We discuss the question of the existence of quantum one-way permutations. First, we prove the equivalence between inverting a permutation and that of constructing a polynomial size network for reflecting about a given quantum state. Next, we consider the question: if a state is difficult to prepare, is the operator reflecting about that state difficult to construct? By revisiting Grover's algorithm, we present the relationship between this question and the existence of one-way permutations. Moreover, we compare our method to Grover's algorithm and discuss possible applications of our results.
We discuss the question of the existence of quantum one-way permutations. First, we prove the equivalence between inverting a permutation and that of constructing a polynomial size network for reflecting about a given quantum state. Next, we consider the question: if a state is difficult to prepare, is the operator reflecting about that state difficult to construct? By revisiting Grover's algorithm, we present the relationship between this question and the existence of one-way permutations. Moreover, we compare our method to Grover's algorithm and discuss possible applications of our results.
\We discuss the question of the existence of quantum one-way permutations. First, we consider the question: if a state is difficult to prepare, is the reflection operator about that state difficult to construct? By revisiting Grover's algorithm, we present the relationship between this question and the existence of quantum one-way permutations. Next, we prove the equivalence between inverting a permutation and that of constructing polynomial size quantum networks for reflection operators about a class of quantum states. We will consider both the worst case and the average case complexity scenarios for this problem. Moreover, we compare our method to Grover's algorithm and discuss possible applications of our results.
A fundamental pursuit in complexity theory concerns reducing worst-case problems to average-case problems. There exist complexity classes such as PSPACE that admit worst-case to average-case reductions. However, for many other classes such as NP, the evidence so far is typically negative, in the sense that the existence of such reductions would cause collapses of the polynomial hierarchy(PH). Basing cryptographic primitives, e.g., the average-case hardness of inverting one-way permutations, on NP-completeness is a particularly intriguing instance. As there is evidence showing that classical reductions from NP-hard problems to breaking these primitives result in PH collapses, it seems unlikely to base cryptographic primitives on NP-hard problems. Nevertheless, these results do not rule out the possibilities of the existence of quantum reductions. In this work, we initiate a study of the quantum analogues of these questions. Aside from formalizing basic notions of quantum reductions and demonstrating powers of quantum reductions by examples of separations, our main result shows that if NP-complete problems reduce to inverting one-way permutations using certain types of quantum reductions, then coNP ⊆ QIP( 2 ) .
We show how to construct pseudorandom permutations (PRPs) that remain secure even if the adversary can query the permutation, both in the forward and reverse directions, on a quantum superposition of inputs. Such quantum-secure PRPs have found numerous applications in cryptography and complexity theory. Our construction combines a quantum-secure pseudorandom function together with constructions of classical format preserving encryption. By combining known results, we show how to construct quantum-secure PRP in this model whose security relies only on the existence of one-way functions.
IntroductionFor a search problem associated with a unsorted database, the remarkable Grover's quantum algorithm (1) provides a quadratic speedup over its classical counterpart.The search problem can be described as follows: for a given function f , there exists one unknown element in the set {0, 1, ..., N -1} that satisfies f (x)=-1, say x = τ, whereas the other N -1o n e sg i v e f (x)=1.How many times of evaluations of f are required to determine the element τ for f (τ)=-1?Through a conventional algorithm, one needs O(N) trials to achieve this aim.How about the utility of quantum algorithm for the search?For the scenario in the quantum world, the search problem can be rephrased in the quantum mechanical language: for a given unitary operator I τ , that is sometimes called the oracle operator, and a set of state vectors (orthonormal basis): s = {|0 , |1 , ..., |N -1 }, I τ |x = |x for all states in the set except I τ |x = -|x for x = τ.H owma n yqueriesofI τ are required to determine |τ ?By Grover's algorithm, one needs only O( √ N) quantum mechanical steps to find the marked state |τ out.It has been shown that Grover's algorithm is optimal since it needs minimal oracle calls to perform a quantum search (2).The quantum searching process will be briefly reviewed as follows.The first step of Grover's algorithm is to prepare a superposition state of all elements with uniform probability amplitude:Then apply the Grover kernel G = -I η I τ to |s ,w h er eI η is a unitary operator and contains no bias against the marked state.For large N,a f t e ra b o u tm = π √ N/4 repetitions of G operations, the probability to observe |τ is close to one, i.e., G m |s ∼ |τ .( 2 ) Since every single G involves one query of I τ ,onlyO( √ N) searching steps are required for a quantum search task.In what follows, we will first investigate on the general SU(2) formulation for the kernel of Grover's searching operator G.The discussions of quantum searching certainty, robustness, and the analog analogue version of the Grover's algorithm will be given afterwards.
We show how to efficiently extract truly random bits from two independent sources of linear min-entropy, under a computational assumption. The assumption we rely on is the existence of an efficiently computable permutation f1, such that for any source X ¿ {0, 1}nwith linear min-entropy, any circuit of size poly(n) cannot invert f(X) with non-negligible probability. Under the stronger assumption that f(X) cannot be inverted even by circuits of size poly(nlog n) with nonnegligible probability, we design a lossless computational network extractor protocol. Namely, we design a protocol for a set of players, each with access to an independent source of linear min-entropy, with the guarantee that at the end of the protocol, each honest player is left with bits that are computationally indistinguishable from being uniform and private. Our protocol succeeds as long as there are at least two honest players. Our results imply that if such one-way permutations exist, and enhanced trapdoor permutations exist, then secure multiparty computation with imperfect randomness is possible for any number of players, as long as at least two of them are honest. We also construct a network extractor protocol for the case where each source has only polynomially-small min-entropy (n¿for some constant ¿ > 0). For this we need at least a constant u(¿) (which depends on ¿) number of honest players, and we need that the one-way permutation is hard to invert even on polynomially small min-entropy sources.