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arXiv:quant-ph/0204064 · Physical Review Letters

Continuous Variable Quantum Cryptography: Beating the 3 dB Loss Limit

Christine Silberhorn, Timothy C. Ralph, Norbert Lütkenhaus, Gerd Leuchs

Published Sep 25, 2002• 384 citations
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Abstract

We demonstrate that secure quantum key distribution systems based on continuous variable implementations can operate beyond the apparent 3 dB loss limit that is implied by the beam splitting attack. The loss limit was established for standard minimum uncertainty states such as coherent states. We show that, by an appropriate postselection mechanism, we can enter a region where Eve's knowledge on Alice's key falls behind the information shared between Alice and Bob, even in the presence of substantial losses.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.89.167901

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We demonstrate that secure quantum key distribution systems based on continuous variable implementations can operate beyond the apparent 3 dB loss limit that is implied by the beam splitting attack. The loss limit was established for standard minimum uncertainty states such as coherent states. We show that, by an appropriate postselection mechanism, we can enter a region where Eve's knowledge on Alice's key falls behind the information shared between Alice and Bob, even in the presence of substantial losses.
In this Letter, first, we investigate the security of a continuous-variable quantum cryptographic scheme with a postselection process against individual beam splitting attack. It is shown that the scheme can be secure in the presence of the transmission loss owing to the postselection. Second, we provide a loss limit for continuous-variable quantum cryptography using coherent states taking into account excess Gaussian noise on quadrature distribution. Since the excess noise is reduced by the loss mechanism, a realistic intercept-resend attack which makes a Gaussian mixture of coherent states gives a loss limit in the presence of any excess Gaussian noise.
Quantum continuous variables (CV) have been explored as an alternative to qubits for quantum key distribution (QKD). More specifically, protocols using coherent states and homodyne or heterodyne measurements have been proposed and experimentally demonstrated (Grosshans et al., 2003). Relying on technologies allowing much higher rates than allowed by the single photon detectors used in qubit based QKD, those protocols are the only ones which could allow key rates in the GHz range in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, their security proofs have recently been extendend to generic attacks in the case of gaussian modulation. However, to our knowledge, all security analyses up to know have implicitely assumed Bob's measurement setup to use a homo- or heterodyne detection with an external classical phase reference, while the experimental realizations use a lightbeam for this role. This beam doesn't carry any information useful to the spy, and any attack on its phase could equally be carried on the signal beam. However, the intensity of this beam is used in experimental implementations to calibrate the quantum noise level. This calibration is then used to determine the channel gain, which is an important parameter of Eve's attack. We show that this allows Eve to implement an intercepte resend attack forbiding QKD as soon as the losses are above 3dB. We also give simple countermeasures to this new class of attacks.
In this paper, using the full security framework for continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD), we provide a composable security proof for the CV-QKD system in a realistic implementation.We take into account equipment losses and contributions from various components of excess noise and evaluate performance against collective and coherent attacks assuming trusted hardware noise.The calculation showed that the system remains operable at channel losses up to 10.2 dB in the presence of collective attacks and up to 7.5 dB in the presence of coherent ones.