition to locality condition) is involved in derivation of Bell's inequalities as shown recently (see: quant-ph/9808005).
This year we celebrate 100 years of quantum mechanics (QM). Incorrect interpretations of QM and incorrect mental models of the invisible details of quantum phenomena lead to paradoxes. To explain these, we advocate the statistical contextual interpretation (SCI) of quantum mechanics. State vectors (wave functions) and various operators are purely mathematical entities that permit quantitative probabilistic predictions. “State vector” describes an ensemble of identically prepared physical systems, and a specific “operator” represents a class of equivalent measurements of a physical observable. A collapse of wavefunction is not a mysterious and instantaneous physical process; a collapsed quantum state describes a new ensemble of physical systems prepared in a particular way. A value of a physical observable, such as a spin projection, associated with a pure quantum ensemble is a characteristic of this ensemble created by its interaction with measuring instruments. Probabilities are objective properties of random experiments in which empirical frequencies stabilize. Following Einstein, SCI rejects the claim that QM provides a complete description of individual physical systems, but it remains agnostic about whether a more detailed subquantum description can be found or is necessary. In conformity with Bohr contextuality, SCI rejects Bell-local and Bell-causal hidden variable models. Nevertheless, by incorporating into a probabilistic model contextual hidden variable measuring instruments, long distance quantum correlations studied in Bell tests can be explained without evoking quantum nonlocality or retro-causality. SCI allows the explanation of several quantum phenomena without evoking quantum magic. SCI does not claim to provide a complete description of quantum phenomena; in fact, it is unknown whether quantum probabilities even provide a complete description of existing experimental data. Time series of experimental data may contain much more information than is obtained using empirical frequencies and histograms. Therefore, predictable completeness of QM must be tested and not taken for granted.
The entangled Schrodinger cat state obtained immediately upon measurement of a superposed two-state quantum system is often considered paradoxical because it appears to predict two macroscopically different outcomes, such as an alive and dead cat. However, nonlocal interferometry experiments testing momentum-entangled photon pairs over all phases demonstrate that the cat state does not fit this description and is not paradoxical. Both experiment and theory imply that it instead represents a superposition of two nonlocally coherent (i.e. phase-dependent) statistical correlations between its sub-systems. This is not paradoxical. Standard quantum theory rigorously predicts the experimentally-observed outcomes of this state. Neither sub-system is superposed; rather, the correlations between the states of the subsystems are superposed. This resolves the problem of definite outcomes. The nonlocal properties of entanglement then ensure that only one outcome occurs while the other outcome simultaneously does not occur, resolving a problem posed by Einstein in 1927. The single outcome that occurs then triggers an irreversible process leading to macroscopic registration of the outcome. This resolves the quantum measurement problem. Collapse occurs because of entanglement and does not require a special collapse postulate. Collapse is a consequence of standard quantum physics and the irreversible nature of the macroscopic registration.
The quantum measurement problems are revisited from a new perspective. One of the main ideas of this work is that the basic entities of our world are various types of particles, elementary or composite. It follows that each elementary process, hence each measurement process at its core, is a space–time, pointlike, event. Another key idea is that, when a microsystem [Formula: see text] gets into contact with the experimental device, factorization of [Formula: see text] rapidly fails and entangled mixed states appear. The wave functions for the microsystem-apparatus coupled systems for different measurement outcomes then lack overlapping space–time support. It means that the aftermath of each measurement is a single term in the sum: a “wave function collapse.” Our discussion leading to a diagonal density matrix, [Formula: see text] shows how the information encoded in the wave function [Formula: see text] gets transcribed, via entanglement with the experimental device and environment, into the relative frequencies [Formula: see text] for various experimental results [Formula: see text]. These results represent the first, significant steps towards filling in the logical gaps in the standard interpretation based on Born’s rule, and replacing it with a more natural one. Accepting objective reality of quantum fluctuations, independent of any experiments, and independently of human presence, one renounces the idea that in a fundamental, complete theory of Nature the result of each single experiment must necessarily be predictable. A few well-known puzzles such as the Schrödinger cat conundrum and the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) paradox are briefly reviewed: they can all be naturally explained away.
