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arXiv:quant-ph/0107144 · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics

Everett and structure

David Wallace

Published Jan 21, 2003• 241 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1016/s1355-2198(02)00085-0

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In this thesis I make a comparison between Hugh Everett’s III interpretation of quantum mechanics and David Wallace’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. I will do this in the first place by developing a basic paradigm of similarity between them, and, secondly, by discussing the differences between their respective philosophical frameworks in which their interpretations are embedded. The development of the basic paradigm of similarity will lead me to the conclusion that it is both Everett’s and Wallace’s aim to identify structures within the wavefunction that are stable over large periods of time, i.e., structures that can be described with Newtonian mechanics. Moreover, it will lead me to the conclusion that the probability measures that Everett and Wallace develop are specifically aimed at those structures. The discussion of their respective philosophical framework will lead me to the conclusion that those frameworks determine the meaning of the structures in the wavefunction. For the difference between Everett and Wallace does this mean that there is a shift from Everett’s branches to Wallace’s worlds.
This chapter considers rather how Everett’s ideas relate to decoherence theory, and what difference that theory makes. The strange gap between the determinism of the Schrödinger equation and the indeterminism evident at the observational level is bridged by the so-called measurement postulates. The projection postulate is sometimes stated without the restriction to repeatability, but then it is very often false. Everett’s strategy to establish the conclusion was to show that a superposition of records of indeterminism could be obtained in this way, satisfying the Schrödinger equation – and specifically, records as could be encoded in a mechanical model. Everett took the thesis of psychophysical parallelism rather more to heart than did its author. Everett’s proposal was to use, as basis states, wavefunctions for centers of mass, as functions on three-dimensional space, well-localized in position and momentum.
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is, inter alia, an interpretation of objective probability: an account of what probability really is. Everett called his work “wave mechanics without probability” for good reason: it provides a non-chancy base level of categorical properties and relations. The objection may concern justification rather than understanding, particularly if decoherence theory is used to derive the Born rule. The branch-counting rule makes nonsense of quantum mechanics but it appears to be suggested by the picture of branching. Branch counting is hardly a rival to the branch-weight rule as an interpretation of branching structure, if it brings that branching structure crashing down. Denizens of anomalous branches, or of anomalous stretches of history in one-world theories, will be misled by the observed statistics of measurements.