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arXiv:quant-ph/0101110 · Physical Review Letters

Quantum Communication between N Partners and Bell's Inequalities

Valerio Scarani, Nicolas Gisin

Published Aug 24, 2001• 239 citations
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Abstract

We consider a family of quantum communication protocols involving N partners. We demonstrate the existence of a link between the security of these protocols against individual attacks by the eavesdropper, and the violation of some Bell's inequalities, generalizing the link that was noticed some years ago for two-partners quantum cryptography. The arguments are independent of the local hidden variable debate.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.87.117901

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We consider a family of quantum communication protocols involving N partners. We demonstrate the existence of a link between the security of these protocols against individual attacks by the eavesdropper, and the violation of some Bell's inequalities, generalizing the link that was noticed some years ago for two-partners quantum cryptography. The arguments are independent of the local hidden variable debate.
Quantum secret-sharing protocols involving N partners are key distribution protocols in which Alice encodes her key into $N\ensuremath{-}1$ qubits, in such a way that all the other partners must cooperate in order to retrieve the key. On these protocols, several eavesdropping scenarios are possible: some partners may want to reconstruct the key without the help of the other ones, and consequently collaborate with an Eve that eavesdrops on the other partners' channels. For each of these scenarios, we give the optimal individual attack that Eve can perform. A link with Bell's inequality is demonstrated analytically for half of the scenarios, and is conjectured on the basis of numerical estimates for the other scenarios: the authorized partners have a higher information on the key than the unauthorized ones if and only if they can violate a Bell's inequality.
Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically interesting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to prove the security of quantum key distribution, or whether its security can be based on other physical principles. The question would also be of practical interest if quantum mechanics were ever to fail in some regime, because a scientifically and technologically advanced eavesdropper could perhaps use postquantum physics to extract information from quantum communications without necessarily causing the quantum state disturbances on which existing security proofs rely. Here we describe a key distribution scheme provably secure against general attacks by a postquantum eavesdropper limited only by the impossibility of superluminal signaling. Its security stems from violation of a Bell inequality.
The violation of certain Bell inequalities allows for device-independent information processing secure against nonsignaling eavesdroppers. However, this only holds for the Bell network, in which two or more agents perform local measurements on a single shared source of entanglement. To overcome the practical constraints that entangled systems can only be transmitted over relatively short distances, large-scale multisource networks have been employed. Do there exist analogs of Bell inequalities for such networks, whose violation is a resource for device independence? In this Letter, the violation of recently derived polynomial Bell inequalities will be shown to allow for device independence on multisource networks, secure against nonsignaling eavesdroppers.