In a recent paper Griffiths claims that the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics gives rise to results that contradict those obtained from the Bohm interpretation. This is in spite of the fact that both claim to provide a realist interpretation of the formalism without the need to add any new mathematical content and both always produce exactly the same probability predictions of the outcome of experiments. In constrasting the differences Griffiths argues that the consistent histories interpretation provides a more physically reasonable account of quantum phenomena. We examine this claim and show that the consistent histories approach is not without its difficulties.
In a recent paper Griffiths claims that the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics gives rise to results that contradict those obtained from the Bohm interpretation. This is in spite of the fact that both claim to provide a realist interpretation of the formalism without the need to add any new mathematical content and both always produce exactly the same probability predictions of the outcome of experiments. In constrasting the differences Griffiths argues that the consistent histories interpretation provides a more physically reasonable account of quantum phenomena. We examine this claim and show that the consistent histories approach is not without its difficulties.
The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism attempts to construct a quantum framework which can be used without the need to introduce observers external to the studied system. The prime motivation in mind is the application of the formalism to the universe as a whole. In order to achieve this, CH maintains that a formulation of quantum mechanics should allow for the assignment of probabilities to alternative histories of a system. Therefore, it provides an observer-independent criterion to decide which sets of histories can be given probabilities and states rules to determine them. The framework establishes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account of a system. Furthermore, the version of CH first presented in [1, 2] proposes an "evolutionary" explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work critically evaluates claims to the effect that the formalism offered in [1, 2] solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, it is pointed out that the interpretation of the proposed framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. The claim of this work is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality.
Within the last decade, significant progress has been made towards a consistent and complete reformulation of the Copenhagen interpretation (an interpretation consisting in a formulation of the experimental aspects of physics in terms of the basic formalism; it is consistent if free from internal contradiction and complete if it provides precise predictions for all experiments). The main steps involved decoherence (the transition from linear superpositions of macroscopic states to a mixing), Griffiths histories describing the evolution of quantum properties, a convenient logical structure for dealing with histories, and also some progress in semiclassical physics, which was made possible by new methods. The main outcome is a theory of phenomena, viz., the classically meaningful properties of a macroscopic system. It shows in particular how and when determinism is valid. This theory can be used to give a deductive form to measurement theory, which now covers some cases that were initially devised as counterexamples against the Copenhagen interpretation. These theories are described, together with their applications to some key experiments and some of their consequences concerning epistemology.
Abstract: The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechani-cal framework which could be applied even to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative histories of a quantum system. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account, but that different realms can be mutually incom-patible. Finally, some of its proponents offer an “evolutionary ” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational prob-lems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality. 1
Some mostly recent theoretical and mathematical advances can be linked together to yield a new consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics. It relies upon a unique and universal interpretative rule of a logical character which is based upon Griffiths consistent historie. Some new results in semi-classical physics allow to derive classical physics from this rule, including its logical aspects, and to prove accordingly the existence of determinism within the quantum framework. Together with decoherence, this can be used to retrieve the existence of facts, despite the probabilistic character of the theory. Measurement theory can then be made entirely deductive. It is accordingly found that wave packet reduction is a logical property, whereas one can always choose to avoid using it. The practical consequences of this interpretation are most often in agreement with the Copenhagen formulation but they can be proved never to give rise to any logical inconsistency or paradox.
A measurement-independent formulation of quantum mechanics called ‘regular histories’ (RH) is presented, able to reproduce the predictions of the standard formalism without the need to for a quantum-classical divide or the presence of an observer. It applies to closed systems and features no wave-function collapse. Weights are assigned only to histories satisfying a criterion called ‘regularity’. As the set of regular histories is not closed under the Boolean operations this requires a new con- cept of weight, called ‘likelihood’. Remarkably, this single change is enough to overcome many of the well-known obstacles to a sensible interpretation of quantum mechanics. For example, Bell’s theorem, which makes essential use of probabilities, places no constraints on the locality properties of a theory based on likelihoods. Indeed, RH is both counter- factually definite and free from action-at-a-distance. Moreover, in RH the meaningful histories are exactly those that can be witnessed at least in principle. Since it is especially difficult to make sense of the concept of probability for histories whose occurrence is intrinsically indeterminable, this makes likelihoods easier to justify than probabilities. Interaction with the environment causes the kinds of histories relevant at the macroscopic scale of human experience to be witnessable and indeed to generate Boolean algebras of witnessable histories, on which likelihoods reduce to ordinary probabilities. Further- more, a formal notion of inference defined on regular histories satisfies, when restricted to such Boolean algebras, the classical axioms of implication, explaining our perception of a largely classical world. Even in the context of general quantum histories the rules of reasoning in RH are remark- ably intuitive. Classical logic must only be amended to reflect the fundamental premise that one cannot meaningfully talk about the occurrence of unwitnessable histories. Crucially, different histories with the same ‘physical content’ can be interpreted in the same way and independently of the family in which they are expressed. RH thereby rectifies a critical flaw of its inspiration, the consistent histories (CH) approach, which requires either an as yet unknown set selection rule or a paradigm shift towards an un- conventional picture of reality whose elements are histories-with-respect-to-a-framework. It can be argued that RH compares favourably with other proposed interpretations of quantum mechanics in that it resolves the measurement problem while retaining an essentially classical worldview without parallel universes, a framework-dependent reality or action-at-a-distance.
The consistent histories approach was initially proposed by Robert Griffiths in 1984. Roland Omnes then developed a more mathematically rigorous version based on the rules of classical probability and logic. In the consistent histories terminology, each projective decomposition defines a framework, which is, in essence, a context for discussing the system. As Griffith describes it: In quantum mechanics, each Boolean event algebra constitutes what is in effect a “language” out of which one can construct a quantum description of some physical system. A crucial and distinctive feature of the consistent histories approach is the single framework rule , which provides guidance for quantum reasoning. From the perspective of consistent histories, the emergence of classical physics from the quantum level is linked to the suppression of interference, so that the normal rules of probability apply.