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arXiv:physics/0605013 · Physics Letters A

Response to Scheuer–Yariv: “A classical key-distribution system based on Johnson (like) noise—how secure?”

László B. Kish

Published Jul 30, 2006• 31 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1016/j.physleta.2006.07.037

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Long Response to Scheuer-Yariv: "A Classical Key-Distribution System based on Johnson (like) noise - How Secure?", physics/0601022

László B. Kish

This is the longer (partially unpublished) version of response; the shorter version (http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0605013) is published in Physics Letters A. We point out that the claims in the comment-paper of Scheuer and Yariv are either irrelevant or incorrect. We first clarify what the security of a physically secure layer means. The idealized Kirchoff-loop-Johnson-like-noise (KLJN) scheme is totally secure therefore it is more secure than idealized quantum communication schemes which can never be totally secure because of the inherent noise processes in those communication schemes and the statistical nature of eavesdropper detection based on error statistics. On the other hand, with sufficient resources, a practical/non-ideal realization of the KLJN cipher can arbitrarily approach the idealized limit and outperform even the idealized quantum communicator schemes because the non-ideality-effects are determined and controlled by the design. The cable resistance issue analyzed by Scheuer and Yariv is a good example for that because the eavesdropper has insufficient time window to build a sufficient statistics and the actual information leak can be designed. We show that Scheuer's and Yariv's numerical result of 1% voltage drop supports higher security than that of quantum communicators. Moreover, choosing thicker or shorter wires can arbitrarily reduce this voltage drop further; the same conclusion holds even according to the equations of Scheuer and Yariv.

arXiv:physics/0602013•Feb 2, 2006•2 citations
This is the longer (partially unpublished) version of response; the shorter version (http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0605013) is published in Physics Letters A. We point out that the claims in the comment-paper of Scheuer and Yariv are either irrelevant or incorrect. We first clarify what the security of a physically secure layer means. The idealized Kirchoff-loop-Johnson-like-noise (KLJN) scheme is totally secure therefore it is more secure than idealized quantum communication schemes which can never be totally secure because of the inherent noise processes in those communication schemes and the statistical nature of eavesdropper detection based on error statistics. On the other hand, with sufficient resources, a practical/non-ideal realization of the KLJN cipher can arbitrarily approach the idealized limit and outperform even the idealized quantum communicator schemes because the non-ideality-effects are determined and controlled by the design. The cable resistance issue analyzed by Scheuer and Yariv is a good example for that because the eavesdropper has insufficient time window to build a sufficient statistics and the actual information leak can be designed. We show that Scheuer's and Yariv's numerical result of 1% voltage drop supports higher security than that of quantum communicators. Moreover, choosing thicker or shorter wires can arbitrarily reduce this voltage drop further; the same conclusion holds even according to the equations of Scheuer and Yariv.