We describe some properties of consistent sets of histories in the Gell-Mann--Hartle formalism, and give an example to illustrate that one cannot recover the standard predictions, retrodictions, and inferences of quasiclassical physics using the criterion of consistency alone.
In the consistent histories formulation of quantum theory, the probabilistic predictions and retrodictions made from observed data depend on the choice of a consistent set. We show that this freedom allows the formalism to retrodict contrary propositions which correspond to orthogonal commuting projections and which each have probability one. We also show that the formalism makes contrary probability one predictions when applied to Gell-Mann and Hartle's generalized time-neutral quantum mechanics.
It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections P and Q, belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that PQ=QP=0 and P=1−Q. To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences P and Q where P=1−Q. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.
There are good motivations for considering some type of quantum histories formalism. Several possible formalisms are known, defined by different definitions of event and by different selection criteria for sets of histories. These formalisms have a natural interpretation, according to which nature somehow chooses one set of histories from among those allowed, and then randomly chooses to realise one history from that set; other interpretations are possible, but their scientific implications are essentially the same. The selection criteria proposed to date are reasonably natural, and certainly raise new questions. For example, the validity of ordering inferences which we normally take for granted – such as that a particle in one region is necessarily in a larger region containing it – depends on whether or not our history respects the criterion of ordered consistency, or merely consistency. However, the known selection criteria, including consistency and medium decoherence, are very weak. It is not possible to derive the predictions of classical mechanics or Copenhagen quantum mechanics from the theories they define, even given observational data in an extended time interval. Attempts to refine the consistent histories approach so as to solve this problem by finding a definition of quasiclassicality have so far not succeeded. On the other hand, it is shown that dynamical collapse models, of the type originally proposed by Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber, can be re-interpreted as set selection criteria within a quantum histories framework, in which context they appear as candidate solutions to the set selection problem. This suggests a new route to relativistic generalisation of these models, since covariant definitions of a quantum event are known.
Precise rules are developed in order to formalize the reasoning processes involved in standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics, with the help of analogies from classical physics. A classical or quantum description of a mechanical system involves a {\it framework}, often chosen implicitly, and a {\it statement} or assertion about the system which is either true or false within the framework with which it is associated. Quantum descriptions are no less ``objective'' than their classical counterparts, but differ from the latter in the following respects: (i) The framework employs a Hilbert space rather than a classical phase space. (ii) The rules for constructing meaningful statements require that the associated projectors commute with each other and, in the case of time-dependent quantum histories, that consistency conditions be satisfied. (iii) There are incompatible frameworks which cannot be combined, either in constructing descriptions or in making logical inferences about them, even though any one of these frameworks may be used separately for describing a particular physical system. A new type of ``generalized history'' is introduced which extends previous proposals by Omnès, and Gell-Mann and Hartle, and a corresponding consistency condition which does not involve density matrices or single out a direction of time. Applications which illustrate the formalism include: measurements of spin, two-slit diffraction, and the emergence of the classical world from a fully quantum description.