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arXiv:quant-ph/0108070 · Foundations of Physics

When Worlds Collide: Quantum Probability from Observer Selection?

Robin Hanson

Published Jul 1, 2003• 18 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1023/a:1025642019178

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Although many people have thought that the difference between the Copenhagen and many-worlds versions of quantum theory was merely metaphysical, quantum cosmology may allow us to make a physical test to distinguish between them empirically. The difference between the two versions shows up when the various components of the wavefunction have different numbers of observers and observations. In the Copenhagen version, a random observation is selected from the sample within the component that is selected by wavefunction collapse, but in the many-worlds version, a random observation is selected from those in all components. Because of the difference in the samples, probable observations in one version can be very improbable in the other version.
The quasi-classical world of modern physics is a class of classical worlds superposed, literally a 'metaworld'. The measurement problem is itself evidence for the two different types of world, at the different levels of logical type. The enactment of linear dynamics in the classical worlds alters the class invariant, and thus induces physical collapse of the metaworld to a subclass. No new physics is required. The complex formalism that seems deeply counterintuitive is class arithmetic. Superposition and interference: properties of classes of worlds. Measurement: set-selection of a subclass compatible with the observed outcome. The uncertainty principle: incompatible set-selections. Fourier transforms: switching set-selection. Operators: enactment of set-selection. Decoherence: loss of coherence between worlds. Normalisation is required because all worlds are equally real, thus the probability of an outcome is essentially the proportion of worlds that instantiate it. True probability arises through phase, which is the degree to which the rest of each world aligns internally with this outcome. This is the second-logical-type phenomenon of interference: the degree to which worlds cohere in the classical actions that give rise to the outcome.This transforms the familiar structures of the formalism from postulates to inherent attributes of the class structure. The Born rule, unitary evolution, the complex structure of amplitudes, the probabilistic character of prediction, and the wave-mechanical form of the theory emerge as outputs of the ontology rather than independent axioms. The wavefunction is real. It is the ontological architecture of the metaworld and the reality of the quasi-classical world: this is the quantum realm. The classical world, quantum mechanics and relativistic physics are unified in logical types.