Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Crítica (México D F En línea)

La objetividad del azar en un mundo determinista

Sergio F. Martínez

Published Dec 13, 1990• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper deals with the notion of objective randomness in classical deterministic theories. After the introduction, section 2 establishes an important distinction between a strictly metaphysical thesis of determinism (as characterized in the Montague-Earman definition, for example), and the doctrine of determinism, which can be roughly characterized as a methodological set of principles. The doctrine of determinism is associated with the idea that probability assignments can only reflect our ignorance of facts, and it also grounds the (ontological) thesis of separability: A system or process can be characterized completely in terms of the properties that a system has when in a given state, independently of the properties of other systems, The key notions of "completeness" and "independence" are only briefly discussed, as they are examined more in depth elsewhere. Section three examines attempts to characterize a notion of objective randomness in ergodic theory. The characterization can be seen to be equivalent to the formulation of a notion of a "physically impossible process". One way of expressing this idea is grounded on the thesis of the "coarse graining" of our measuring instruments. This leads to the problem of distinguishing "objective" from "apparent" randomness. The problem seems to be intrinsic to any attempt of characterizing the required notion of physical impossibility (and thus of objective randomness) in terms of an ideal observer. The alternative of trying to characterize physical impossibility in terms of a theory of algorithms suffers from the difficulty that it is not clear what would be the required notion of (non-epistemic) computability. The "coarse graining" approach, as well as the alternative in terms of a theory of algorithms seem to share the usual confusion between a strictly metaphysical thesis of determinism and the (methodological) doctrine of determinism. In section four an alternative approach is suggested. It is noticed that a denial of the thesis of separability is compatible with a strict deterministic theory, and thus that at least some classical systems (the "statistical" ones) can be described in terms of non-separable states. We do not have to think that the impossibility of preparing a classical state is too only possible explanation for physical (objective) randomness in deterministic theories. This proposal is an elaboration of an idea of Blatt (1959), although Blatt was still trying to understand objective randomness within an ideal-observer framework.[S.M.]

DOI
10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1990.741

Related papers

El azar en la mecánica cuántica: de Bohr a Bell

Sergio Martínez Muñoz

Usual interpretations of the quantum theory, beginning with Bohr's interpretation, consider that randomness in quanlum mechanics arises from (objeclive) restrictions to our capacity of making precise measurements of the corresponding state variables. I show that this assumption is problematic and leaves open important questions concerning the role and nature of quantum randomness. On the basis of a concept of state introduced elsewhere and on the basis of a distinction between the principles of separability and locality in quantum mechanics, I suggest in this paper a different sense in which quantum randomness is objective. In order to carry out the proposed task a distinction is made between two different types of objective randomness. Objective epistemic randomness arises from the limitations that the physical structure of the world imposes upon our possibilities of coming to know (measure) this structure. Objective non-epistemic randomness or systemic randomness is to be expressed in terms of a state description in a fundamental theory of physics. It is shown that the non-Boolean structure of properties of quantum theory, as this structure has been constructed and interpreted in Martínez 1991a, can be inlerpreled as an expression of the non-separability of the theory, Thus, the irreducibility of the transition probabilities that generate the non-Boolean structure of properties can be interpreted in this way as systemic randomness. In the case of quantum mechanics systemic randomness and non-separability are two sides of the same coin.

Crítica (México D F En línea)•Dec 13, 1991•1 citation

Critique of Determinism: In Favor of Probabilistic Determinism

Ignacio Ospino

This paper argues that such strictly deterministic formulations rely on idealizations that obscure an essential physical feature: the objective growth of information associated with irreversible processes. Drawing on thermodynamics, information theory, and the foundations of quantum mechanics, the paper is based on the notion of ontic entropy as a measure of the objective informational content instantiated by physical systems. This paper proposes a classification of determinism based on the informational characteristics of physical evolution. By distinguishing between strict causal determinism, probabilistic determinism, and chaotic determinism, it becomes possible to analyze causal structure without conflating necessity with lawfulness or probability with indeterminism.

