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arXiv:quant-ph/0011030

Formal context for cryptographic models

John M. Myers, F. Hadi Madjid

Published Nov 8, 2000• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

To clarify what is involved in linking models to instruments, we adapt quantum mechanics to define models that display explicitly the points at which they can be linked to statistics of results of the use of instruments. Extending an earlier proof that linking models to instruments takes guesswork, we show: Any model of cryptographic instruments can be *enveloped*, nonuniquely, by another model that expresses conditions of instruments that must be met if the first model is to fit a set of measured outcomes. As a result, model A of key distribution can be enveloped in various ways to reveal alternative models that Eve can try to implement, in conflict with model A and its promise of security. A different enveloping model can help Alice and Bob by expressing necessities of synchronization that they manipulate to improve their detection of eavesdropping. Finally we show that models based on pre-quantum physics are also open to envelopment.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0011030

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To clarify what is involved in linking models to instruments, we adapt quantum mechanics to define models that display explicitly the points at which they can be linked to statistics of results of the use of instruments. Extending an earlier proof that linking models to instruments takes guesswork, we show: Any model of cryptographic instruments can be enveloped, nonuniquely, by another model that expresses conditions of instruments that must be met if the first model is to fit a set of measured outcomes. As a result, model A of key distribution can be enveloped in various ways to reveal alternative models that Eve can try to implement, in conflict with model A and its promise of security. A different enveloping model can help Alice and Bob by expressing necessities of synchronization that they manipulate to improve their detection of eavesdropping. Finally we show that models based on pre-quantum physics are also open to envelopment.
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This thesis presents a formal model for quantum protocols, that is, cryptographic protocols based on quantum mechanics. It also develops a definition of security (which includes notions such as privacy and correctness) for quantum protocols. First, existing classical (non-quantum) definitions of security are studied. There are essentially two approaches: one based on Turing Machines and simulation, the other using information theory. Both approaches are explored in detail and compared, then a particular variation of the first approach is chosen. Security is defined by introducing an interface (also called a simulator) which is capable of translating an attack on protocol 1 into an attack on protocol 2. The profile of a protocol is a stochastic variable, defined as the output of the participants and the view of the adversary who performs the attack. If an interface exists such that the profile of protocol 1 is indistinguishable from the profile of protocol 2 with the help of this interface, then protocol 1 is at least as secure as protocol 2. An absolute notion of security is obtained by comparing the protocol implementation with its 'ideal' equivalent. In this approach, and in classical cryptography in general, indistinguishability of probability distributions is a crucial tool. The meaning of this notion is explored in the context of density matrices, the mathematical formalism which is used to describe the state of a quantum system. Various measures of distinguishability of quantum states relevant from a cryptographic point of view are investigated: probability of error, trace norm (related to the Kolmogorov distance), overlap (related to the Bhattacharyya coefficient) and Shannon distinguishability (defined through the mutual information). It is shown that if we require that the distinguishability between two families of quantum states vanish exponentially fast, these four distinguishability measures are equivalent. Along the way upper and lower bounds for the Shannon distinguishability are obtained. This is a very useful result, because explicit computation of the Shannon distinguishability between two quantum states is often difficult (it requires solving a transcendental equation), whereas the other distinguishability measures, in particular the trace norm, are usually much easier to compute. In the last chapter the two previous topics are combined. A formal model for quantum protocols is formulated. It uses Quantum Turing Machines to represent the participants, who communicate through a quantum channel. The different nature of quantum information as opposed to classical information is explored in detail, including the implications this has for the definition. As in the classical case, we introduce an interface to compare the security of two protocols for the same task. Subsequently some consequences of the proposed definition are investigated. In particular, strong evidence is given that one classical technique often used in proofs of security for classical protocols, called rewinding, is impossible in the quantum setting.
Cryptographic protocols can be classified by the type of security against eavesdropping which they provide. There exist mathematically secure schemes whose security relies on mathematical proofs (like the Vernam cipher discussed below) or conjectures (like public key RSA encryption) about the complexity of deciphering the message without possessing the correct key. The majority of current secure public Internet connections rely on such schemes. Alternatively, a cryptographic setup may provide a physically secure method for communicating. In these setups the security is provided by the physical laws governing the communication protocol. Here we first discuss a provably secure classical communication protocol and then quantum methods for distributing the necessary keys. The BB84 protocol relies on the impossibility of perfectly distinguishing non-orthogonal quantum states from one copy of the quantum system. The scheme was invented in 1984 and is the first of its kind. In contrast, the Ekert91 protocol makes use of Bell correlations between entangled pairs of photons. These correlations are destroyed when Eve attempts to make a measurement on one of the particles but also when imperfections, such as decoherence processes, affect the scheme. As long as no such “elements of reality” are introduced, and Bell correlations violating local realism can be generated by Alice and Bob, no eavesdropper can be present.
The design and operation of a quantum-mechanical device as a laboratory instrument puts models written in equations of quantum mechanics in contact with instruments. This contact is recordable in files of a Classical Digital Process-control Computer (CPC) used both to calculate with the equations and to manage the instruments. By noticing that equations and instruments make contact in a CPC, we rewrite equations of quantum mechanics to explicitly include functions of CPC-commands to the instruments. This sets up a proof that a scientist's choice in linking mathematical models to instruments is unresolvable without guesswork to narrow the set of models from which one is to be chosen. As for implications of the proof, scientists inherit choices from the past and frame choices for the future, choices open to guesswork and visible in CPC files. To picture these choices, we adapt colored Petri nets, and the availability of these net fragments makes choice and guesswork part and parcel of physics. Net fragments as a means of expressing guess-demanding choices are applied to portray guesswork needed in testing and calibrating a quantum computer. The sample size required to test a quantum gate in a quantum computer is shown to grow as the inverse square of the error allowed in implementing the gate.
Quantum information theory has improved communication systems at all levels, such as storage, processing, transmission, security, and responsiveness, but it is the quantum cryptography that has thefastestgrowthintermsofresearchresults.Quantumcryptographyisaphysicalmodelforthegeneration and distribution of cryptographic keys, which takes advantage of the properties of quantum mechanicssuchasoverlappingstates,polarizationofindividualphotons,entanglement,teleportation, anddensecoding,propertiesthatprovidecomputationaladvantagestotransmit,processandencode information at a higher speed and with better security. In addition applications can be developed for factoring numbers in polynomial time and build security systems based on quantum cryptography in order to maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. In this context, this paper presents the theoretical concepts of quantum mechanics that allowed simulating a cryptographic method that uses the generation and distribution of quantum keys of the BB84 protocol, as a system secure keys exchange between a transmitter, Alice, and a receiver, Bob, who use the properties of quantum mechanics to distribute the key and not hard-to-solve mathematical problems like those used by cryptography built on a base of classical states. For this cryptographic method, the generation and distribution of the quantum key will be developed in two scenarios, in the first one there will be no entity that tries to intestate the communication between the transmitter and the receiver, in the second scenario there will be an Eve spy in the quantum communication channel that will try to obtain the key that is being transmitted between Alice and Bob. The generation and distribution of the quantum key using the BB84 protocol with and without a spy will be displayed in a programming and simulation environment developed with the quantum language Qiskit implemented by IBM for its quantum computers, this language is described in the development of the cryptographic method and in Appendix A of this work. The operation of the BB84 protocol is explained step by step and, as from the error rate generated by the intruder in the communication channel, the transmitter and the receiver detect an intrusion into the system. In addition, the simulation of the model shows how to integrate quantum keys with ciphers such as Vernam, and you can obtain perfect security in the encoding and decoding of information