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Birkhäuser Basel eBooks

The Debate between Einstein and Bohr, or How to Interpret Quantum Mechanics

P. Marage, Grégoire Wallenborn

Published Jan 1, 1999• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The famous debate between Einstein and Bohr began at the Solvay Council in 1927. The debate was about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, but also addressed the fundamental question of what the purpose and aim of a physical theory should be. Their conflicting positions were based on two diametrically opposed philosophical approaches to the fundamental problems of physics. The many books popularising quantum mechanics quite rightly place the emphasis on the problem of interpretation: they discuss the opposing positions of Einstein’s “realism” and the “Copenhagen interpretation” of which Bohr is seen as the leading protagonist.

DOI
10.1007/978-3-0348-7703-9_10

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The Bohr-Einstein debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics may be viewed as a discussion on the epistemological status of knowledge gained by physics. It is shown that in fact the advent of quantum theory has led, in a new context, to an old philosophical controversy between epistemological realism (held by Einstein) and phenomenalism (held by Bohr). An inquiry into this controversy, taking into account the contemporary understanding of quantum mechanics based on the axiomatic study of its foundations, leads to the conclusion that contrary to widespread opinion, it is perfectly possible to formulate quantum mechanics in an entirely realistic manner according to the postulate of Einstein. We demonstrate that Bohr's episteme-logy, in which the role of experimental arrangements in the physical description is taken as a starting point, does not necessarily imply phenomenlism, but may be justifiably considered as a complementary standpoint to the realistic epistemology of Einstein, which is based on the notion of a mental construction which pictures reality.

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The famous debate between Einstein and Bohr began at the Solvay Council in 1927. The debate was about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, but also addressed the fundamental question of what the purpose and aim of a physical theory should be. Their conflicting positions were based on two diametrically opposed philosophical approaches to the fundamental problems of physics. The many books popularising quantum mechanics quite rightly place the emphasis on the problem of interpretation: they discuss the opposing positions of Einstein’s “realism” and the “Copenhagen interpretation” of which Bohr is seen as the leading protagonist.
Abstract The confrontation between Einstein and Bohr over the interpretation of quantum theory has been painted in the past as a direct conflict between realism and positivism. However, more recent attempts to uncover the philosophical positions of both Einstein and Bohr have revealed that these were not so black and white. Einstein’s realism was conditioned by the strong empiricist influence in his own early experiences as a theorist and the growing wariness that led him eventually to reject Machian positivism. His was a realism born of a sense of necessity: a belief that a realist stance is the only one that leads to productive theorizing about the physical world. Bohr’s philosophy went through some quite marked changes, principally in response to Einstein’s challenges. The father of modem atomic theory could hardly subscribe to an uncompromising positivist position that rejected the reality of atoms. But the reality of the inner workings of those atoms was, Bohr contended, beyond the reach of a knowledge founded on complementary classical concepts of waves and particles. As Einstein’s challenges became deeper and more subtle, so Bohr’s position shifted to that of a distinctive anti-realism. Add to this a rhetoric in Bohr’s speeches and published writings that insisted on the logical inevitability of the Copenhagen interpretation, that insisted on its status as the only feasible interpretation, and that countenanced no other alternative, and you have dogma in the making. Heisenberg called it ‘Kopen hagener Geist der Quantentheorie’, the Copenhagen spirit of quantum theory which, he declared in 1930, ‘has directed the entire development of modem atomic physics’. Einstein frequently referred to the Copenhagen doctrine as ‘Talmudic’.
Although Dirac rarely participated in the interpretational debates over quantum theory, it is traditionally assumed that his views were aligned with Heisenberg and Bohr in the so-called Copenhagen-Göttingen camp. However, an unpublished—and apparently unknown—lecture of Dirac's reveals that this view is mistaken; in the famous debate between Einstein and Bohr, Dirac sided with Einstein. Surprisingly, Dirac believed that quantum mechanics was not complete, that the uncertainty principle would not survive in the future physics, and that a deterministic description of the microworld would be recovered. In this paper I show how we can make sense of this unpublished lecture in the context of Dirac's broader philosophy of quantum mechanics, and how our present understanding of Dirac's philosophical views must be revised.
The 1935 paper by Einstein, Podolski and Rosen represented the culmination of a long debate that had begun soon after quantum theory was developed in the 1920s. One of the main protagonists in this discussion was Niels Bohr, a Danish physicist who worked in Copenhagen until, like so many other European scientists of his time, he became a refugee in the face of the German invasion during the Second World War. As we shall see, Bohr's views differed strongly from those of Einstein and his co-workers on a number of fundamental issues, but it was his approach to the fundamental problems of quantum physics that eventually gained general, though not universal, acceptance. Because much of Bohr's work was done in that city, his ideas and those developed from them have become known as the ‘Copenhagen interpretation’. In this chapter we shall discuss the main ideas of this approach. We shall try to appreciate its strengths as well as attempting to understand why some believe that there are important questions left unanswered.
This book gives a clear and comprehensive exposition of Niels Bohr's philosophy of physics. Bohr's ideas are of major importance, for they are the source of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics; yet they are obscure, and call for the sort of close analysis that this book provides. The book describes the historical background of the physics from which Bohr's ideas grew. The core of the book is a detailed analysis of Bohr's arguments for complementarity and of the interpretation which he put upon it. Special emphasis is placed throughout on the contrasting views of Einstein, and the great debate between Bohr and Einstein is thoroughly examined. The book traces the philosophical influences on Bohr, and unravels the realist and anti-realist strands in his thinking. Bohr's philosophy is critically assessed in the light of recent developments in the foundations of quantum physics (the work of Bell and others) and in philosophy (the realism-anti-realism debate) and it is revealed as being much more subtle and sophisticated than it is generally taken to be. While the book will be of interest to specialists, it is written in a style that will make it accessible to those who have no specialist knowledge of the relevant physics and philosophy.
The Bohr-Einstein debates of the 20th century represent the most famous intellectual conflict in the history of quantum mechanics. For three decades, Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr clashed over the completeness of quantum theory, the nature of reality, and the role of the observer. Neither convinced the other, and the debate ultimately ended in a pragmatic stalemate: the Copenhagen interpretation was adopted, and metaphysical questions were banished from physics. We apply the Category Error Detector (CED) to this historical debate to demonstrate that both physicists were committing a shared category error. They were attempting to force the invariant, deterministic structure of the Abstraction axis into the localized, probabilistic framework of the Contingency axis. They lacked the two-axis geometry required to see that they were both right, but describing different layers of the manifold. We argue that the Solvay Conferences were the exact historical inflection point where Structural Rationalism should have been born. The failure to do so resulted in a century of theoretical aporia, culminating in the current crisis of unfalsifiable models and particle phantoms.
The Bohr-Einstein debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics may be viewed as a discussion on the epistemological status of knowledge gained by physics. It is shown that in fact the advent of quantum theory has led, in a new context, to an old philosophical controversy between epistemological realism (held by Einstein) and phenomenalism (held by Bohr). An inquiry into this controversy, taking into account the contemporary understanding of quantum mechanics based on the axiomatic study of its foundations, leads to the conclusion that contrary to widespread opinion, it is perfectly possible to formulate quantum mechanics in an entirely realistic manner according to the postulate of Einstein. We demonstrate that Bohr's episteme-logy, in which the role of experimental arrangements in the physical description is taken as a starting point, does not necessarily imply phenomenlism, but may be justifiably considered as a complementary standpoint to the realistic epistemology of Einstein, which is based on the notion of a mental construction which pictures reality.