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arXiv:quant-ph/0007075

Quantum mechanics without interpretation

Yaremchuk, O.

Published Jul 20, 2000• 0 citations
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Abstract

It is shown that the independence of the continuum hypothesis points to the unique definite status of the set of intermediate cardinality: the intermediate set exists only as a subset of continuum. This latent status is a consequence of duality of the members of the set. Due to the structural inhomogeneity of the intermediate set, its complete description falls into several "sections" (theories) with their special main laws, dimensions, and directions, i.e., the complete description of the one-dimensional intermediate set is multidimensional. Quantum mechanics is one of these theories.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0007075

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It is shown that the independence of the continuum hypothesis points to the unique definite status of the set of intermediate cardinality: the intermediate set exists only as a subset of continuum. This latent status is a consequence of duality of the members of the set. Due to the structural inhomogeneity of the intermediate set, its complete description falls into several "sections" (theories) with their special main laws, dimensions, and directions, i.e., the complete description of the one-dimensional intermediate set is multidimensional. Quantum mechanics is one of these theories.
Quantum mechanical descriptions in terms of momentum and position are identified as alternatives under the condition of equal complex-vaulted Lebesgue square integrability. While this does not change any of the formal results obtained in quantum mechanics, it does shed a different interpretive light on the steps that lead up to these results. Instead of being independent, even in concept, momentum and position are identified as being the same thing, merely seen from different views. Neither is required to complement the descriptive capability of the other, since each forms a complete alternative in its own right. Apparent complementarity, as well as mutual indeterminacy of codescription, comes about whenever an attempt is made to overlap these two descriptions to form a third codescription which tries to maintain both the terminology and the net integration values of the separate alternatives. Noncommutation of associated operators is a direct consequence of the alternative nature of momentum and position, and the local to global character of the particular map between these alternatives leads to an apparent point-wave duality in their descriptions. It is suggested that challenges to the contemporary interpretation of quantum theory should begin with the assumptions that lead to its formulation involving alternative representations.
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory.