We show that the notion of "levels of Reality" introduced by Werner Heisenberg in his "Manuscript of 1942" (1984) and by myself (1983-1985) could explain the quantum indeterminacy. General epistemological implications of this notion are also studied.
AbstractQuantum physics has overturned the classical view of the world by introducing probability, indeterminacy and the participation of the observer. It is not merely a scientific revolution, it reshapes causality, reality and knowledge, opening the way to an epistemology of relation. From Bohr to Rovelli, from Heisenberg to Morin, contemporary thought recognizes that reality no longer appears as an independent structure, but as a network of interactions. This relational conception of the world crosses the boundary between science and philosophy and invites us to rethink human responsibility in the production of knowledge. Knowledge thus becomes an act of co-creation, articulating scientific rigor, reflexivity and awareness of interconnectedness : a new humanism grounded in complexity and relation. Keywordsquantum mechanics, indeterminacy, causality, reality, observer, relation, epistemology, complexity, complementarity, entanglement, Bohr, Heisenberg, Rovelli, Morin, humanism, responsibility, knowledge, interaction, philosophy of science, ethics of knowledge
Abstract Uses a historical approach to explore the extent to which quantum theory mandates indeterminism. Drawing on important examples in the history of physics, it discusses explicitly the crucial distinction – often overlooked in the philosophical literature – between indeterminacy of physical quantities and causal indeterminism. It pursues at a more sophisticated level, issues raised in Ch. 2 concerning determinism and indeterminism in modern science. It concludes that quantum indeterminacy is an objective feature of the world, but that the jury is still out regarding quantum indeterminism.
This article examines the epistemological views of key quantum physicists of the Copenhagen circle (Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and Léon Rosenfeld). The discussion begins with a presentation of their conception of measurement, indeterminacy and complementarity, and goes on to focus on their views regarding the nature of being and knowledge. The author identifies the basic areas of consensus in the Copenhagen circle as well as the disagreements and disputes that arose between its members. Three main points are argued: (1) The fundamental epistemological consensus in the group was that subject and object are inseparable; that the subject participates in the formation of images of reality, which are multiple and depend on how the subject is concretely constituted historically; the disagreements within the group did not arise with logical inevitability from the principles of quantum mechanics but largely stemmed from ideological clash in the Cold War context. (2) Being linked to specific configurations of the subjects, knowledge is always relative; but it does not follow that knowledge is illusory or inadequate; on the contrary, it is the pretension of attaining the ultimate nature of things “in themselves” that leads to devaluation of any concrete knowledge. (3) The world is something external, generally independent of our desires and will, but at the same time is constructed as concrete objects through the specific configuration of each concrete subject.