•Dec 15, 2025•0 citations

Quantum Meta-physics: Nonlocality and Limits of Determinism

Bartosz Wesół

This essay aims to show that the recent development of quantum theory may provide us with an answer to one of the most compelling metaphysical problems, namely the problem of determinism.First, I sketch the conceptual background and draw the distinction between metaphysical and epistemological determinisms.Then, on the ground of the analysis of the problem of determinism in quantum mechanics, I argue that (1) metaphysical determinism is independent of quantum-mechanical formalism, and (2) that quantum nonlocality makes epistemological determinism impossible.I also try to show that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as a Kantian regulative idea which sets the horizon for scientific inquiry but which at the same time lacks what Kant calls "objective validity."The main conclusion is that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as an idealization -a formal, cognitive principle that we a priori assume and not something that we discover through scientific inquiry.

Eidos A Journal for Philosophy of Culture•Dec 31, 2023•1 citation

Determinism Is Ontic, Determinability is Epistemic

Harald Atmanspacher A

Philosophical discourse traditionally distinguishes between ontology and epistemology and generally enforces this distinction by keeping the two subject areas separated. However, the relationship between the two areas is of central importance to physics and philosophy of physics. For instance, many measurement-related problems force us to consider both our knowledge of the states and observables of a system (epistemic perspective) and its states and observables independent of such knowledge (ontic perspective). This applies to quantum systems in particular. This contribution presents an example showing the importance of distinguishing between ontic and epistemic levels of description even for classical systems. Corresponding conceptions of ontic and epistemic states and their evolution are introduced and discussed with respect to aspects of stability and information flow. These aspects show why the ontic/epistemic distinction is particularly important for systems exhibiting deterministic chaos. Moreover, this distinction provides some understanding of the relationships between determinism, causation, predictability, randomness, and stochasticity.

•May 1, 2001•31 citations

Methodological Paradigm of Non-Classical Science

Галухин Андрей Владимирович, Elena Vladimirovna Malakhova, Irina Ponizovkina

Scientific theories and methods developed within the framework of quantum and relativistic physics are the most representative paradigmatic instantiations of non-classical science. The profile of non-classical science is exposed through the analysis of a set of epistemic ideals and methodological principles. The adoption of the principle of operational relativity of phenomenal descriptions showed that a reference to the means of observation had become an intrinsic part of scientific description strategies. The transformation of the concept of objectivity can be seen in a specific combination of operationalism with interactional phenomenalism and constructivism. The introduction of the principle of complementarity marked the deviation from the standards of a monologic and linear description of the objects under study. This principle provides the operational basis for the integration of different parts of our knowledge with regard to non-trivial cognitive situations featured by the indeterminacy relations. Another prominent methodological trend is the reconsideration of the value of strict deterministic explanation strategies in favour of probabilistically oriented approaches. Scientists have encountered a new class of regularities that are typically analysed in terms of various types of statistical and non-causal determination. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that any probabilistic account of natural phenomena implies indeterminism.

wisdom•Mar 28, 2022•0 citations

The Ontology-Information Dichotomy Framework: The Truth Identity Axiom and Empirical Evidence for Macroscopic Apparent Randomness

Jiale Wu

If all hidden variables behind so‑called intrinsic randomness were known to me, would it still be intrinsic randomness? This question exposes a fatal logical impasse within traditional physics: the moment complete information () is achieved, random phenomena vanish. Therefore, all observable randomness in reality is structurally tied to an information gap. This paper proposes the "Ontology‑Information Dichotomy Framework" and the "Theorem of Information Gap‑Randomness Necessity". Through time‑sequence‑separated macroscopic dice‑cup experiments (decoupling physical perturbation from information occlusion) and control tests with AI vision algorithms, we empirically demonstrate that apparent randomness is an inevitable product of finite physical information systems under , independent of biological consciousness. We further prove that unobservable hidden variables and pure observational information deficiency are observationally equivalent. Any claim of "intrinsic randomness" lacking decisive evidence under complete‑input conditions () is either a self‑contradictory notion or a metaphysical presupposition. Ranging from engineering encapsulation (e.g., lotteries, PRNGs) to microscopic quantum scenarios, apparent randomness strictly derived from the information gap constitutes the only empirically supported and logically self‑consistent mechanism.