Aharonov, Popescu, and Tollaksen reply: We thank the letter writers for their interest and for the opportunity to better clarify our ideas.Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson make essentially the same point—namely, that our ideas are completely wrong. To put their criticism in the right context, we point out that the outcome of our research program is twofold. First, we have discovered an entirely new class of quantum effects; second, we present a new way of thinking about quantum mechanics.The fact that quantum mechanics predicts the effects we discovered is just that, a fact. The effects are computed using standard quantum mechanics, without additions or modifications. As such, their prediction by quantum mechanics is beyond doubt (unless one suspects algebraic mistakes). Furthermore, many of our effects have been verified experimentally; in particular, different versions of our amplification method have been used as novel technological tools. Both Nauenberg and Hobson completely ignore our effects. But one should not ignore them. They are novel and they are strange. Even more, they don’t appear in isolation, but they form a well-structured pattern. Surely there is a lesson here that quantum mechanics wants to teach us; one ignores it at one’s peril.On the other hand, our way of looking at quantum mechanics is certainly unconventional; it introduces new concepts, and it approaches old concepts in a new way. That is essentially what the two letter writers point out, Hobson most emphatically when he writes that our article “is riddled with errors.” We are criticized for thinking in a different way and for asking new questions. But our way of thinking leads to the same predictions as the conventional way, so as far as experiments are concerned they are completely equivalent. As Richard Feynman says in his book The Character of Physical Law (Modern Library, 1994), suppose we have “two theories” that “have all the consequences . . . exactly the same. . . . How are we going to decide which one is right? There is no way by science, because they both agree with the experiment to the same extent.” So the criticism is baseless.At the same time, if our approach is completely equivalent to the standard one, why bother? Again Feynman gives the best answer: “For psychological reasons . . . , these two things may be far from equivalent, because one gives a man different ideas from the other. . . . There will be something, for instance, in theory A that talks about something, . . . but to find out what the corresponding thing is . . . in [theory] B may be very complicated—it may not be a very simple idea at all.” As a consequence, a new way of thinking allows one to ask new questions that, although they could be asked in the old theory as well, would have been very difficult to even envisage. That is precisely what we did. First, we raised the issue of the physics in pre- and postselected ensembles. And to reply to Hobson, no, there is nothing “erroneous” in the process of postselection. Postselection is a question about results of experiments, and every question about the results of actual measurements is legitimate. Subsequently, we discovered the concept of weak measurements, which in turn led us to discover the various effects we presented. Since the power of any new approach is given by its ability to predict new effects, one should conclude that ours is strong indeed.Furthermore, as many physicists agree, an intuitive understanding of quantum mechanics is still missing. That is why quantum physicists are surprised over and over again by the discovery of strange and unexpected fundamental effects. We hope that our new way of thinking is a step toward the long-sought intuition. Even more important, the new way of thinking may give us new ideas about what to change, if experiments ever turn out to contradict quantum mechanics and therefore require its modification. In particular, since we tinker with the idea of time— one of the most important concepts in physics—starting the change from there may be a very potent method.Shaul Mukamel refers to our experiment in which the component along some given axis of a spin-1⁄2 particle is found, by a weak measurement, to have the value √2‾/2 which is √2‾ times larger than the largest eigenvalue. He suggests an alternative explanation based on a classical vector model of spin. According to his explanation, values up to √3‾/2 should be possible. However, we presented the experiment showing √2‾/2 only because it was mathematically simple; by choosing a different postselection, we could have obtained, as results of weak measurements, values as large as we wanted. Hence the above simple classical-vector view doesn’t work.Robert Griffiths points out that there are two other time-symmetric formulations of quantum mechanics besides ours—“consistent histories” and “decoherent histories.” In particular, Griffiths is right when he emphasizes a major difference in spirit between our theory and consistent histories. The main goal of consistent histories is to find an explanation for the (apparent?) collapse of the wavefunction during a quantum measurement; although that solution is hotly disputed, as are all other solutions to the collapse problem, it is certainly a very ingenious one. However, an answer to the collapse problem is not our primary interest (though we are starting to see glimmers of an alternative answer to it using our approach).The letter by Griffiths, however, runs the risk of being misread as implying that solving the collapse problem will by itself clarify most or all of the counterintuitive aspects of quantum mechanics. That conclusion would be wrong. Quantum mechanics is strange and unusual and defies intuition in many ways; solving the collapse problem is by no means its only interesting fundamental issue. Nor can the solution of that one problem lead to a complete understanding of quantum phenomena. That particles tunnel in the first place is surprising by itself; even more so is the fact that, as we showed, perfectly good measuring devices, working with arbitrarily high precision, indicate consistently that the tunneling particles have negative kinetic energy. Equally surprising is that we can arrange a situation in which perfectly good measurements, made with as high a precision as we want, indicate that spin-1⁄2 particles have arbitrarily large spin. And these are only two examples. As far as we are aware, none of the many proposed solutions to the collapse problem make these effects seem less surprising, let alone predict them.© 2011 American Institute of Physics.