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arXiv:quant-ph/0011016 · Foundations of Physics Letters

The EPR Argument in a Relational Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Federico Laudisa

Published Apr 1, 2001• 29 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1023/a:1012325503383

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Abstract This essay has two main claims about EPR’s Reality Criterion. First, we claim that the application of the Reality Criterion makes an essential difference between the EPR argument and Einstein’s later arguments against quantum mechanics. We show that while the EPR argument, making use of the Reality Criterion, does derive that certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are incomplete, Einstein’s later arguments, making no use of the Reality Criterion, do not prove incompleteness, but rather point to the inadequacy of the Copenhagen interpretation. We take this fact as an indication that the Reality Criterion is a crucial, indispensable component of the incompleteness argument(s). The second claim is more substantive. We argue that the Reality Criterion is a special case of the Common Cause Principle. Finally, we relate this proposal to Tim Maudlin’s recent assertion that the Reality Criterion is an analytic truth.
The article offers a rereading of Bohr’s reply to the argument of A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen (EPR) concerning the incompleteness, or else nonlocality, of quantum mechanics. Bohr shows EPR’s argument to be deficient on their own terms, by virtue of an ambiguity found in their application of the criterion of reality they propose to the phenomena in question. He also offers an alternative interpretation of the EPR experiment itself, the thought experiment proposed by EPR, as part of his overall interpretation of quantum mechanics as complementarity.
This chapter examines the A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen (EPR) argument and the opinion toward interpretational matters from various noted quantum physicists. The paradox of EPR can equally well be tested by polarization properties of pairs of photons. “When the momentum of a particle is known, its coordinate has no physical reality” is an essential component of the EPR argument. A useful pragmatic perspective on quantum mechanics is provided by N. G. Van Kampen. He argues that the difficulties in quantum mechanics only surface when one starts philosophizing: “this philosophizing has given rise to a number of ‘interpretations’, in which ψ is endowed with more physical significance than is needed”. There is a plethora of interpretations of quantum mechanics. Among the most prominent interpretations one finds are the Copenhagen interpretation and the many-worlds interpretation.