•Nov 3, 2026•0 citations
This paper deals with the notion of objective randomness in classical deterministic theories. After the introduction, section 2 establishes an important distinction between a strictly metaphysical thesis of determinism (as characterized in the Montague-Earman definition, for example), and the doctrine of determinism, which can be roughly characterized as a methodological set of principles. The doctrine of determinism is associated with the idea that probability assignments can only reflect our ignorance of facts, and it also grounds the (ontological) thesis of separability: A system or process can be characterized completely in terms of the properties that a system has when in a given state, independently of the properties of other systems, The key notions of "completeness" and "independence" are only briefly discussed, as they are examined more in depth elsewhere. Section three examines attempts to characterize a notion of objective randomness in ergodic theory. The characterization can be seen to be equivalent to the formulation of a notion of a "physically impossible process". One way of expressing this idea is grounded on the thesis of the "coarse graining" of our measuring instruments. This leads to the problem of distinguishing "objective" from "apparent" randomness. The problem seems to be intrinsic to any attempt of characterizing the required notion of physical impossibility (and thus of objective randomness) in terms of an ideal observer. The alternative of trying to characterize physical impossibility in terms of a theory of algorithms suffers from the difficulty that it is not clear what would be the required notion of (non-epistemic) computability. The "coarse graining" approach, as well as the alternative in terms of a theory of algorithms seem to share the usual confusion between a strictly metaphysical thesis of determinism and the (methodological) doctrine of determinism. In section four an alternative approach is suggested. It is noticed that a denial of the thesis of separability is compatible with a strict deterministic theory, and thus that at least some classical systems (the "statistical" ones) can be described in terms of non-separable states. We do not have to think that the impossibility of preparing a classical state is too only possible explanation for physical (objective) randomness in deterministic theories. This proposal is an elaboration of an idea of Blatt (1959), although Blatt was still trying to understand objective randomness within an ideal-observer framework.[S.M.]
Usual interpretations of the quantum theory, beginning with Bohr's interpretation, consider that randomness in quanlum mechanics arises from (objeclive) restrictions to our capacity of making precise measurements of the corresponding state variables. I show that this assumption is problematic and leaves open important questions concerning the role and nature of quantum randomness. On the basis of a concept of state introduced elsewhere and on the basis of a distinction between the principles of separability and locality in quantum mechanics, I suggest in this paper a different sense in which quantum randomness is objective. In order to carry out the proposed task a distinction is made between two different types of objective randomness. Objective epistemic randomness arises from the limitations that the physical structure of the world imposes upon our possibilities of coming to know (measure) this structure. Objective non-epistemic randomness or systemic randomness is to be expressed in terms of a state description in a fundamental theory of physics. It is shown that the non-Boolean structure of properties of quantum theory, as this structure has been constructed and interpreted in Martínez 1991a, can be inlerpreled as an expression of the non-separability of the theory, Thus, the irreducibility of the transition probabilities that generate the non-Boolean structure of properties can be interpreted in this way as systemic randomness. In the case of quantum mechanics systemic randomness and non-separability are two sides of the same coin.
This paper argues that such strictly deterministic formulations rely on idealizations that obscure an essential physical feature: the objective growth of information associated with irreversible processes. Drawing on thermodynamics, information theory, and the foundations of quantum mechanics, the paper is based on the notion of ontic entropy as a measure of the objective informational content instantiated by physical systems. This paper proposes a classification of determinism based on the informational characteristics of physical evolution. By distinguishing between strict causal determinism, probabilistic determinism, and chaotic determinism, it becomes possible to analyze causal structure without conflating necessity with lawfulness or probability with indeterminism.
