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Lecture notes in computer science

The Limits of Common Coins: Further Results

Hemanta K. Maji, Manoj Prabhakaran

Published Jan 1, 2011• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-25578-6_25

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In a multiparty fair coin-flipping protocol, the parties output a common (close to) unbiased bit, even when some corrupted parties try to bias the output. Cleve [STOC 1986] has shown that in the case of dishonest majority (i.e., at least half of the parties can be corrupted), in any m-round coin-flipping protocol, the corrupted parties can bias the honest parties' common output bit by Ω(1/m). For more than two decades, the best known coin-flipping protocols against dishonest majority had bias [EQUATION], where ℓ is the number of corrupted parties. This was changed by a recent breakthrough result of Moran et al. [TCC 2009], who constructed an m-round, two-party coin-flipping protocol with optimal bias Θ(1/m). In a subsequent work, Beimel et al. [Crypto 2010] extended this result to the multiparty case in which less than 2/3 of the parties can be corrupted. Still for the case of 2/3 (or more) corrupted parties, the best known protocol had bias [EQUATION]. In particular, this was the state of affairs for the natural three-party case.

ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)•May 31, 2014•22 citations
We consider the task of extending a given coin toss. By this, we mean the two-party task of using a single instance of a given coin toss protocol in order to interactively generate more random coins. A bit more formally, our goal is to generate n common random coins from a single use of an ideal functionality that gives m<nm<nm<n common random coins to both parties. In the framework of universal composability, we show the impossibility of securely extending a coin toss for statistical and perfect security. On the other hand, for computational security, the existence of a protocol for coin toss extension depends on the number m of random coins that can be obtained “for free.” For the case of stand-alone security, i.e., a simulation-based security definition without an environment, we present a protocol for statistically secure coin toss extension. Our protocol works for superlogarithmic m, which is optimal as we show the impossibility of statistically secure coin toss extension for smaller m. Combining our results with already known results, we obtain a (nearly) complete characterization under which circumstances coin toss extension is possible.
In a multiparty fair coin-flipping protocol, the parties output a common (close to) unbiased bit, even when some corrupted parties try to bias the output. Cleve [STOC 1986] has shown that in the case of dishonest majority (i.e., at least half of the parties can be corrupted), in any m-round coin-flipping protocol, the corrupted parties can bias the honest parties' common output bit by Ω(1/m). For more than two decades, the best known coin-flipping protocols against dishonest majority had bias [EQUATION], where ℓ is the number of corrupted parties. This was changed by a recent breakthrough result of Moran et al. [TCC 2009], who constructed an m-round, two-party coin-flipping protocol with optimal bias Θ(1/m). In a subsequent work, Beimel et al. [Crypto 2010] extended this result to the multiparty case in which less than 2/3 of the parties can be corrupted. Still for the case of 2/3 (or more) corrupted parties, the best known protocol had bias [EQUATION]. In particular, this was the state of affairs for the natural three-party case.