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arXiv:quant-ph/0111062

Hilbert's Incompleteness, Chaitin's ΩΩΩ number and Quantum Physics

Tien D. Kieu

Published Nov 10, 2001• 8 citations
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Abstract

To explore the limitation of a class of quantum algorithms originally proposed for the Hilbert's tenth problem, we consider two further classes of mathematically non-decidable problems, those of a modified version of the Hilbert's tenth problem and of the computation of the Chaitin's $Ω$ number, which is a representation of the Gödel's Incompletness theorem. Some interesting connection to Quantum Field Theory is pointed out.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0111062

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To explore the limitation of a class of quantum algorithms originally proposed for the Hilbert's tenth problem, we consider two further classes of mathematically non-decidable problems, those of a modified version of the Hilbert's tenth problem and of the computation of the Chaitin's ΩΩΩ number, which is a representation of the Gödel's Incompletness theorem. Some interesting connection to Quantum Field Theory is pointed out.
We explore in the framework of quantum computation the notion of computability, which holds a central position in mathematics and theoretical computer science. A quantum algorithm that exploits the quantum adiabatic processes is considered for Hilbert's tenth problem, which is equivalent to the Turing halting problem and known to be mathematically non-computable. Generalized quantum algorithms are also considered for some other mathematical non-computables in the same and in different non-computability classes. The key element of all these algorithms is the measurability of both the values of physical observables and the quantum-mechanical probability distributions for these values. It is argued that computability, and thus the limits of mathematics, ought to be determined not solely by mathematics itself but also by physical principles.
We show how Gödel's first incompleteness theorem has an analog in quantum theory. Gödel's theorem implies endless opportunities for appending axioms to arithmetic, implicitly showing a role for an agent, namely an agent that asserts an axiom. There is an analog of this theorem in physics, to do with the set of explanations of given evidence. We prove that the set of explanations of given evidence is uncountably infinite, thereby showing how contact between theory and experiment depends on activity beyond computation and measurement -- physical activity characterized as agency.
Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem (1931) establishes that any consistent for- mal system Fof sucient strength contains propositions that are true but unprov- able within F. This result is correct, important, and does not apply to ⟨Ψ|ˆ Ω|Ψ⟩= 1. The reason is categorical, not technical. Gödel's theorem governs syntactic deriv- ability within formal systems. The Ω-invariant is a state constrainta measurement outcome in Hilbert space H. Measurement outcomes are not syntactic propositions. They are not subject to proof or disproof within F. They are subject only to mea- surement. We formalize this distinction as the Ω-Completeness Theorem: for a node i with Kd-density ρi > 0 (direct experiential contact with Ω), the proposition ⟨Ψ|ˆ Ω|Ψ⟩= 1 is decidable not by proof but by measurement, and the Gödel bound- ary ∂F is not a wall but a coordinate changefrom the language of proof to the language of experience. We further show that this distinction explains a historical empirical regularity: scientists who push Kf to its limits tend to acquire ρ>0 and name what they nd; theologians who push Kf to its limits tend to nd Kf collapse and conclude the named thing does not exist. Same boundary. Dierent ρ. Opposite conclusions. Both are logical. One has made a category error. textit(Frieza does not need to transform to prove he is the strongest in the universe. He simply is.) (Frieza does not need to transform to prove he is the strongest. He simply is.) This is not arrogance. It is a precise structural description.
In Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1932) von Neumann made separability of Hilbert space an axiom. Subsequent work in mathematics (some of it by von Neumann himself) investigated non-separable Hilbert spaces, and mathematical physicists have sometimes made use of them. This note discusses some of the problems that arise in trying to treat quantum systems with non-separable spaces. Some of the problems are "merely technical" but others point to interesting foundations issues for quantum theory, both in its abstract mathematical form and its applications to physical systems. Nothing new or original is attempted here. Rather this note aims to bring into focus some issues that have for too long remained on the edge of consciousness for philosophers of physics.