This essay aims to show that the recent development of quantum theory may provide us with an answer to one of the most compelling metaphysical problems, namely the problem of determinism.First, I sketch the conceptual background and draw the distinction between metaphysical and epistemological determinisms.Then, on the ground of the analysis of the problem of determinism in quantum mechanics, I argue that (1) metaphysical determinism is independent of quantum-mechanical formalism, and (2) that quantum nonlocality makes epistemological determinism impossible.I also try to show that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as a Kantian regulative idea which sets the horizon for scientific inquiry but which at the same time lacks what Kant calls "objective validity."The main conclusion is that metaphysical determinism should be regarded as an idealization -a formal, cognitive principle that we a priori assume and not something that we discover through scientific inquiry.
Philosophical discourse traditionally distinguishes between ontology and epistemology and generally enforces this distinction by keeping the two subject areas separated. However, the relationship between the two areas is of central importance to physics and philosophy of physics. For instance, many measurement-related problems force us to consider both our knowledge of the states and observables of a system (epistemic perspective) and its states and observables independent of such knowledge (ontic perspective). This applies to quantum systems in particular. This contribution presents an example showing the importance of distinguishing between ontic and epistemic levels of description even for classical systems. Corresponding conceptions of ontic and epistemic states and their evolution are introduced and discussed with respect to aspects of stability and information flow. These aspects show why the ontic/epistemic distinction is particularly important for systems exhibiting deterministic chaos. Moreover, this distinction provides some understanding of the relationships between determinism, causation, predictability, randomness, and stochasticity.
Scientific theories and methods developed within the framework of quantum and relativistic physics are the most representative paradigmatic instantiations of non-classical science. The profile of non-classical science is exposed through the analysis of a set of epistemic ideals and methodological principles. The adoption of the principle of operational relativity of phenomenal descriptions showed that a reference to the means of observation had become an intrinsic part of scientific description strategies. The transformation of the concept of objectivity can be seen in a specific combination of operationalism with interactional phenomenalism and constructivism. The introduction of the principle of complementarity marked the deviation from the standards of a monologic and linear description of the objects under study. This principle provides the operational basis for the integration of different parts of our knowledge with regard to non-trivial cognitive situations featured by the indeterminacy relations. Another prominent methodological trend is the reconsideration of the value of strict deterministic explanation strategies in favour of probabilistically oriented approaches. Scientists have encountered a new class of regularities that are typically analysed in terms of various types of statistical and non-causal determination. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that any probabilistic account of natural phenomena implies indeterminism.
If all hidden variables behind so‑called intrinsic randomness were known to me, would it still be intrinsic randomness? This question exposes a fatal logical impasse within traditional physics: the moment complete information () is achieved, random phenomena vanish. Therefore, all observable randomness in reality is structurally tied to an information gap. This paper proposes the "Ontology‑Information Dichotomy Framework" and the "Theorem of Information Gap‑Randomness Necessity". Through time‑sequence‑separated macroscopic dice‑cup experiments (decoupling physical perturbation from information occlusion) and control tests with AI vision algorithms, we empirically demonstrate that apparent randomness is an inevitable product of finite physical information systems under , independent of biological consciousness. We further prove that unobservable hidden variables and pure observational information deficiency are observationally equivalent. Any claim of "intrinsic randomness" lacking decisive evidence under complete‑input conditions () is either a self‑contradictory notion or a metaphysical presupposition. Ranging from engineering encapsulation (e.g., lotteries, PRNGs) to microscopic quantum scenarios, apparent randomness strictly derived from the information gap constitutes the only empirically supported and logically self‑consistent mechanism.