We investigate the behavior of two users and one jammer in an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel with and without fading when they participate in a noncooperative zero-sum game, with the channel's input/output mutual information as the objective function. We assume that the jammer can eavesdrop on the channel and can use the information obtained to perform correlated jamming. We also differentiate between the availability of perfect and noisy information about the user signals at the jammer. Under various assumptions on the channel characteristics, and the extent of information available at the users and the jammer, we show the existence, or otherwise nonexistence of a simultaneously optimal set of strategies for the users and the jammer, and characterize those strategies whenever they exist.
We investigate the behavior of two users and one jammer in an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel with and without fading when they participate in a noncooperative zero-sum game, with the channel's input/output mutual information as the objective function. We assume that the jammer can eavesdrop on the channel and can use the information obtained to perform correlated jamming. We also differentiate between the availability of perfect and noisy information about the user signals at the jammer. Under various assumptions on the channel characteristics, and the extent of information available at the users and the jammer, we show the existence, or otherwise nonexistence of a simultaneously optimal set of strategies for the users and the jammer, and characterize those strategies whenever they exist.
Gaussian wireless channels are studied under two forms of security attacks: (i) the jamming attack, where the adversary is active and transmits corruptive signal, but is not interested in the content of the communication, (ii) the eavesdropping attack, where the adversary is passive and overhears the communication and tries to obtain the message that has been transmitted. The active attack is studied in a multi-user setting. The behavior of two users and one jammer in an additive white Gaussian channel (AWGN) with and without fading is investigated, when they participate in a non-cooperative zero-sum game, with the channel's input/output mutual information as the objective function. We assume that the jammer can eavesdrop the channel and can use the information obtained to perform correlated jamming. We also differentiate between the availability of perfect and noisy information about the user signals at the jammer. Under various assumptions on the channel characteristics, and the extent of channel state information available at the users and the jammer, we show the existence, or otherwise non-existence of a simultaneously optimal set of strategies for the users and the jammer, and characterize those strategies whenever they exist. For the passive eavesdropping attack, we study multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) AWGN channels. We first consider a multiple-input single-output (MISO) channel, where the transmitter has multiple antennas, while the receiver and the eavesdropper have single antennas each. We find achievable rates for this channel. With the channel input restricted to Gaussian signalling with no pre-processing of information, optimal transmission strategies that maximize the achievable secrecy rates are found, in terms of the input covariance matrices. It is shown that, under the optimal communication strategy, the system reduces to a single-input single-output (SISO) channel. We then extend the achievability results to fading Gaussian MISO channels. Finally, as a step toward generalizing the problem to one with multiple antennas at the receiver, we discuss the Gaussian 2-2-1 channel with a transmitter and a receiver with two antennas each, and a single antenna eavesdropper. We develop an achievability scheme similar to those of the SISO and MISO channels, and further show that in fact, it achieves the secrecy capacity of this 2-2-1 channel.
The additive infinite-dimensional Gaussian channel subject to jamming is modeled as a two-person zero-sum game with mutual information as the payoff function. The jammer's noise is added to the ambient Gaussian noise. The coder's signal energy is subject to a constraint given in terms of the RKHS of the covariance of the ambient noise; such a constraint is necessary in order that the capacity without feedback be finite. It is shown that use of this same RKHS constraint on the jammer's process is too strong; the jammer would then not be able to reduce capacity, regardless of the amount of jamming energy available. The constraint on the jammer is thus on the total jamming energy, without regard to its distribution relative to that of the ambient noise energy. The existence of a saddle value for the problem does not follow from the von Neuman minimax theorem in the original problem formulation. However, a solution is shown to exist. A saddle point, saddle value, and the jammer's minimax strategy are determined. The solution is a function of the problem
The mismatched communication channel with an infinite-dimensional real separable Hilbert space as input and output spaces is considered. To study communication in the presence of jamming, a two person zero sum game with mutual information of input source and output source as the payoff function can be formulated. The coder’s goal is to make mutual information as large as possible, and the jammer’s goal is to make mutual information as small as possible. The optimal mutual information under appropriate constraints of coders and jammers is obtained.
This paper investigates reliable and covert transmission strategies in a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel with a transmitter, receiver and an adversarial wiretapper, each equipped with multiple antennas. In a departure from existing work, the wiretapper possesses a novel capability to act either as a passive eavesdropper or as an active jammer, under a half-duplex constraint. The transmitter therefore faces a choice between allocating all of its power for data, or broadcasting artificial interference along with the information signal in an attempt to jam the eavesdropper (assuming its instantaneous channel state is unknown). To examine the resulting trade-offs for the legitimate transmitter and the adversary, we model their interactions as a two-person zero-sum game with the ergodic MIMO secrecy rate as the payoff function. We first examine conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (NE) and the structure of mixed-strategy NE for the strategic form of the game. We then derive equilibrium strategies for the extensive form of the game where players move sequentially under scenarios of perfect and imperfect information. Finally, numerical simulations are presented to examine the equilibrium outcomes of the various scenarios considered.
This paper considers secure communication in the presence of an eavesdropper and a malicious jammer. The jammer is assumed to be oblivious of the communication signals emitted by the legitimate transmitter(s) but can employ any jamming strategy subject to a given power constraint and shares her jamming signal with the eavesdropper. Four such models are considered: (i) the Gaussian point-to-point wiretap channel; (ii) the Gaussian multiple-access wiretap channel; (iii) the Gaussian broadcast wiretap channel; and (iv) the Gaussian symmetric interference wiretap channel. The use of pre-shared randomness between the legitimate users is not allowed in our models. Inner and outer bounds are derived for these four models. For (i), the secrecy capacity is obtained. For (ii) and (iv) under a degraded setup, the optimal secrecy sum-rate is characterized. Finally, for (iii), ranges of model parameter values for which the inner and outer bounds coincide are identified.
In this work, a four-terminal complex Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper, and a jammer relay is studied under two different set of assumptions: 1) The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission, and 2) The jammer relay is causally given the source message. In both cases, the jammer relay assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase it. To help the eavesdropper, the jammer relay can use pure relaying and/or send interference. Each of the problems is formulated as a two-player, noncooperative, zero-sum continuous game. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay in the first problem, the Nash equilibrium is found and shown to be achieved with mixed strategies in general. The optimal cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the Nash equilibrium secrecy rate, are found. For the second problem, the Nash equilibrium solution is found and the results are compared to the case when the jammer relay is not informed about the source message.